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In recent decades, there have been rapid changes in the world’s demographic structure.
Population aging is a serious problem faced by many countries in the world. The
world old-age dependency ratio, measured as the ratio of people aged 65 or above
to those aged 15-64, has increased from 10.9% to 12.6% since the beginning of the
21th century. As for the more developed regions, the old-age dependency ratio has
reached the level of 26.7% in 2015.1 The increase in the old-age dependency ratio is
a result of lower fertility rate in combination with longer life expectancy. According
to the World Bank, the fertility rate has decreased from 4.96 in 1960 to 2.45 in 2014,
and at the same time, the life expectancy at birth has increased from 52.48 to 71.46
years.2 In Europe, the fertility rate has decreased from 2.66 to 1.60 since the early
1950’s, while the life expectancy at birth has increased from 63.59 to 77.01 years and
life expectancy at age 60 has increased from 16.78 to 21.93 years.3
As people approach an advanced age, their work capacity gradually decreases and
their health condition generally is getting worse. How to support those elderly people
becomes more and more important in the world, given that both the proportion of
elderly people and their remaining life expectancy are increasing. In most developed
countries, the current existing pension systems are under pressure, and reforms are
carried out in order to face the aging society. In the developing world, related social
welfare systems are introduced. Many countries set up a state pension system (funded
or pay-as-you-go, or a mixture of the two) for their citizens as a main source of their
post-retirement income. For instance, a new rural social pension system aimed at the
whole rural population was launched in China in 2009. Not only the governments
1The data are obtained from the World Population Prospects, the 2015 Revision. The more
developed regions comprise Europe, Northern America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
2The World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN.
3Population Division of the United Nations: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Stand
ardard/Mortality/.
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are aware of the aging problem, but also the private sectors are aware of it and
take it as an opportunity to develop the old age care industry and to introduce
financial innovations. Private pension funds and annuity products are popular in
many countries. In recent decades, equity release products are being introduced to
free up the housing equity for the asset-rich-cash-poor elderly. In this thesis, we focus
on three topics out of the broad range of old-age supporting.
In Chapter 2, we analyze the sustainability of a new regulatory framework for
the Dutch pension funds. The new regulatory framework came into force in 2015,
replacing the earlier system that had existed since 2007. The Dutch pension system
consists of three pillars, namely the state pension, the collective pension schemes,
and the individual pension products. As a result of the financial crisis, the prolonged
low interest rate period and the aging population, the second pillar of the pension
system has been under pressure, reflected by underfunding of the pension funds.
The underfunding triggered recovery measures, and questions were raised concerning
the fairness and effectiveness of that system. Thus, a revision, known as the new
Financial Assessment Framework (abbreviated “nFTK” in Dutch), was introduced.
In this chapter, we carry out an analysis of the new framework based on a simulation
study, focusing on economic scenarios and leaving aside the possible consequences
of unanticipated changes in mortality. We use a stylized pension fund that has the
same demographic structure as the Dutch population. The fund follows a fixed-
mix investment policy and keeps contributions constant, except when reductions are
permitted under the nFTK rules. Economic scenarios are generated by a VAR model.
We find that although average funding ratios are high, fully wage-indexed pensions are
still achieved in only approximately 60% of the scenarios. Under the best scenarios,
the policy funding ratio can soar to 700% while under the worst scenarios, replacement
ratios can drop to under 40%. Under those circumstances, the nFTK will probably
be changed. Therefore, it fails to make the contract complete. There is a “reverse
Ponzi ” effect in the system. The nFTK is slower in giving indexation than cutting
benefits, therefore it tends to shift wealth to the future indefinitely. The pension
fund will in most scenarios become rich; however, the participants cannot benefit
from the high policy funding ratio. Given that, the nFTK encourages a conservative
investment policy. The participants cannot take advantage of the high return from a
riskier investment, but they have to bear the losses. Previous studies of the regulatory
system for Dutch collective pension funds include Bikker and Vlaar (2007), van Rooij
et al. (2008), Nijman et al. (2013), and van Stalborch (2012). Those studies focus
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on the consequences and intergenerational fairness of the earlier system. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper that carries out an extensive analysis of the nFTK.
Chapter 3 studies reverse mortgage products. For elderly people, housing equity
takes up a large proportion of their accumulated wealth. A reverse mortgage is one
of the products available on the market that allow elderly homeowners to convert
(part of) the value of their house value into cash without repayment, while staying
in their home (until death or permanently moving out of the home due to other rea-
sons). Most of the existing reverse mortgage products include a guarantee that the
loan value cannot exceed the house value when the contract ends, which is called the
No-Negative-Equity-Guarantee (NNEG). Previous studies on reverse mortgage typi-
cally consider from three different aspects. The first aspect is focusing on the market
volume of the product. The demand for reverse mortgages was very small when the
product was first introduced (Venti, Wise, 1991), and it began to expand since the
New Millennium (Chou et al., 2006, Shan, 2011). The second aspect concerns the
reason of the low demand. Bequest motives, adverse selection and moral hazard, as
well as the complexity of the product all play a role in reducing the market volume
(Davidoff, 2010, Michelangeli, 2008, Chou et al., 2006, Davidoff et al., 2015). The
third aspect of the literature is focusing on the pricing and risk analysis of the product.
Longevity risks, house price risks and the price of the NNEG are all heavily discussed
(Wang et al., 2008, Li et al., 2010, Yang et al., 2011, Chen et al., 2010, Lee, 2012,
Shao et al., 2015, Ji et al., 2012.). Although different models, which are potentially
misspecified, have been developed to price the NNEG, model risk is typically not in-
vestigated. We evaluate the cash flows of different reverse mortgage designs and the
implied value of the embedded NNEG, taking into account model risk. We compare
the values of the NNEG and their sensitivities to different parameters generated from
two popular models in the literature for the house price process, i.e., the Geometric
Brownian Motion model and the VAR model. We calibrate the models using prices
of regular mortgages and determine the corresponding price ranges for reverse mort-
gages. We find quite substantial price ranges for both models, indicating that there is
substantial model risk in pricing the NNEG in reverse mortgage products. Moreover,
the degree of model risk is larger in the VAR model than in the GBM model. Among
the different parameters that affect the price of the NNEG, we find that it is most
sensitive to the probability distribution of the future house price, which is reflected by
the dividend rate in the GBM model and by the house price increase rate in the VAR
model. With considerable model risk, reverse mortgage providers might be reluctant
3
to provide the product or they may charge a higher premium to compensate their
risk. This might keep some potential buyers out of the market.
In chapter 4, we investigate the impact of a newly introduced rural pension system
in China. In 2009, the Chinese Government introduced the New Rural Social Pension
Insurance program (NRSPI). The program was extended to nationwide scale in 2012.
This chapter investigates the effect of the NRSPI on the retirement and old-age labor
supply pattern in China using two-wave nationwide survey data. After using instru-
mental variables to control for the endogenous bias, we find that receiving pension
benefits from the NRSPI can substantially increase the likelihood of retirement and
decrease the number of working hours for females, even though the amount of pension
benefits of the NRSPI is far below the minimum cost of living. We further decompose
the labor supply into agricultural labor supply and non-agricultural labor supply, and
find that most of the decrease in labor supply is from agricultural labor supply. The
NRSPI program is a quite unique social security program, given its modest pension
benefit and the pure income effect brought by the program. Previous studies that
show the pension systems shift people’s retirement behavior by providing economic
incentives focused on pension systems providing the main income for the elderly in-
volved (Gruber and Wise, 2008). Contrarily, the basic pension benefit of the NRSPI
program is far below the minimum cost of living. Thus, this pension program gives us
a chance to study whether and, if so, to what extent people respond to such a small
amount of money. Besides, the pension benefits from the NRSPI program are not con-
tingent on the work status. Pensioners can continue to work while receiving pension
benefits; thus, joining the pension program generates a pure income effect. Although
there are many papers that discuss the relation between social security programs and
the retirement decision, this study helps us understand the retirement behavior un-
der a unique social security program. This study also contributes to the literature
regarding the impact of non-financial factors by investigating the role played by the
regional characteristics in the retirement decision. We find that rural dwellers be-
have substantially differently in terms of retirement pattern from people living in the
cities, even after controlling for financial situation, demographic background, family
structure and so on.
In terms of methodology, both simulation and estimation methods are used in this
thesis. There is some overlap in the methodology between chapter 2 and chapter 3. In
both chapters, we set up a Vector-Auto-Regression (VAR) model to derive the term
structure of interest rates, to capture the co-movement of different macro-economic
variables, and to simulate future economic scenarios. In chapter 3, we also use a GBM
4
model to compute the price of the reverse mortgage product as a comparison to the
VAR model. The house price in the GBM model is assumed to follow a Geometric
Brownian Motion and the NNEG is priced as a Black-Scholes put option on the net
house price. Chapter 4 is an empirical study; an Instrumental Variable Panel Data
model is used to analyze the effect of the NRSPI program on labor supply decision.
The instrumental variable approach is adopted to solve the endogeneity problem, and
a panel data model is used for better control of the individual effect.
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Chapter 2
An Evaluation of the nFTK
2.1 Introduction
In 2007, the Dutch government replaced the obsolete Pension and Savings Funds Act
(Pensioen- en Spaarfondsenwet), which dated from 1952, with a new Pension Act.
The new law was innovative in its use of funding ratios based on market value as
an indicator of the financial health of collective pension funds. In the Netherlands,
these funds play a very important role in providing retirement income, with a total
asset value in 2014 of more than 160% of Dutch GDP. As a result of the financial
crisis of 2008 and the ensuing prolonged period of low interest rates, however, the
recovery measures triggered by underfunding under the terms of the new law quickly
became a reality. Millions of retirees were affected by reductions in their nominal
benefits, and many questions were raised concerning the fairness and effectiveness
of the existing regulatory framework. While the debate continues with regard to
restructuring retirement income provision systems, a revision of the Pension Act
was introduced in 2015. The new law is commonly known as the “new Financial
Assessment Framework” (nieuw Financieel Toetsingskader, or nFTK). Modifications
with respect to the 2007 FTK include the following: replacing the funding ratio
with an averaged version, called the “policy funding ratio”; placing less emphasis on
the contributions level as an instrument for recovery; and tightening the conditions
under which indexation of benefits may be applied. These modifications are intended
to lead to a system that is more sustainable and maintains a better balance between
generations.
We carry out an investigation of the performance of the nFTK over a fifty-year
horizon, given a stylized pension fund combined with specific choices in terms of the
contribution and investment policies and using a set of model-based scenarios. In
particular, we focus on the evolution of the funding ratio and the indexation ratio
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over this time horizon. The funding ratio is defined as the ratio of the fund’s assets
to its liabilities. We define the indexation ratio as the ratio of the actual pension
entitlements to the pension entitlements under full indexation. Thus, the indexation
ratio is equivalent to the replacement rate for pensioners. And full indexation means
full wage indexation. Since using the replacement rate for workers is not appropriate,
we use the indexation ratio instead of the replacement rate to quantify the extent
to which the pension system can provide fully indexed pension entitlements for both
workers and retirees.
The stylized pension fund in our study has the same demographic characteristics
as the Dutch population as a whole. We assume that the fund keeps contributions
at a constant level, unless reductions are allowed under the nFTK. Raising contri-
butions would be required under the nFTK in situations in which newly accrued
rights are expensive, in other words, during prolonged periods of low interest rates.
Since we calibrate interest data from 1990 on, however, such scenarios hardly occur
in our scenario set. Investment policy under the nFTK is not specified beyond the
‘prudent person’ rule. For the purposes of the simulation study, we assume that our
stylized pension fund follows a simple fixed-mix policy, with 35% in stocks and 65%
in ten-year bonds; no separate interest rate hedge is assumed beyond the protection
already offered by the bond portfolio. In our scenario set, we concentrate on economic
risks, leaving longevity risks aside. Scenarios are generated by a vector autoregressive
(VAR) model that accounts for the variability in price inflation, wage inflation, stock
returns, and long-term and short-term interest rates. The use of scenario sets to per-
form an analysis like we do is well established; early references on this methodology
include papers by Wilkie (1984, 1995), Mulvey and Thorlacius (1998), and Boender
(1997, 1998).
The model we use to generate the scenario set is calibrated on equity data, interest
rate, and inflation data starting from 1990. Therefore, starting from the current low
interest rate, interest rates rise on average to levels that are typical of the last 25 years,
and there is a substantial equity premium. As a result, we find many scenarios in
which funding ratios are high. Nevertheless, the goal of full wage indexation is reached
in only about 60% of the scenarios, even on a fifty-year horizon. On the downside,
we find that, in bad scenarios (5% quantile), pension benefits fall far behind the level
corresponding to full indexation; indexation ratios on a fifty-year horizon reach levels
as low as 40%. Based on these outcomes, we conclude that, at least given our stylized
pension fund and chosen contribution and investment strategy, improvements might
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still be needed in the new regulatory framework to deal with the extreme outcomes
in a substantial fraction of the scenarios.1
Earlier asset-liability studies for pension funds have been conducted by, for in-
stance, Bosch-Pŕıncep et al. (2002) and by Dempster et al. (2003). Shortly after the
introduction of the Dutch FTK in 2007, a simulation study of the consequences of the
new system was undertaken by Bikker and Vlaar (2007). Subsequent studies of the
regulatory system for Dutch collective pension funds and proposed modifications to
it include those by van Rooij et al. (2008), Nijman et al. (2013), and van Stalborch
(2012). These studies partly emphasize aspects not covered here, such as intergen-
erational fairness on a market value basis. The policy dilemmas for pension funds
under a regulatory regime based on market valuation of nominal liabilities have been
discussed by Kortleve and Ponds (2009). These dilemmas continue to exist under the
nFTK; pension funds may look for investment policies that modify the consequences
of the system, while balancing the interests of different generations. In the present
study, however, we do not attempt to formulate such policies; instead, we assume a
fixed-mix investment plan. This allows us to evaluate the performance of the nFTK
with respect to a simple but reasonable investment policy.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2.2, we
describe our stylized pension fund. In particular, we state our assumptions concerning
the choices that the stylized fund makes in various options left open by the nFTK.
Section 2.3 describes the economic model from which our scenario set is generated.
The main results follow in Section 2.4. We report statistics concerning the distribution
of the indexation ratio and the funding ratio, and we also discuss the nature of the
relationship of these quantities to economic determinants such as asset returns and
wage inflation. In Section 2.5, we give some design recommendations. Finally, our
conclusions are presented in Section 2.6. Additional information, including technical
details, can be found in the appendix.
2.2 An Implementation of the nFTK
2.2.1 Stylized Pension Fund Set-up
In this section, we set up a stylized pension fund to facilitate the analysis of the nFTK.
The appendix, to which we shall occasionally refer, contains the technical details. We
assume our stylized pension fund covers all of the Dutch population over the age
1Alternatively, the pension fund might change its contribution and/or investment policies in
extreme outcomes. We do not investigate this alternative in this paper.
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of 25. The demographic structure of our pension fund is taken directly from the
real Dutch demographic structure for 2009, as obtained from the Human Mortality
Database.2 The maximum attainable age is 110, and the minimum age in this dataset
is 0. We assume a constant influx of newborns every year, equal to the generation
of newborns in 2009, which allows us to define an open fund with a workforce influx
each year. The reason for choosing an open fund rather than a closed fund is that
an open fund is more stable in terms of demographic structure. Each year, a new
generation of 25-year-olds enters into our pension system. At the same time, there are
outflows caused by the deaths of participants. The number of survivals is assumed to
evolve according to the most recent forecast mortality table provided by the Dutch
Koninklijk Actuarieel Genootschap (Royal Actuarial Society). This mortality table
predicts the mortality rates for each age group through the year 2184. The maximum
attainable age in the mortality table is 120, but in the population size data, it is 110
years old. We take the lower limit as the maximum attainable age in our study. We
work with gender-neutral mortality rates, computed as the average of the male and
female mortality rates.
One of the cash inflows for the pension fund is the contributions made by workers.
Total contributions are determined by three factors, namely the pension base, the
number of workers in the pension fund, and the individual pension contributions.
The pension base of each working generation is the wage minus the franchise (a
deduction made in view of the existence of the state pension). The individual pension
contribution is defined as a fraction of the pension base. We assume that this fraction
will be kept constant at a level that is fixed at the beginning of the simulation,
except when a reduction is allowed by the nFTK. The amount for the total annual
contributions made by each worker is defined as the individual pension contribution
times the worker’s pension base; the total contribution is the sum of the individual
contributions of all workers.
The cash outflow of the pension fund consists of the pension benefits paid to
retirees. We consider only payments to retirees and leave additional payments (e.g., to
the spouses of deceased participants) out of consideration. To determine the pension
payment, we need the pension entitlements of each retired generation, in addition
to the number of retirees. The pension entitlements for each generation are built
up during their working life. When a new generation comes into the pension fund,
the members of that generation will build up a pension entitlement that is a certain
fraction of the pension base in that year. Following the latest revision of pension
2http://www.mortality.org.
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rules, this fraction has been set at 1.875%. Before retirement, the pension entitlement
will first be indexed and then increased by the pension entitlements accrued in that
year. After retirement, there is no further accrual, but indexation may still take
place. Given the actual pension entitlements, the total pension payments paid at the
beginning of the period is the sum of the pension entitlements for all retirees.
Given the cash outflow and inflow of the pension fund, we can determine the
assets at hand. At the beginning of each period, pension payments are made, and
at the end of each period, pension contributions are received. We assume that the
stylized pension fund invests its assets in a portfolio consisting of 65% bonds and
35% stocks. Therefore, the pension assets at the beginning of each period will be
the assets of the previous period, after deduction of pension payments, plus the
proceeds of investments and pension contributions. We do not assume any recovery
contributions from a sponsor.
The stylized pension fund applies indexation according to a policy ladder, as is
usual for Dutch collective pension funds, within the restrictions set by the nFTK.
Whether or not full or partial indexation occurs depends on the financial status of
the fund. Although one might argue that the option value of conditional indexation
should be taken into account when determining the market value of liabilities, in
practice the value of liabilities is computed from unconditional liabilities only (i.e.,
conditional indexation is not taken into account). Based on the current pension en-
titlements for each generation, we can project current and future pension payments.
The value of the liabilities is the discounted value of those pension payments. Dis-
counting takes place on the basis of the current term structure of interest rates for
non-defaultable bonds, extended by an Ultimate Forward Rate (UFR). The scenarios
generated by our economic model include possible future term structures and al-
low computation of future UFRs in a manner recommended by the UFR Committee
(2013) (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4 in the appendix for details).
The funding ratio is defined as the ratio of the current value of assets to the
current value of liabilities. In the proposed revision of the law, a new concept is
being introduced, called the Policy Funding Ratio (beleidsdekkingsgraad). The Policy
Funding Ratio (PFR) is defined as the 12-month moving average of the actual funding
ratio. Because our simulation is on an annual basis, we define the PFR as the average
of the current actual funding ratio and the funding ratio of the previous year. The
initial PFR in our simulation exercise is set at 104.3%, which not only reflects the
current situation of low funding ratios, but also satisfies the lower bound given by
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the Minimum Required Funding Ratio (MRFR) (see Section 2.3).3
2.2.2 Determining the Individual Pension Contributions
Individual pension contributions are set at the beginning of the simulation and will
not be raised above the initial level under any scenario. With this assumption, we can
see whether the pension fund can meet its goal of providing full indexation without
raising contributions. To calculate this contribution, we choose a term-structure-based
pension contribution with cushioning, among the various options left open by the
regulatory requirements. Cushioning is based on the average of the term structures
in the past ten years.4 The individual pension contribution is set such that the
total pension contributions made by all workers in a year is equal to the Required
Funding Ratio (see next section) times the present value (according to the averaged
term structure) of the accrued pension entitlements of those workers within that year.
This individual pension contribution in our model turns out to be 16.33%.
2.2.3 Recovery, Indexation, and Repair Policies
Under the nFTK, the behavior of pension funds in various possible states of financial
health (as measured by the Policy Funding Ratio) is prescribed in considerable detail.
There are five different situations that can arise, which are illustrated graphically in
Figure 2.1. The determination as to which situation applies is related to a set of
critical levels for the PFR (cf. Table 2.1).
The first of these critical levels is the Minimum Required Funding Ratio, which
determines whether the immediate recovery plan needs to be implemented. We take
MRFR = 104.3%, in accordance with existing regulations. When the PFR drops
below the MRFR for five consecutive years, an immediate recovery plan is called for.
This consists of a reduction in all pension entitlements. The reduction factor is not
completely prescribed in the nFTK; we choose a factor such that after the recovery
plan, the maximum of the PFR and the actual funding ratio would be equal to the
MRFR. So, there is no reduction in pension entitlements when the current PFR is
above the MRFR, nor when the current actual funding ratio is above MRFR, while
3Actually, the value of 104.3% was chosen more or less arbitrarily (but to some extent reflects
the current low values of the funding ratios). Since we work on a long time horizon, the effect of the
initial PFR is not likely to be large.
4The ten-year averaged term structure is higher than the current term structure. This means
that applying cushioning will result in lower pension contributions than without cushioning. From
a longer term perspective, also assuming that the past is representative for the future, applying
cushioning to determine pension contributions seems plausible.
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Figure 2.1: At the beginning of each period, the Policy Funding Ratio (PFR) is given.
Depending on its value, the pension fund will decide which policies to implement. If
the PFR has been below the Minimum Required Funding Ratio (MRFR) for five
consecutive years, an immediate recovery plan has to be implemented. In this case,
pension entitlements for current and future retirees will be cut immediately. The
liabilities will be recomputed given the reduced pension entitlements. If the PFR
is below the Required Funding Ratio (RFR), a ten-year recovery plan has to be
implemented. The implementation of the ten-year recovery plan guarantees a recovery
of at least 10% during the first year. If the PFR is larger than 110%, indexation
may be possible. If the PFR exceeds both the RFR and the Full Indexation Funding
Ratio (FIFR), then repair policies may be implemented. Finally, pension contribution
reductions may be possible when full indexation has been given during ten consecutive
years, pension entitlements are equal to the full indexation pension entitlements, and
the PFR is larger than the lower bound for pension contribution reductions.
PFR Policy Funding Ratio
MFR Minimum Required Funding Ratio
RFR Required Funding Ratio
IFR Indexation Funding Ratio
(lower bound for indexation)
FIFR Full Indexation Funding Ratio
(lower bound for full indexation)
RIFR Reduction Indexation Funding Ratio
(lower bound for pension contribution reduction)
Table 2.1: Abbreviations
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the PFR is below MRFR, as permitted by the nFTK.5If neither of these conditions
holds, however, pension entitlements will be reduced. If the previous funding ratio
is smaller than the MRFR, we choose a reduction factor to bring the current actual
funding ratio back to the MRFR; otherwise, we make the PFR equal to the MRFR.
The new liabilities and pension entitlements will then replace the old ones in the
future calculation and simulation. This results in a lower value for the indexation
ratio, since the numerator of this ratio will become smaller, while the denominator
remains unaffected.
The second critical level is the Required Funding Ratio. It should be set such
that, with a probability of 97.5%, next year’s actual funding ratio is at least equal
to one. We use its current average value of 126.6% in the simulation, which we
assume to remain constant over the fifty-year time horizon. As soon as the PFR is
below the RFR, a recovery plan has to be implemented, which should result in the
PFR recovering to at least the level of the RFR in no more than ten years, with
at least 10% recovery in the first year, using the values of the expected returns and
inflation according to the “Advies Commissie Parameters” (Parameters Committee
Recommendations, ACP).6 The ten-year recovery plan includes a series of adjustments
which may apply to indexation, pension contributions, and pension entitlements. We
choose a plan in which pension contributions are not modified. We first try to find
an indexation factor to make the increase in the PFR equal to the desired increase
of 10% in the gap between the RFR and the PFR, without any reduction in pension
entitlements. If zero indexation by itself is not sufficient, then we supplement this
with a reduction factor that will be applied to pension entitlements to increase the
PFR by the desired amount. We calculate the required forward rates using the yield
curve provided by our model.
The third critical level is the lower bound for indexation, the Indexation Funding
Ratio (IFR). Its value is not prescribed in the proposed Pension Act but is subject
to lower-level regulation; it has been announced that the IFR will be set at 110%.
Partial (but not necessarily full) indexation will only be allowed if the PFR is higher
than the IFR. The nFTK framework allows pension funds to use an indexation target
in either absolute or relative terms with respect to a given index, such as wage or price
inflation. We use a relative indexation target with respect to wage inflation. Since
IFR is less than RFR for our stylized fund, the fund could provide indexation, but at
5In the latest revision of the law, this rule has been further refined; this modification has not




the same time it is constrained by the recovery rules. When there are no constraints
from recovery, indexation is determined by the rule that after pension payments at
the beginning of the period have been made, the resulting funding ratio must be
equal to at least the IFR. The funding ratio is computed under the assumptions
that indexation is applied to the present and future periods based on expected wage
inflation and that liabilities are discounted on the basis of the Expected Return on
Stocks (ERS) using the ACP parameter values. The indexation factor is set as high
as possible given this rule, but not higher than the current wage inflation. When
the fund is in recovery, we use a lower indexation factor, determined by the recovery
rules.
The fourth critical level is the lower bound for full indexation (denoted by FIFR
for “Full Indexation Funding Ratio”). It is the funding ratio that corresponds to
the situation in which full indexation according to expected wage inflation (using the
ACP parameter value) is applied to present and future years. This lower bound plays
a role when pension entitlements are lower than the fully indexed pension entitlement
(i.e., the pension entitlements under the assumption of full indexation and no cuts;
see Equation (2.4) in the appendix). If, after indexation, we still have a PFR that
exceeds the RFR and the FIFR, repair policies may be implemented. Repair policies
are intended to decrease (or even close) the gap between the actual and fully indexed
pension entitlements. When the conditions for a repair policy are satisfied, 20% of
the excess funds may be used to reduce the gap between pension entitlements and
fully indexed pension entitlements. However, the repair should be limited such that
the funding ratio after application of the repair policy is still at least as large as the
maximum of the RFR and the FIFR.
The fifth and highest critical level is the Reduction Indexation Funding Ratio
(RIFR), the lower bound for a reduction in pension contributions set by the pension
fund. We set it equal to the RFR. This criterion is relevant for pension contribution
reduction policies. When the PFR is at least equal to the lower bound for pension
contribution reduction (RIFR), full indexation has taken place in the previous ten
years, and pension entitlements are at the same level as the fully indexed pension
entitlements for all generations, then there can be an immediate reduction in pension
contributions. We continue to use the term-structure-based pension contribution.
The pension contribution is reduced to a level under which the resulting funding
ratio is equal to RIFR.
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2.3 Economic Setting
We want to investigate the performance of the nFTK in different economic situations.
To do so, we want to simulate the PFR, indexation ratios, and pension entitlements
for a period of fifty years and examine the relationships between the indexation ratio,
PFR, asset return, and wage inflation. We use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model
to generate economic scenarios and determine the term structure of interest rate. We
assume that prices for all of the assets in the economy are determined by a state
vector xt which follows a VAR process in the form of
xt+1 = α + Γxt + Σεt+1 (2.1)
where εt+1
i.i.d∼ N(0n×1, In×n). We can use the VAR model to generate many future
scenarios; for each scenario, a model-based affine term structure can be determined.
Our model is a discrete time model, in the spirit of the continuous time model of
Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2010). We use monthly data to estimate the VAR
model. Time-to-maturity is measured in half years.
The set of common factors xt consists of five components (n = 5), which are
the German annualized zero-coupon federal securities rate with remaining time to
maturity of 0.5 years; the Dutch inflation rate; the MSCI world stock return in excess
of the six-month rate (i.e., in excess of the first component); the German ten-year zero-
coupon federal securities yield spread; and the Dutch nominal wage inflation rate. The
six-month rate and the ten-year rate are downloaded from Deutsche Bundesbank.7
Both series are available from September 1972. The inflation rate is derived from
the Netherlands consumer price index, which is obtained from Datastream. Nominal
wage inflation is derived from the CAO wage index, also obtained from Datastream.
The CAO wage index is available starting from January 1990; consequently, taking
into account that time to maturity is measured in half years, wage inflation is available
from July 1990. The excess stock return is derived from the MSCI world total return
stock index downloaded from Datastream. The MSCI world total return index has
been available since 1969. Table 2.2 shows the names and meanings of each variable
used in the VAR model; Table 2.3 presents the sample statistics; and Figure 2.2 plots
the development of each variable since the initial date.
In the estimation, we only use data from July 1990 to March 2014. First, this
is because most variables, such as inflation, the short rate, and the ten-year rate,




y(1) Annualized six-month zero-coupon federal security rate
cpi Inflation
rs − y(1) Stock return premium
y(20) − y(1) Ten-year zero-coupon federal security yield spread
wage Nominal wage inflation
Table 2.2: Symbols and Meanings of Variables
average std.dev minimum maximum
y(1) 3.48% 2.52% -0.06% 9.63%
cpi 2.20% 1.35% -2.04% 6.25%
rs − y(1) 2.86% 28.62% -118.71% 67.41%
y(20) − y(1) 1.40% 1.19% -1.76% 3.59%
wage 2.29% 1.30% 0.18% 6.23%
Table 2.3: Sample Statistics for the State Variables
(a) Inflation (b) MSCI Return (c) Wage Inflation
(d) Short Rate (e) Ten-year rate (f) MSCI
Figure 2.2: Historical Data
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we see in Figure 2.2a that inflation was very volatile in the 1970s and 1980s. The
second reason for this is that wage inflation data is only available since July 1990. We
use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the coefficients of the VAR model.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.4. Next, we calibrate the price of risk
to fit an affine term structure to the observed term structures of interest rates. A
detailed description of this calibration can be found in the appendix.
α Γ
y(1) 0.0044 0.9602 -0.0237 0.0013 -0.1048 -0.0465
0.0012 0.0178 0.0259 0.0011 0.0368 0.0298
cpi 0.0027 0.0006 0.7680 0.0029 -0.0289 0.1194
0.0018 0.0255 0.0370 0.0016 0.0526 0.0426
rs − y(1) 0.0269 0.3727 -1.3627 0.8635 0.7079 -0.6779
0.0321 0.4638 0.6747 0.0289 0.9587 0.7762
y(20) − y(1) 0.0008 -0.0090 -0.0135 -0.0009 0.9698 0.0154
0.0006 0.0082 0.0120 0.0005 0.0170 0.0138
wage 0.0059 0.0018 -0.0559 0.0009 -0.1177 0.8672
0.0013 0.0194 0.0281 0.0012 0.0400 0.0324
Σ
y(1) 0.0052 0 0 0 0
cpi 0.0019 0.0072 0 0 0
rs − y(1) -0.0120 0.0071 0.1356 0 0
y(20) − y(1) -0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 0.0024 0
wage 0.0017 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0053
Table 2.4: The VAR model is described by equation (2.1). The variables in the
first column are the state variables. In the upper panel of this table, the estimated
coefficients of α and Γ are presented, with the corresponding standard errors in italics.
In the lower panel of this table the estimated coefficients of Σ are presented.
With the estimated VAR model, we can simulate economic scenarios for future
interest rates, stock returns, price inflation, and wage inflation. The starting values
of the simulation are the average of the last year’s observations. Using the simulated
term structures, we can derive the bond returns and discount factors needed for
calculating pension liabilities. Given the bond and stock returns, the pension fund’s
asset returns can be determined as a weighted average of the bond returns and the
stock returns, with 65% invested in bonds (i.e., zero-coupon bonds with a maturity
of ten years) and 35% in stocks (with returns given by rs). Assuming the initial wage
base is 1, the wage inflation gives us enough information to simulate the wage base
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(a) Pension fund’s asset returns (b) Nominal wage inflation
Figure 2.3: Quantiles of the pension fund’s average annual asset returns (left panel)
and average nominal wage inflation (right panel)
for fifty future years, and the full indexation pension entitlements can thus also be
determined. The number of workers and number of retirees for each generation are
fully determined by the population distribution of the pension fund and the 2014
cohort life table. With this information, we can update the pension assets, liabilities,
pension entitlements for each generation, actual funding ratio, and PFR at each
period in each path.
To illustrate the model outcomes, Figure 2.3 shows the development over time of
the quantiles of two of the main drivers determining outcomes, namely the average
(across time) of the pension fund’s annual asset returns (Panel [a]) and the average
(across time) of the nominal wage inflation (Panel [b]). As the figure shows, in most
scenarios the pension fund’s average annual asset returns at the time horizon (i.e.,
fifty years from now) is between 3% and 8%, and the average nominal wage inflation
is between 1.6% and 2.6%.
As the main measure of success of a pension scheme, we use the indexation ratio8 in
this paper. We define the indexation ratio for a given generation as the ratio of actual
pension entitlements (incorporating the cumulative effects of conditional indexation)
to fully indexed entitlements, computed cumulatively from the start of a working
career.9 In the case of retired generations, the indexation ratio is defined as the
ratio of paid-out benefits with respect to the benefits that would have been received
if full indexation had been applied throughout the generation’s participation in the
8We use this term rather than “pension result” in view of the fact that several different definitions
of that notion have been given in the literature.
9See Equation (2.5) in the appendix. We exclude negative indexation due to negative wage
inflation.
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pension scheme. Thus, it is equivalent to the replacement ratio for those generations.
Table 2.5 presents, at a time horizon of fifty years from now, the correlations between
the indexation ratios of the cohorts in age groups 25, 45, and 67 at the start of the
simulation, the PFR, the pension fund’s average annual asset returns (“return index”,
abbreviated RI), and the average wage inflation (“wage”).10 The correlation between
the indexation ratios of the different cohorts is close to one, indicating that in the
long run, there will only be minor differences between the cohorts in terms of their
indexation ratios. There is a positive correlation around 0.51 between the RI and
the indexation ratios and a positive correlation around 0.35 between the indexation
ratios and the PFR. The correlation between the PFR and the RI is high, around
0.91. We find a negative correlation around −0.21 between wage inflation and the
indexation ratios and PFR. Finally, the correlation between the two main drivers, RI
and wage inflation, is around −0.09. This negative correlation is of the same order
of magnitude as the negative correlation we observe in-sample between the pension
fund’s annual asset returns and annual wage inflation (where both are not averaged
in-sample), namely around −0.14.
Figure 2.4 plots the wage inflation against the RI at the time horizon. The figure
includes the conditional 5% quantile, the conditional median, and the conditional
mean, the latter together with 95% uniform confidence bands, of the wage inflation,
conditional on the return index.11 As the figure illustrates, the negative correlation
of around 0.09 corresponds to a slightly negative linear relationship between the wage
base and the RI. This suggests, according to the model outcomes, that the scenarios
with a high value of RI are not necessarily the scenarios where a high value is needed
for wage indexation, and, similarly, the scenarios with a low value of RI are not
necessarily the scenarios with a lower need for wage indexation.
2.4 Evaluation of the nFTK
In this section, we use our stylized pension fund to evaluate the nFTK, taking the
contribution and investment policies of the pension fund as given. We focus on the
10At the time horizon, the generation whose current age is 67 years does not exist anymore in our
model. However, the model allows us to calculate the indexation ratios that would apply to this
generation.
11More precisely, the figure shows nonparametric Kernel estimates of Med(w|r = r),
Quant0.05(w|r = r), and E(w|r = r), for different values of r, with w standing for the random
wage inflation per year and r standing for the random return on the index per year, both mea-
sured at the time horizon. The estimates are calculated based on the scenarios. The estimates of
E(w|r = r) are supplemented with 95% uniform confidence bands.
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Ind 25 Ind 45 Ind 67 PFR RI wage
1 99.3% 99.2% 35.3% 50.5% −21.0%
99.3% 1 100.0% 35.4% 50.9% −20.7%
99.2% 100.0% 1 35.3% 50.9% −20.7%
35.3% 35.4% 35.3% 1 90.7% −21.1%
50.5% 50.9% 50.9% 90.7% 1 −9.3%
−21.0% −20.7% −20.7% −21.1% −9.3% 1
Table 2.5: The correlation matrix at the time horizon is shown for the indexation
ratios of the current 25-year-olds (Ind 25), 45-year-olds (Ind 45), and 67-year-olds
(Ind 67), the policy funding ratio (PFR), the pension fund’s average annual asset
returns (“return index”, abbreviated RI), and the average wage inflation (“wage”).
The table is based on all paths at the fifty-year horizon.
Figure 2.4: Wage inflation in relation to the pension fund’s asset return.
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pension fund’s real ambition, which we assume to be reflected in fully indexed pension
entitlements. The actual pension entitlements might be less than the fully indexed
entitlements. Therefore, we quantify the real ambition in terms of the indexation
ratio, which we define as the ratio of the actual pension entitlements to the fully
indexed pension entitlements (see previous section). We take a long-term perspective,
a time horizon of fifty years. We investigate to what extent the pension fund will be
able to fulfill its real ambition at the time horizon, and, if so, whether this ambition
can be fulfilled without overfunding. We use the economic setting described in the
previous section. In particular, we assume that pension contributions will be kept
constant, even under less favorable circumstances, and we assume that the pension
fund’s asset portfolio composition (i.e., 65% bonds and 35% stock) will also be kept
constant over time, irrespective of the economic circumstances. Our study therefore
shows the effects of the regulatory framework on a pension fund that follows such a
relatively simple policy.
Figures 2.5 shows the development over time of the quantiles of the resulting
indexation ratios for the three age cohorts 25-years-old (Panel [a]), 45-years-old
(Panel [b]), and 67-years-old (Panel [c]) at the start of the simulations.12 Figure 2.6
shows the corresponding quantiles of the resulting evolution of the PFR up to the
time horizon. Table 2.6 gives the exact percentages of underfunding and overfunding
at various horizons. In the last column of Table 2.6, we also present the percentages of
the simulations in which the indexation ratios for all generations still alive are equal
to one for different future years.
The movement of the 5% and 95% quantile of Figure 2.6 shows that the downside
of the PFR is quite stable but the upside can soar up to more than 700% in fifty
years. It reflects the asymmetry of the system design. When the PFR is very low,
an immediate cut in the pension entitlements will bring the PFR back, resulting in a
stable PFR in the downside. When the PFR is very high, however, many criteria have
to be met to give full indexation, raise pension entitlement, and cut contributions.
The pension fund is restricted in the possibilities to share the built up wealth with the
pension participants. As a consequence, wealth is shifted to the future indefinitely.
The wealthy pension fund also benefits from our assumptions of the term structure
and the asset returns. The average term structure of interest rates generated from
our model is higher than the current term structure. As shown in Figure 2.7, the
PFR is positively related to the interest rates. However, the effect of interest rate on
the PFR is not as large as one might think. For instance, the PFR in the median
12See Footnote 10.
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(a) Current 25-year-olds. (b) Current 45-year-olds.
(c) Current 67-year-olds.
Figure 2.5: Quantiles of the indexation ratios of the current 25-year-olds (Panel [a]),
45-year-olds (Panel [b]), and 67-year-olds (Panel [c]).
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Figure 2.6: Quantiles of the Policy Funding Ratio (PFR).
case only increases by around 0.13 if the one-year rate increases from 0% to 2%. As
shown in Figure 2.10, the PFR is positively related to the asset return, as well. To
achieve the RFR in the median case, an asset return of 4.5% is required. Panel [a] of
Figure 2.3 shows that the median asset return is more than 5% in our model.
The 5% quantile in Panel (a) of Figure 2.5 shows that the indexation ratio for
the generation whose current age is 25 can decrease to less than 50% at around
retirement age in at least 5% of the scenarios. Similarly, the 5% quantiles of Panels
(b) and (c) of Figure 2.5 show that the indexation ratio for the generation whose
current age is 45 or 67 can decrease to less than 50% within between 25 to 30 years in
at least 5% of the scenarios. Such low indexation ratios are a result of less-than-full
indexation and pension entitlement cuts, under the assumptions (which we make)
that pension contributions are kept constant even under less favorable circumstances
and the pension fund’s asset portfolio composition is kept constant over time.
In the median case, the indexation ratio equals one in all three cases. In fact,
full indexation at the end of the simulations occurs in close to 60% of the scenarios
(see last column of Table 2.6), which also means that in around 40% of the scenarios,
the real ambition of an indexation ratio equal to one is not achieved. To clarify the
outcomes, we present in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 the indexation ratios for the cohorts of
current 25-year-olds (Panel (a)) and current 45-year-olds (Panel (b)) at the time hori-
zon in relation to the PFR (Figure 2.8) and the pension fund’s average annual asset
returns (Figure 2.9).13 The figures include the conditional 5% quantile, the condi-
13We do not include the graph for the current 67-year-olds since that generation will no longer
exist in our model at the time horizon. See also Footnote 10.
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Year PFR<100% PFR<104.3% PFR>110% PFR>126.66% PFR>150% Full Ind. Ratio
1 15.1% 34.4% 34.2% 0.9% 0.0% -
2 12.5% 17.7% 71.4% 30.4% 5.4% 58.5%
3 8.3% 12.3% 80.9% 54.2% 19.7% 59.1%
4 8.1% 12.0% 82.9% 58.6% 29.8% 61.5%
5 8.8% 12.2% 82.1% 62.4% 34.9% 61.9%
10 9.3% 12.3% 82.8% 64.7% 43.2% 63.4%
15 12.7% 15.7% 78.8% 63.0% 44.4% 63.4%
20 12.5% 15.6% 80.2% 63.4% 43.1% 57.7%
25 11.0% 14.4% 79.1% 62.5% 45.7% 56.9%
30 11.2% 15.8% 79.3% 63.2% 46.2% 57.7%
35 9.9% 12.3% 82.9% 67.3% 51.8% 58.6%
40 10.5% 13.7% 81.7% 67.4% 52.7% 60.0%
45 11.4% 13.4% 80.2% 65.9% 53.3% 59.8%
49 12.2% 15.0% 79.0% 66.7% 53.6% 60.7%
Table 2.6: We summarize the probability of the Policy Funding Ratio (PFR) being
below 100%, below the Minimum Required Funding Ratio (MRFR), above the lower
bound for indexation, above the Required Funding Ratio (RFR), and above 150% at
various horizons. The probability of full indexation is given as well. Both the pension
entitlements and the fully indexed pension entitlements start at the same level, so
the indexation ratio is not relevant for the first year.
tional median, and the conditional mean, where the last variable is also accompanied
by a 95% uniform confidence band. The vertical line indicates the RFR. These figures
are constructed analogously to Figure 2.4.
As these figures show, given a PFR that is approximately the same as the RFR,
the indexation ratio will be around 95% or more in 50% of the scenarios (according
to the estimated conditional median); the average indexation ratio will be just below
80%; and the indexation ratio can be as low as 35% in 5% of the scenarios (according
to the estimated conditional 5% quantile). Thus, based on the worst 5% of cases, we
find that a value of the PFR equal to the RFR at the time horizon of fifty years is no
guarantee that the pension fund will be able to fulfill its real ambitions. It is highly
likely that under such poor conditions, with indexation ratios dropping to 35%, there
will be mounting pressure for changes in the system.
On the other hand, circumstances under which the PFR is close to 400% or the
pension fund’s average annual asset return is around 7% will result in full indexation
in at least 95% of the scenarios (according to the estimated conditional 5% quan-
tiles). To achieve full indexation in at least 50% of the scenarios, a PFR of close to
200% or average annual asset return of close to 5% seems to be required (according
to the estimated conditional medians). Thus, under favorable conditions (average
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(a) One-year rate (b) Ten-year rate
Figure 2.7: Policy Funding Ratio in relation to the one-year rate ( Panel [a]) and
ten-year rate (Panel [b]), measured at the time horizon.
(a) Current 25-year-olds (b) Current 45-year-olds
Figure 2.8: Indexation ratios for current 25-year-olds (Panel [a]) and 45-year-olds
(Panel [b]) in relation to the Policy Funding Ratio (PFR), measured at the time
horizon. The vertical line indicates the Required Funding Ratio (RFR).
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(a) Current 25-year-olds (b) Current 45-year-olds
Figure 2.9: Indexation ratios for current 25-year-olds (Panel [a]) and 45-year-olds
(Panel [b]) in relation to the pension fund’s average annual returns, measured at the
time horizon.
annual asset return of around 7% or more), the pension fund is able to fulfill its real
ambitions (at the time horizon) to a large extent. But given the current nFTK, such
favorable conditions will likely result in PFRs far above the RFR. This is confirmed
by Figure 2.10, which shows the conditional 5% quantile, the conditional median, and
the conditional mean (accompanied by a 95% uniform confidence band) of the PFR
measured at the time horizon, conditional on the pension fund’s average annual asset
returns.14 The horizontal line in this figure represents the RFR. As the figure shows,
given an average annual asset return of around 7%, the PFR will be over 325% in
50% of the scenarios (according the conditional median estimates). Such high PFRs
are achieved by taking into account the pension contribution reduction policies under
the nFTK (but also assuming no change in the composition of the pension fund’s
asset portfolio over time). Therefore, there will be pressure for changes of the system
even under favorable circumstances. We have assumed a fixed investment mix here;
if the nFTK is sustained, this assumption is not likely to remain valid. However, it
is nevertheless likely that under such circumstances, the regulatory system will also
be under pressure to allow more benefits to be paid to current generations.
Our model therefore indicates that in both bad-weather and good-weather scenar-
ios, it is likely that the nFTK will not be sustained. We should point out, however,
that the predicted effect may be due in part to limitations in the model in combination
with the available data. Figure 2.4 shows that the negative correlation between the
pension fund’s average annual asset return and average wage inflation in our model
14The qualitative nature of this figure might not come as a surprise; we include this figure because
of its quantitative information.
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Figure 2.10: The Policy Funding Ratio (PFR) in relation to the pension fund’s average
annual returns, measured at the time horizon. The horizontal line indicates the
Required Funding Ratio (RFR).
corresponds to a slightly downward sloping line when the average wage inflation is
considered in relation to the average annual asset return. This means that in our
model, the pension fund’s asset return does not hedge against wage inflation. The
negative correlation in our model between the pension fund’s average annual asset
return and average wage inflation is in line with the observed in-sample correlation
between annual wage inflation and annual asset return (equal to around −0.14). How-
ever, the actual relationship between average wage inflation and average annual asset
return may be nonlinear, as indicated by Figure 2.11.This figure shows the conditional
5% quantile, the conditional median, and the conditional mean (accompanied by a
95% uniform confidence band) of the in-sample annual wage inflation in relation to
the in-sample pension fund’s annual asset returns. The relationship between annual
wage inflation and the in-sample pension fund’s annual asset returns appears to be
nonlinear, with a more or less unclear pattern for annual returns of less than −15%
(due to a lack of observations), followed by a more or less clear U-shaped pattern for
annual returns above −15%.15 If there is a positive correlation between asset returns
and wage inflation in scenarios with either very good or very bad returns, then the
15As reported, this nonlinear relationship corresponds to a linear correlation of around −0.14.
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Figure 2.11: The in-sample annual wage inflation in relation to the in-sample pension
fund’s annual asset return.
large spread of outcomes that we get from our model would be mitigated. However,
to capture a relationship as presented in Figure 2.11 requires a more flexible, and
likely heavily nonlinear, model, which is beyond the scope of this paper.16
2.5 Some Design Issues
We consider a stylized pension fund with a fixed investment and contribution policy
(but where the contributions will be lowered if allowed by the nFTK rules). Given
this set-up, the policy funding ratios turn out to be high in many scenarios within the
set generated by our economic model. After five years, the probability of the PFR
exceeding 150% is around 35%; the median PFR goes over 150% after 35 years; and
the 95% quantile soars to more than 700% at the end of the simulation period. The
occurrence of such unrealistically high funding ratios is due to the restrictions that are
placed on recovery indexation and pension contribution reductions, in combination
with the assumptions that are built into our economic model.17 Given that expected
16Moreover, more flexible nonlinear models might improve the in-sample fit but typically perform
rather poorly out-of-sample due to the possibility of overfitting.
17In the revision of the Pension Act as originally proposed by the Dutch government, the amount
that could be used for recovery indexation was maximized to 10% of the surplus. Parliament adopted
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asset returns exceed wage inflation, funding ratios may still reach high levels even
under full indexation; the additional instrument of reducing pension contributions
can only be applied under very restrictive assumptions within the nFTK.
In spite of the high median funding ratio produced in our scenario set, the proba-
bility of less than full indexation is substantial, even after fifty years. This indicates
that under the nFTK, pension fund participants cannot always take full advantage of
favorable economic circumstances. In the set of scenarios corresponding to less than
full indexation, realized funding ratios are distributed more or less evenly across a
wide spectrum of outcomes. As can be expected, low indexation ratios tend to be
associated with scenarios under which there are low asset returns and/or high wage
inflation. The 5% quantile corresponds to policy funding ratios that go down to al-
most 40%. It appears that, for a fund that maintains a fixed-mix investment policy,
the nFTK system neither provides an effective cap on fund wealth nor protects pen-
sions against adverse economic scenarios. Under such circumstances, the system is
not expected to be maintained. The goal of providing a sustainable, future-proof sys-
tem seems too ambitious to be achieved by the current design of the nFTK in itself.
There is a “catch” in the system: full indexation occurs mainly in scenarios in which
the funding ratio is at levels that are likely to lead to changes in the system. At the
same time, under adverse scenarios, indexation ratios may drop dramatically. The
system is not symmetric on the upper and lower sides. It is slower to give indexation
on the upper side than to cut pension entitlements on the lower side, which can result
in the “catch” and cause instability in the form of a very high PFR. The system has
a tendency to shift wealth to the future. In that sense, it is unfair to the participants
since the value of what they get could be less than what they pay for. However,
further investigation is needed to judge the fairness of the system.
We do some sensitivity analysis on the asset mix, the initial funding ratio, and
parameter values to see how robust the results are to those changes. Increasing the
asset allocation to stocks does not help to improve the results. Changing the asset mix
to 45% in stocks and 55% in long-term bonds results in an even higher PFR on the
upper side and an even lower indexation ratio on the lower side. After 50 years, the
PFR can soar to 1200% at the 95% quantile while the indexation ratio of the current
25-year-olds can drop to 36% at the 5% quantile. Under the nFTK, with a fixed
asset mix, it is better for the participants to have a conservative investment policy.
The system is reluctant to give indexation when there are gains from the investment,
an amendment which raised the maximum to 20%. In our calculations, we have applied the latter
policy; however, the differences with the outcomes under the rule originally proposed are small.
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but an investment loss will be borne by the pension participants via cuts in pension
entitlements. A much lower initial funding ratio of 95% decreases the frequency of
full indexation and its effect is stronger for short periods than for long periods. Full
indexation is achieved in about 40% of the scenarios in the beginning years, and at
the time horizon of fifty-year, it is achieved in 56.1% of the scenarios.
The results could possibly be improved by adapting some of the parameters of
the nFTK regulatory framework. For example, changing the conditions for the repair
policy, such that 100% of the funds in excess of the RFR could be used to reduce
the gap between actual and full indexed pension entitlements, would increase the
probability of full indexation at a ten-year horizon from 63.4% to 66.7%, while the
probability of underfunding at the same time horizon would only increase from 12.3%
to 12.8%. Coupling such a change in the repair policy with replacing the ACP pa-
rameter values by the model-based parameters (e.g., increasing the expected stock
returns from 6.75% to 7.5%) would increase the probability of full indexation at a
ten-year horizon even further, to 69.2%, while the probability of underfunding at the
same time horizon would increase only to 12.9%.
Alternatively, adopting investment policies that are more responsive to economic
conditions than the fixed investment mix we created as a benchmark could help avoid
the catch referred to earlier. More fundamental improvements, on both the upside and
the downside, could be derived from introducing greater flexibility into the policies.
Some interesting possibilities for investigation, as topics of future research, could be
indexation policies that differentiate between generations or contribution-reduction
policies that are more flexible and tied to, for instance, the PFR level.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the stability of the nFTK based on simulations. We start
by establishing a stylized pension fund that mimics the actual demographic structure
of the Netherlands. New workers enter into the pension fund at the age of 25 and
retire at the age of 67. We assume mortality according to the 2014 life table provided
by the actuarial association of the Netherlands. The influx of workers is assumed to
be constant. The contributions per individual as a fraction of the pension base are
determined at the start of the simulations and assumed to be constant over time,
except when a reduction according to the nFTK is permitted. The pension fund’s
investment policy is a simple fixed-mix policy, 35% in stocks and 65% in ten-year
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bonds. Pension liabilities are discounted according to the term structure constructed
by our own model.
Next, we formalize the nFTK and the various actions that must be taken under
different circumstances. We study how the stylized pension fund performs under the
nFTK under different simulated economic scenarios. In particular, we investigate the
evolution of the indexation ratio and the policy funding ratio of the pension fund in
relation to each other and to wage inflation and asset returns. We find that the highly
ambitious goal of providing a sustainable, future-proof system seems too great to be
achieved by the current design of the nFTK alone, at least given our stylized pension
fund and the investment, contribution, and benefits policies considered.
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This appendix provides the relevant background information to this chapter. Section
2.7.2 contains a detailed discussion of our implementation of the nFTK, including
the choices we made when implementing the nFTK. Section 2.7.3 provides additional
information on the economic setting that is used to generate our scenarios.
2.7.2 Stylized Pension Fund and Implementation of the nFTK
In this section we first introduce some notation and we present the set-up of our
stylized pension fund in Subsection 2.7.2.1. In Subsection 2.7.2.2 we discuss the
premium policies. Subsections 2.7.2.3 and 2.7.2.4 deal with recovery policies in case
the funding ratio turns out to be too low. In Subsection 2.7.2.5 we present the
indexation policies. In Subsection 2.7.2.6 we then discuss repair policies, followed by
pension contribution reduction policies in Subsection 2.7.2.7.
2.7.2.1 Notation and Set-Up
Time is denoted by t. A generation g is referred to by the superscript (g). We assume
that in each period t a new generation g = t enters. At the start of time t there are
N
(g)
t individuals of generation g. Survival probabilities at time t of generation g are
denoted by τp
(g)
t , with τ the number of survival periods. Starting from N
(g)
g (given










t . Time to retirement of
generation g at the start of time t ≥ g is denoted by T (g)t . We have T
(g)
g = Tg, with





t−1− 1 for t ≥ g+ 1. We define the generations paying pension contributions
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The pension base of generation g at the end of period t is denoted by W
(g)
t . It is the
wage minus the franchise. We assume that W
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t ), g < t ≤ g + Tg, (2.2a)
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t denotes the relative increase of the pension base of generation g at time
t.
Each period t the pension fund has to set the pension contribution ct and the
indexation factor It. The pension contribution has to be paid by generations g ∈ G0t
as a fraction ct of W
(g)
t at the end of period t. The total contribution is denoted by









We shall focus on wage indexation. Let WIt denote the actual wage inflation during
period t (averaged over the generations). The indexation is set equal to It = 1+xtWIt,
where xt ∈ [0, 1], depending on the circumstances. We set xt = 0 in case WIt < 0.
The indexation factor It determines the dynamic evolution of PE
(g)
t , the (actual)







t−1 × It−1 + at−1W
(g)
t−1, if t ≤ g + Tg
PE
(g)






g , where at stands for the pension entitlements, as a fraction
of the pension base, built up during period t.
Given the actual pension entitlements, PE
(g)
t , the pension payments, paid at the









In addition to the actual pension entitlements PE
(g)
t , we will also keep track of FIPEt,
the pension entitlements corresponding to full indexation, where full indexation will
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for t ≥ g + 1, starting at FIPE(g)g = atW
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t , see Repair Policies. We set FIt = 1 + max{0,WIt}.
The indexation ratio IR
(g)












We denote the time t return on the pension plan’s assets by Rt. Then the time
t (pension plan’s) assets At at the beginning of period t (before period t’s pension
payments) are given by
At = (1 +Rt) (At−1 − Pt−1) + Ct−1.
To be able to determine the (pension plan’s) liabilities, we first need to introduce
discount factors. Discount factors at the start of time t, discounting τ periods ahead










where m ∈ {a, p, i, · · · } refers to the method used. For m = a, we discount using




t , the τ -periods zero coupon yield at time t
(also taking into account the prescriptions of the “Committee UFR”). The discount
factors corresponding to m = p (see Premium Policies) and m = i (see Indexation
Policies) will be introduced later. The (pension plan’s) liabilities Lt, determined at
the beginning of period t before period t’s pension payments, are now defined as
follows:














The funding ratio FRt (at the beginning of time t) is defined as FRt = At/Lt
(i.e., the ratio of the pension plan’s assets and liabilities). The “Policy Funding
Ratio” is defined as the 12-months moving average, which we shall approximate by







where M represents a period of one year. Since FRt is measured annually in our
simulation, PFRt is the average of FRt and FRt−1. Thus, M = 2 in our simulation.
There are (at least) five critical points for PFRt. First, RFRt denotes the Required
Funding Ratio at time t. It should be set such that with probability 0.975 next year’s
actual funding ratio is at least one. Second, MRFRt denotes the Minimal Required
Funding Ratio at time t. As soon as PFRt is below RFRt, a recovery plan has to
be implemented, which should result in a recovery of the Policy Funding Ratio to
at least the level of the Required Funding Ratio in at most ten years, with at least
10% recovery in the first year. Moreover, as soon as PFRt is below MRFRt during M
periods, where M represents five years, immediate action has to be taken to ensure
36
that the actual or the Policy Funding Ratio is at least the Minimal Required Funding
Ratio (i.e., max{FRt,PFRt} ≥ MRFRt). See Recovery Policies for further details.
The third critical point is IFRt, the time t lower bound for indexation. Only if
PFRt is larger than IFRt, (at least partial) indexation is allowed. See Indexation
Policies for further details. The fourth critical point is FIFRt, the time t lower bound





t )), see Repair Policies. The fifth critical point is RIFRt,
the time t lower bound of the funding ratio above which pension contributions below
the cost-neutral contribution are allowed, see Premium Reduction Policies18.
Our choices: We set RFRt = 1.266 for all t. This is its current average value.
In addition, we have MRFRt = 1.043 (the value set by European regulations) and
IFRt = 1.1 for all t. For FIFRt, see Repair Policies. We set RIFRt = RFRt, see
Premium Reduction Policies. The demographic structure of the pension plan starts
from the Dutch demographic structure in 2009. The inflow of newborns is set constant
and equal to the inflow of newborns in 2009. We use the 2014 life tables provided
by the Actuarial Society. New generations enter at age 25 with retirement age set
at 67, so that Tg = 42. The initial wage base W
(g)
g is set equal to 1. We use
at = 0.01875 ≈ 0.7/37, constant over time. If T denotes the starting period of our
simulations, then, if g ≤ T , we set PE(g)T = FIPE
(g)





T = 1. The pension fund’s initial asset value at the start of the simulations (time
T ) is set equal to MRF × LT . The zero coupon yield curve (R(τ)t ) and the wage
index WI
(g)
t = WIt (the same for all generations) follow from our model. Because our





In this section we discuss the premium policies, determining the pension contribution
ct that generates a cost-neutral contribution. This premium ct consists of a basis
premium bpt raised by an extra premium πt. The basis premium bpt is set by the
regulator as the actuarially required premium for the purchase of new pension obli-
gations (in terms of the nominal pension aspiration at, without taking into account
future indexation). The extra premium πt ≥ 0 depends on the chosen way of calcu-
lating the premium. The actual premium may be different from the premium bpt+πt,
but only if it is larger, or if it turns out that πt = 0, and a premium reduction below
18We carry out the analysis based on the regulations from December 2014
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bpt might become possible (under strict conditions). For the latter case, see Premium
Reduction Policies.
The total amount of premiums received during period t should suffice to pay off




















p,t the corresponding discount factor (to be discussed below). We shall assume
that bpt is set such that we have an equality, i.e.,























With respect to the discount factor D
(τ)
p,t = 1/(1 + d
(τ)
p,t )
τ there are two basis choices
for d
(τ)
p,t . The first one is just d
(τ)
a,t , the actual term structure of interest rates. The
second one is the pension fund’s expected return ERt. In both cases cushioning (in
volatility, terminology DNB) is also allowed, i.e., one may use a moving average using
past observations (over maximum recent 10 years) or one may use an expectation of
the future value (according to the CP). Thus, there are at least four possibilities for
d
(τ)
p,t , in addition to d
(τ)
a,t and ERt:




a,t−k, the M̃ -periods moving average interest rate (where M̃
represents (at most) 10 years. With monthly data, M̃ = 120.);
• d(τ)p,t = d
CP,(τ)
a,t , the expected term structure using the parameter values set by
the CP;




t−k, the M̃ -periods moving average expected returns;
• d(τ)p,t = ERCPt , the expected return determined using the parameter values set
by the CP.
There are some debates going on regarding the discount factor (see, for example,
Nijman et al. 2006, Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009). However, it is not the purpose
of this paper to analyze the discounting method. We shall refer to the premiums in
the first case, when d
(τ)
p,t is based on d
(τ)
a,t , as the term structure based premiums, and
we shall refer to the premiums in the second case, when d
(τ)
p,t is based on ERt, as the
expected return premiums.
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or, using bpt as given by (2.8), we find πt ≥ (RFRt−1)×bpt. Thus, the term structure
based premium is set to ct = bpt + πt ≥ RFRt × bpt to ensure that the funding ratio
that would result from the generated assets and the corresponding liabilities, built
up during period t, is at least equal to RFRt. In other words, the lower bound on πt
should generate sufficient extra funds for future indexation (in addition to maintaining
a sufficiently high funding ratio).
For cushioned expected return based premiums, πt should be such that future
indexation is possible. Let EWIt stand for the expected wage inflation at time t,
















































Thus, the expected return based premium is set to ct = bpt + πt satisfying this lower
bound to ensure that enough assets are generated to be able to meet the corresponding
liabilities when taking into account expected future indexation.
Our choices: Let T denote the starting period of our simulations. We use a constant
term structure based premium with cushioning , i.e., we set ct = RFRT×bpT for all t ≥














T−k, where M̃ represents 10 years (with monthly data, M̃ = 120 ), and
where R
(τ)
T−k follows from our model, see Section 2.7.3.
2.7.2.3 Immediate Recovery Plans
In this section we discuss recovery policies that have to be implemented immediately,
when the Policy Funding Ratio turns out to be too low during five years in a row.
This immediate action should be taken as soon as the Policy Funding Ratio is
below the minimal required funding ratio during M periods, where M represents 5
years, i.e., as soon as
PFRt−τ < MRFRt−τ ,
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for τ = 0, 1, · · · ,M . This immediate action consists of implementing a recovery plan
IRect = (ρ
ir
t ), with ρ
ir
t ∈ [0, 1] the reduction factor to be applied to the pension
entitlements PE
(g)












where FRirt = At/L
ir
t and where PFR
ir
t is calculated as the moving average using





t and Lt by L
ir
t .
Our choices: We choose as immediate recovery plan IRect = (ρ
ir
t ), where ρ
ir
t is set
such that we have an equality in (2.9).
2.7.2.4 Ten Years Recovery Plans
In this section we discuss ten year recovery policies that have to be implemented,
when the Policy Funding Ratio turns out to be lower than the Required Funding
Ratio RFRt.
Assume that the Policy Funding Ratio is below the required funding ratio, i.e.,






t ) be part of the recovery plan applying to the
first period t + 1, with xrt ∈ [0, 1] determining the (lack of) indexation, πrt ∈ [1,∞)
the (extra) raise in the pension contribution, and ρrt ∈ [0, 1] the reduction factor to
be applied to the pension entitlements.
We assume the following implementation of the recovery plan in period t+ 1:
• W (g)t+1 = W
(g)
t (1 + EWI),
• It+1 = 1 + xrtEWI,
• PE(g)t+1 = PE
(g)



















• At+1 = (1 + ERt)(At − Pt) + Ct,

















a,t,t+1 = 1/(1 + d
CP,(τ)
a,t,t+1)
τ , where d
CP,(τ)
a,t,t+1 denotes the predicted τ -periods ahead
interest rate at time t + 1, as it is predicted at time t according to the CP. The
prediction d
CP,(τ)
a,t,t+1 according to the CP is the time t forward rate between the periods
t+ 1 and t+ 1 + τ .
This plan is an appropriate recovery plan under the following conditions:
• Its implementation guarantees a recovery of at least a fraction of 10% during
the first period, i.e.,
PFRt+1 ≥ PFRt + 0.1× (RFRt − PFRt) . (2.10)
• ρrt is less than one, only if xrt = 0 and πrt is strictly larger than one, or, in case
a pension contribution correction is excluded from the recovery plan (which
means πrt = 1), ρ
r
t is less than one, only if x
r
t = 0 .
Given such an appropriate recovery plan, we set It = (1 + x
r
tWIt), with WIt the










Our choices: We choose a ten years recovery plan where the pension contribution
is excluded from the recovery plan (i.e., πrt = 1). We first try to set x
r
t ∈ [0, 1], with
ρrt = 1, to get an equality in (2.10). If even x
r
t = 0 does not suffice, we set x
r
t = 0
and choose ρrt ∈ [0, 1] such that (2.10) is satisfied with an equality. We calculate the
required forward rates using the zero-coupon yield curve (R
(T )
t ) applying to period
t. Thus, if F
(1,1+τ)
t denotes the time t forward rate between the periods t + 1 and



































In this section we discuss the indexation policies, i.e., policies determining the index-
ation factor It.
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Let again EWIt be the expected wage inflation according to the CP at time t
(see previous sections). If there is no recovery plan, the indexation is set equal to
It = 1 + x
i
tWIt (with WIt the actual wage inflation), where x
i

















i,t = ERS, the Expected Returns on Stocks according to the CP. Thus, as-
suming that the indexation 1 + xitEWI is applied to the present and future periods,
the resulting funding ratio (after the payments of the pensions at the beginning of
period t) should be at least IFRt.






t ) (see previous section) the indexation
will be set to It = 1 + xtWIt, with xt = min{xit, xrt}. If xit < xrt , the recovery plan
Rect might have to be reconsidered.
Our choices: We first solve xit, imposing an equality in (2.11) when WIt is positive.
If the solution is bigger than 1, we set xit = 1. When WIt < 0 or PFRt < 110%,
we set xit = 0. Without a recovery plan in period t, we set It = 1 + x
i
tWIt. With a






t ), we set It = 1+xtWIt, with xt = min{xit, xrt}. There
is no need to reconsider the recovery plan.
2.7.2.6 Repair Policies
As a consequence of less than full indexation or as a consequence of the implementa-







are the pension entitlement under full indexation, see Notation and Set-Up). Repair
policies are intended to decrease (or even close) the gaps between the actual and full
indexation pension bases. We discuss these repair policies in this section.
Repair policies are only allowed to be implemented under a strict condition,
namely PFRt ≥ max{FIFRt, RFRt}, where FIFRt denotes the level of the funding
















If the condition PFRt ≥ max{FIFRt,RFRt} is satisfied, 20%19 of the excess funds





19In the original proposal, it was 10%. After the parliament discussion, some amendments were
made, among which is the recovery fraction.
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Let FRAt denote the fraction of available funds for repair, i.e.,
FRAt = 0.2×max {0, PFRt −max{FIFRt,RFRt}} .
As immediate repair plan we consider Rept = (α
r
t ), with α
r


















































t and Lt by L̃t.
Our choices: We choose our immediate repair plan Rept = (α
r
t ) to minimize At/L̃t−
(1− FRAt)× PFRt with αrt ∈ [0, 1].
2.7.2.7 Premium Reduction Policies
Under favorable circumstances, premium reductions, resulting in a premium below
the minimum premium level bpt, are possible. In this section we discuss such premium
reduction policies.
A premium reduction below the minimum level bpt is possible if
• PFRt ≥ RIFRt, with RIFRt the lower bound for premium reduction, set by the
pension fund, with RIFRt ≥ RFRt,
• It−τ = FIt−τ , τ = 1, · · · , 10,
• PE(g)t = FIPE
(g)
t , for all generations g ≤ t.
Under these conditions, let Redt = (π
pr
t ), with π
pr
t < ct − bpt, be an immediate
premium reduction plan. It is an appropriate premium reduction plan if, in case of a


















































(see Premium Policies for details). We then set ĉt = bpt + π
pr
t < ct.
Our choices: We set RIFRt = RFRt, and we choose the immediate premium re-
duction plan Redt = (π
pr
t ) such that we have an equality in (2.13) (corresponding to
a term structure based premium).
2.7.3 The Economic Setting
In this section we provide additional information concerning the economic setting used
in this chapter. First, Subsection 2.7.3.1 contains information on the construction of
some of the variables used. Our estimation and calibration procedure consists of two
steps, a first step to estimate the VAR-model and a second step to calibrate the price
of risk. In Subsection 2.7.3.2 we provide additional information on the first step. In
Subsection 2.7.3.3 we then describe the modeling of the term structure of interest
rates. Subsection 2.7.3.4 presents the outcomes of the second step of our estimation
and calibration procedure.
2.7.3.1 Some Variable Definitions
Inflation is calculated as




where CPIt is the consumer price index at time t. Wage inflation is calculated in the
same way from the CAO wage index. The stock return premium is derived from the
MSCI world total return stock index which is in U.S. dollars. We use the USD to
EUR (WMR&DS) exchange rate to express the return in euros. We first compute
the annualized 6-month stock return in local currency (USD) from the total return







Then the return in euros can be derived from
rt,s = (1 + rt,s,l)(1 + rt,x)− 1, (2.17)
where rt,x is the return from the local currency appreciation (depreciation).
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2.7.3.2 First Step Estimation
In the first step, we use maximum likelihood method to estimate the coefficients of
the VAR model. Since the error terms in the VAR model are i.i.d. jointly normally
distributed, the likelihood function is given by












(xt − µ− Γ(xt−1 − µ))′(ΣΣ′)−1(xt − µ− Γ(xt−1 − µ))
) (2.19)
When choosing the number of lags of the VAR model, we used the information cri-
teria as shown in Table 2.7. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggests higher
lags while the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) suggests lag 1. Previous studies
show that the AIC might be inconsistent whereas the BIC is generally statistically
consistent, see, for example, van Erven et al. (2012). Therefore, we choose the order
of lags based on the BIC.
VAR(1) VAR(2) VAR(3) VAR(4)
AIC -9240.63 -9245.16 -9263.35 -9269.81
BIC -9077.23 -8990.97 -8918.39 -8834.06
Table 2.7: This table presents the values of two Information Criteria of the VAR-
model presented in section 2.3 with different lags. AIC is the Akaike Information
Criterion and BIC is Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criterion.
Table 2.8 presents the empirical and model-based means and correlations between
the five state variables, where the model-based correlations are calculated using the
VAR-model with one lag. The table also contains the p-values for testing the null
hypothesis that the corresponding correlation is equal to zero. Most correlations are
statistically significantly different from zero, using the conventional significance levels.
2.7.3.3 The Term Structure of Interest Rates
We assume that the prices are set such that arbitrage opportunities are excluded.
This implies the existence of a pricing kernel Mt, for all t, which we postulate to be
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Correlation Matrix Implied by Data Sample Mean
y(1) 1.000 0.339 -0.112 -0.700 0.485 0.035
cpi 0.339 1.000 -0.078 -0.298 0.442 0.022
rs − y(1) -0.112 -0.078 1.000 0.155 -0.205 0.029
y(20) − y(1) -0.700 -0.298 0.155 1.000 -0.471 0.014
wage 0.485 0.442 -0.205 -0.471 1.000 0.023
p-values of the correlations
0 0.0582 0 0
0 0.1865 0 0
0.0582 0.1865 0.0086 0.0005
0 0 0.0086 0
0 0 0.0005 0
Correlation Matrix Implied by Model Model Mean
y(1) 1.000 0.253 -0.088 -0.195 0.297 0.032
cpi 0.253 1.000 0.028 -0.025 0.243 0.022
rs − y(1) -0.088 0.028 1.000 0.041 -0.041 0.043
y(20) − y(1) -0.195 -0.025 0.041 1.000 0.037 0.016
wage 0.297 0.243 -0.041 0.037 1.000 0.022












where δ0 is a constant and δ1 is an n-dimensional vector of constants, εt+1 is the
innovation defined in equation (2.1), and λt is the price of risk, which is postulated
to be affine in the state variables xt, i.e.,
λt = Λ0 + Λ1xt. (2.21)
where Λ0 is a n-dimensional vector of unknown parameters, and Λ1 is an n × n-
dimensional matrix of unknown parameters, that accounts for part of the risk pre-
mium, sensitive to changes in the state vector xt.
The nominal term structure describes the nominal interest rates as a function of
time to maturity. It can be derived from the yields of zero-coupon bonds. The yield
to maturity of a zero-coupon bond is defined as R
(T )
t and the relation between the







For T = 1 we get
R
(1)
t = − log(P
(1)
t ) = Et (Mt+1 × 1) = δ0 + δ′1xt.
Thus, δ0 + δ1xt is the short rate R
(1)
t . The short rate is the first state variable in
the VAR model. To make the model self-consistent, we therefore set δ0 = 0 and
δ′1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0).
A T -year zero coupon bond at time t will become a T − 1 year zero coupon bond
one year later, with payoff after one year given by P T−1t+1 . Therefore, the price of this













t ) = −A(T )−B(T )′xt, (2.24)
we can solve A(T ) and B(T ) recursively, which results in the following equations:
A(T ) = A(T − 1) +B(T − 1)′α− 1
2
B(T − 1)′ΣΣ′B(T − 1)−B(T − 1)′ΣΛ0
B(T ) = (Γ− ΣΛ1)′B(T − 1) + δ1
(2.25)
with as starting values A0 = 0, B0 = 0n, following from logP
(0)
t = log(1) = 0. We
then also have R
(T )
t = a(T ) + b(T )
′xt, with a(T ) = −A(T )/T and b(T ) = −B(T )/T .
2.7.3.4 Second Step Calibration
In the second step, we calibrate the price of risk λt to the observed term structure
by minimizing the squared difference of the estimated model-based yields and the
corresponding observed yield.
As follows from (3.16) the pricing kernel Mt+1 is lognormally distributed. The
expectation of the corresponding normal distribution is given by −(δ0 + δ1xt + 12λ
′
tλt)






















The variance of the pricing kernel strongly depends on the magnitude of λ′tλt. If
λ′tλt is very large, this variance will explode, potentially complicating a Monte Carlo
simulation analysis. To avoid this from happening, we include the variance of the
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2 + ω2var(Mt+1), (2.27)
where R̂
(T )
t is the estimated interest rate for maturity T at time t and R
(T )
t is the
observed interest rate for maturity T at time t. The weights are given as follows:
ω1 = 99.99%, ω2 = 0.01%, and xt is substituted by its model implied average.
We cannot simply choose any combination of Λ0 and Λ1 that minimizes the ob-
jective function as described in equation (2.27). To make the model self-consistent
and stable, we impose several constraints.
• First, there is a model implied 10-year interest rate but at the same time, the
10-year interest rate spread also enters into our VAR model. Since our short
rate is 6-month federal security rate, one period is 6-month, so the 10 year rate
is actual the 20-periods interest rate. We have R
(20)
t = a(20) + b(20)
′xt and the
10-year interest rate implied by the VAR model is R
(10)
t = (ei+ej)
′xt, where ei is
the unit vector with the ith element the short rate and ej is another unit vector
with the jth element the 10-year interest rate spread. By setting the right hand
sides of the above two equations equal to each other, we obtain a(20) = 0 and
b(20) = ei + ej.
• Second, the stock return premium appears in the VAR model and is implied by
the risk premium in the pricing kernel. Let Rs,t+1 stand for the net return on
the stock index, and define rs,t+1 ≡ log(1 +Rs,t+1). Then we should have
1 = Et [Mt+1(1 +Rs,t+1)]
Taking logarithms on both sides, we have,




Since log(Mt+1) = −yt − 12λ
′
tλt − λ′tεt+1, we find
0 = Et(−yt −
1
2










λ′tλt + yt + e
′












′es − e′sΣ(Λ0 + Λ1xt)
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• Third, as shown in equation (3.20), the process of B(T ) is a first order autore-
gressive series with coefficient matrix (Γ−ΣΛ1)′. To ensure the stability of the
model, we add as constraint that all the eigen-values of Γ−ΣΛ1 are within the
unit circle.






where B(∞) satisfies B(∞) = (Γ− ΣΛ1)′B(∞). So, the last constraint is
((I − (Γ− ΣΛ1)′)−1δ1)′(α− ΣΛ0)− 0.5((I − (Γ− ΣΛ1)′)−1δ1)′ΣΣ′
((I − (Γ− ΣΛ1)′)−1δ1)
= 0.042.
(2.28)
The second step calibration results are shown in Table 2.9.
Λ0 Λ1
y(1) 1.4427 -16.6623 -3.8282 0.3328 -69.1103 -8.1960
cpi 8.5830 -91.6736 -62.3017 -49.7687 -55.9294 -19.5505
rs − y(1) -0.0557 6.0829 -7.1205 9.0118 2.0227 -4.7016
y(20) − y(1) -1.3127 19.0576 -6.6427 0.5693 58.2557 3.5234
wage -4.5112 8.7138 44.5454 59.7123 2.5231 28.7268
Table 2.9: This Table presents the second step calibration results. Column Λ0 shows
the calibrated constant part of the risk premium and column Λ1 shows the time
varying part.
Figure 2.12 shows both the average term structures as implied by the model
for time to maturity up to 135 years and the current term structure. The Figure
also shows a sample of simulated term structures. The panel with the current term
structure also shows the corresponding 6-month yield and 10-year yields.
To further investigate the model fit, we compare the model-based mean and volatil-
ity of the yield in our model to the historical ones, see Figure 2.13. We simulate the
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(a) Average term structure. (b) Current term structure.
(c) Sample of simulated term struc-
tures.
Figure 2.12: Panel (a) shows the average model-based term structure. Panel (b)
shows the model-based current term structure and the corresponding sample-based
0.5 year and 10 year interest rates. Panel (c) presents some simulated term structures.
The lines from the bottom to the top in Panel (c) represent term structure of the
year 2015, 2016, 2017, 2022, 2027, 2032, 2037, and 2042, respectively.
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(a) Comparison of model-based and
sample average yields.
(b) Comparison of model-based and
sample yield volatilities.
Figure 2.13: Term Structure Means and Volatilities. Panel (a) and panel (b)
compare the model-based and sample-based results.
stochastic term structure for 1000 paths for a period that is equal to the time horizon
of the observed term structure. We then plot the average yield and the 5% and 95%
quantiles of the simulated yields and compare these to the historical average yield.
We do a similar comparison for the volatility, plotting the average volatility, the 5%
and the 95% quantile of the volatility of the yield and the volatility of the observed
yield in the same picture. As shown in Figure 2.13, the historical mean and volatility
are between the 5% and 95% quantiles.
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Chapter 3
Model Risk in the Pricing of
Reverse Mortgage Products
3.1 Introduction
When people are approaching their retirement age, their human capital decreases,
while unexpected expenditures on health care may occur. Moreover, the main source
of post-retirement income, the pension payment, is threatened. This occurs because
the pension system is under stress due to the financial crisis and its aftermath, the
aging population, and retirement of the baby boom generation. With a less stable
income from the pension system and longer life expectancy, individuals might face
considerable financial problems after retirement. At the same time, a large propor-
tion of their accumulated wealth is typically invested in housing equities, which, if
liquidated, can generate substantial post-retirement income. A reverse mortgage is
one of the products available on the market that allows the elderly to use home equity
to finance retirement income, while staying in their home (until death or permanently
moving out of the home due to other reasons).
There has been a growing literature studying three aspects of reverse mortgage
products. The first aspect is the market volume of the product. Earlier empirical
studies found that the demand for reverse mortgages was very small. According to
this earlier research (Venti, Wise, 1991), an annuity reverse mortgage cannot substan-
tially increase the income of average elderly and very few families chose to increase
their post-retirement income by equitizing their house. However, since the New Mil-
lennium, the reverse mortgage market began to expand. In the US, $30.21 billion of
reverse mortgage loans were made in 2009, which was a record. In Hong Kong, in a
survey conducted among middle-aged adults in 2000, approximately 11% of the home-
owners indicated that they would definitely or probably apply for a reverse mortgage
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if it were available (Chou et al. 2006). According to Shan (2011), the main reason
that led to the market expansion is the increasing house price, which can account for
one third of the growth between 2003 and 2007.
The second aspect the literature is trying to explain is why the demand for reverse
mortgages is below what one might expect. Bequest motives play a substantial role in
the decision of elderly home-owners whether to enter into a reverse mortgage contract
(Davidoff, 2010, Michelangeli, 2008). Empirical studies found that childless elderly
are more likely to buy reverse mortgages (Chou et al., 2006). Adverse selection and
moral hazard are other reasons that may reduce the demand. People who buy annu-
ities tend to have a longer life expectancy (McCarthy and Mitchell, 2010, Finkelstein
and Poterba, 2002). Since some reverse mortgage designs have similar characteristics
as annuities, the adverse selection problem may also exist in the reverse mortgage
market. The moral hazard arises when a reverse mortgage buyer reduces the expen-
diture on maintaining the condition of the house (Shiller and Weiss, 2000, Miceli and
Sirmans, 1994). The complexity of the product also hinders potential buyers from
entering the market (Davidoff et al. 2015).
The third aspect the literature is focusing on is the pricing and risk analysis
of the product. Longevity risks, house price risks and the price of the embedded
“No-Negative-Equity Guarantee” (NNEG) are all discussed extensively (Wang, et
al., 2008, Li, et al., 2010, Yang, et al., 2011, Chen, et al., 2010, Lee, 2012, Shao,
et al., 2015, Ji et al., 2012.). To evaluate different reverse mortgage designs one
needs to value the various cash flows involved. This requires the use of quantitative
models, including the quantification of interest rates, house prices, mortality, and so
on. Typically, in order to get a manageable model, one has to make use of simplifying
assumptions. However, the use of a simple model may come at the cost of model risk,
i.e., one has to deal with a model that is potentially misspecified (in addition to model
parameter values that might be imprecise due to sampling error). Although different
models which are potentially misspecified are developed to quantify the risks and
price the NNEG, model risk is typically not investigated.
We investigate the impact of model risk on the price of the NNEG. We consider
two types of models to value the NNEG for various reverse mortgage designs. In
the first model, the house price follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) while
in the second model, the house price is modeled using a VAR model (together with
other economic variables). Both models are popular in previous studies on reverse
mortgages. For instance, Szymanoski ( 1994), Wang et al. (2008), Ji et al. (2012)
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assume that a GBM drives the house price, and Shao et al. (2015), Sherris and Sun
(2010), Alai et al. (2014), Cho et al. (2013) use a Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR)
to model the interrelation between house price and other economic variables. While
previous studies have used the two models, the issue of model risk has, to the best of
our knowledge, not been investigated.
In this paper, we first investigate the sensitivity of the price of the NNEG to
changes in the (calibrated or estimated) model parameters. In both models we in-
terpret the house as a dividend paying asset, where the dividend is parameterized by
the dividend yield. As an asset the house might have a nonzero price of idiosyncratic
risk. In the models we consider, the dividend yield is negatively related to the house
price growth rate, but also depends on the price of idiosyncratic risk of the house.
Our analysis shows that in both models, the price of the NNEG is highly sensitive
to the dividend yield. This high sensitivity is a concern because the dividend yield
cannot be determined using only house price data if the house has a nonzero price of
idiosyncratic risk. But also with a zero price of idiosyncratic risk (a possibility that
we consider in the VAR model) the dividend yield is difficult to estimate or calibrate
accurately. Due to the recent crisis on the housing market, estimates can be highly
sensitive to the period that is chosen to estimate or calibrate the model parameters.
Therefore, as an alternative, we use data on prices of regular mortgages to calibrate
the dividend yield. Using these calibrated ranges of the dividend yield, we then de-
termine the model implied price ranges of the NNEG for different reverse mortgage
products. We find quite substantial price ranges, indicating that there is substantial
model risk.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2, we
present three basic reverse mortgage schemes and describe the cash flow pattern for
each scheme. In Section 3.3, we determine the market consistent reverse mortgage
rate and quantify the value of the NNEG. We apply the GBM model in Section 3.4
and VAR model in Section 3.5 to price the NNEG and analyze its sensitivity to
parameter risk. Section 3.6 studies the model risk. We conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Reverse Mortgage Schemes
In this section, we present the reverse mortgage contract designs that we investigate
in this paper. A summary of the notation used in the paper can be found in Table
3.10 in the Appendix.
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A reverse mortgage is a loan that allows homeowners to convert (part of) the value
of their house value into cash. Instead of a fixed end date, as in case of a traditional
mortgage, the borrower pays back the loan when (s)he dies, or when the home is sold.
This time is denoted as date T . The initial loan amount is typically expressed as a
fraction ϕ of the house value, i.e., the initial loan amount is
L0 = ϕH0, (3.1)
where H0 is the value of the house at the beginning of the contract. The fraction ϕ is
referred to as the loan-to-value ratio. This is a contract parameter, whose maximum
value is set by the lender, typically depending on characteristics of the house and on
the characteristics of the owners, such as, for example, their ages. Instead of receiving
a lump sum amount, the loan can also take the form of a whole life annuity of value
L0 = ϕ · H0. On date T , the house is sold and the net revenues of sales are used
to pay back the loan. To protect the buyer of the reverse mortgage from negative
equity, the contract includes a No-Negative-Equity-Guarantee, NNEG. Specifically,
the repayment of debt on date T is capped at the net revenue from selling the house.
This implies that the outstanding debt is not fully repaid in case the net revenues
from the house are lower than the outstanding debt; the lender offers the buyer a
guarantee NNT which is defined as follows:
NNT =
{
LT − (1− δ) ·HT , if (1− δ) ·HT < LT ,
0, if otherwise,
(3.2)
where LT is the loan balance on date T , HT is the house price on date T , and δ is
the proportional transaction cost in case of a (forced) sale. On date t = 0, the lender
charges a premium πNN to cover for the guarantee.
To summarize, the main characteristics of the reverse mortgage are as follows:
• The borrower either receives a lump-sum amount of L0 = ϕH0 on date zero, or
receives a flat amount per period until the contract terminates.
• On date 0, the borrower pays a premium πNN for the NNEG to the lender.
• When the contract terminates on date T , the lender receives the minimum of
the loan balance on date T , which is denoted as LT , and the net revenues from
selling the house, i.e., the lender receives min{(1− δ) ·HT , LT} = LT −NNT .
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It remains to specify how the loan balance accrues over time. We assume that
contract termination occurs at the end of a period, i.e., T ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , Tmax},
and that any intermediate payments occur only on dates t ∈ T . We consider reverse
mortgage schemes in which the lender charges a deterministic interest rate of r per
period. Whether the borrower pays interest before date T depends on the type of
reverse mortgage, as discussed below.
Lump sum contract—A lump-sum reverse mortgage product pays a lump-sum
amount at contract initiation. It is the most common type of reverse mortgage in
most of the markets. There are no intermediate interest payments and no principal
repayment before contract termination. Thus L0 = ϕH0, and the loan balance on
date T , denoted by LT , equals:
LT = L0(1 + r)
T . (3.3)
Hence, the cash flow stream of the reverse mortgage is as follows:
• t = 0: the borrower receives L0 − πNN from the lender, where πNN is the
premium for the guarantee.
• t = T : the lender receives LT −NNT from the borrower.
Interest only contract—The contract is the same as the lump-sum contract, except
that now each year the borrower pays interest on the outstanding debt. So, the initial
loan amount again equals L0 = ϕH0, but now, due to payment of interest, the loan
balance stays constant. Thus, the loan balance on date T equals:
LT = L0. (3.4)
The cash flow stream of the reverse mortgage is as follows:
• t = 0: borrower receives L0 − πNN .
• t ∈ {1, . . . , T}: the borrower pays interest rL0.
• t = T : the lender receives LT −NNT from the borrower.
Tenure contract—The tenure reverse mortgage product pays a fixed amount C at
the end of each period until the termination of the contract. This means that the




(1 + r)s. (3.5)
The cash flow stream is as follows:
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• t = 0: the borrower pays the premium πNN .
• t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}: the borrower receives C.
• t = T : the lender receives LT −NNT from the borrower.
The fixed payment C will be set such that the market value of the payments equals
ϕH0. This will be determined in the next section.
Table 3.1 summarizes the net cash flows from the point of view of the lender in
each of the three cases.
t = 0 t = 1 · · · t = T − 1 t = T
Lump-sum πNN − L0 0 · · · 0 LT −NNT
Interest only πNN − L0 rL0 · · · rL0 rL0 + L0 −NNT
Tenure πNN − C −C · · · −C LT −NNT
Table 3.1: This table presents the net cash flows from the point of view of the lender
in the three reverse mortgage schemes. In case of the lump sum and interest only
contract we have L0 = ϕH0. In case of the lump sum contract, we have LT =
L0(1 + r)
T , in case of the interest only contract, we have LT = L0, and in case of the




3.3 Pricing Reverse Mortgage Products
To determine the price of the reverse mortgage, we split it into two parts. We first
determine the market-consistent interest rate r for the “regular” loan without the
NNEG. We then calculate the NNEG as the present value of the loss of the lender at
contract termination. We assume that the conditions under which this loan is offered
are market-consistent, i.e., arbitrage opportunities are excluded. This means the
existence of a Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) Mt > 0 such that a (random) payoff
Xt at time t has price E(XtMt) at time 0. In addition, we assume that mortality risk
is independent of the other sources of risk (house price risk and financial risk), i.e., T
is independent of (Ht,Mt).
1 Thus, we have
1The assumption that T is independent of (Ht,Mt) does not exclude the possibility that there
is dependence between mortality and other sources of risk under the actual probability distribution:
the actual SDF M̃t might satisfy M̃t = MtΛt, where Λt represents the change of measure going
from the actual probability measure to the probability measure used in pricing (and which might be
converted into the risk neutral probability distribution). In the former there might be dependence
between mortality and the other risk sources. Only in the latter we assume independence between
T and (Ht,Mt).
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• P (t)0 = E(Mt),
with P
(t)
0 the time 0 price of a zero coupon bond that pays off 1 at maturity, with
time-to-maturity t, and we have
• E(MT ) =
∑Tmax




0 P(T = t),
where Tmax denotes the maximum value of T and using E(Mt|T = t) = E(Mt).
3.3.1 Termination Date
In this section, we model the probability distribution of the termination date T .
We consider the case where the contract terminates upon the decease of the last
surviving household member. If the borrower is a single person, T = Tx, where Tx
is the remaining lifetime of the borrower at time t = 0. If the borrower is a couple
consisting of a male aged x and a female aged y, then T = max{Tx, Ty}, where Tx
and Ty are the remaining lifetimes of the spouses at time t = 0.
To model the probability distribution of T , we let sp
(g)
z,t denote the probability that
a z-year-old in year t with gender g ∈ {m, f} survives at least s more years, and let
q
(g)
z,t be the probability that a z-year-old in year t with gender g dies within a year.
We assume that death always occurs at the end of a year. Moreover, in case of a
couple, we assume that Tx and Ty are independent. Then, the probability that the
contract terminates at the end of year t, P(T = t), is given by
P(T = t) = t−1p(g)x,0 · q
(g)
x+t−1,t−1
in case of a single insured of gender g and aged x at time t = 0, and is given by










































for a couple with a male aged x and a female aged y at time t = 0.
3.3.2 Pricing the Loan without the Guarantee
In this section, we determine the market-consistent fixed interest rate for the mortgage
without the NNEG. For each of the three types of reverse mortgage, the market-
consistent interest rate r is determined such that the market value of the net cash
flow stream to the lender (as displayed in Table 1) is zero, given πNN = NNT = 0.
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Lump sum contract—In absence of the NNEG, the lender pays L0 to the borrower
on date zero, and receives LT = (1 + r)
T · L0 from the borrower upon contract
termination. Therefore, the market-consistent interest rate r solves:
L0 = E(LTMT ) = L0(1 + r)T · E(MT ),




(1 + r)t · P (t)0 · P(T = t). (3.7)
Thus, the required interest rate r depends on the term structure of interest rate at
contract initiation as well as on the probability distribution of the termination time
T .
Interest only contract—The lender offers a loan of L0 on date zero, receives interest
payments rL0 in any year prior to termination, and receives L0 upon contract termi-















· P(T = t). (3.8)
Tenure contract—The lender pays the constant amount C to the borrower at times





at time T . We assume that C
is set such that the market value of the payments at time t = 0 equals ϕH0, i.e.,




P(T > t) · P (t)0
)
. (3.9)
The market-consistent interest rate r in this case follows from equating
ϕH0 = E(MTLT ), (3.10)
with ϕH0 given by (3.9). This yields (after canceling C from both sides):
Tmax−1∑
t=0
P(T > t) · P (t)0 =
Tmax∑
t=1








3.3.3 Pricing the Guarantee
In this section we discuss the approaches that we consider to determine the price of
the NNEG, given that r is set equal to the market-consistent rate for the loan without
the guarantee ((3.7), (3.8), or (3.11)).
If the lender offers a NNEG, she runs the risk that the value of the net revenue
from selling the property at contract termination, after transaction costs, is lower
than the outstanding debt. The lender then effectively acts as a guarantor who will
cover the amount NNT from (3.2) on date T . Assuming market-consistent pricing,
the date-zero price of the guarantee is:




E [max {Lt − (1− δ) ·Ht, 0} ·Mt|T = t] · P(T = t),
where LT is the loan balance on date T , given by (3.3), (3.4), or (3.5) depending on
the type of reverse mortgage, and where MT denotes the stochastic discount factor
on date T . Because we assume that T is independent of (Ht,Mt), the market price




π̃NN(t) · P(T = t), (3.12)
where π̃NN(t) = E [max {Lt − (1− δ) ·Ht, 0} ·Mt] denotes the time t = 0 price of the
guarantee (exactly) ending at date t. For each of the three reverse mortgage designs,
the value of π̃NN(t) depends on the joint distribution of the house price Ht and the
stochastic discount factor (SDF) Mt.
In the next section we will consider two approaches to determine the value of
π̃NN(t) by treating it as a put option:
• The GBM model: we price the NNEG in a Black-Scholes world.
• The (VAR) model: we derive the joint distribution of the SDF process Mt and
the house price process Ht in the context of a Vector AutoRegression (VAR)
model. The value of the NNEG is then determined via simulation.
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3.4 Pricing with the GBM model
3.4.1 The NNEG in the GBM Model
In the first model, we interpret the house as a dividend paying asset in continuous
time. Assuming the dividend rate is q and the house price and the SDF follow a
Geometric Brownian Motion, the NNEG can be priced as a Black-Scholes (European)
put option on the net house price. Indeed, at contract termination, payments to the
lender are capped by the net value of the house. As long as the net house value is
above the loan balance, the value of the NNEG will be zero. Only when the net house
value falls below the loan balance, the guarantee will have material effect. Thus, the
NNEG is a put option with strike price equal to the loan balance and with the net
house price as the underlying asset. The value of the option conditional on T = t is:
π̃NN(t) = E [max {Lt − (1− δ) ·Ht, 0} ·Mt]
= BSput ((1− δ)H0, Lt, rf , q, t, σ) , (3.13)
where
• rf is the risk-free rate, σ is the volatility of the house price, q is the dividend rate,
and Lt is the loan balance on date t given, by (3.3), (3.4), or (3.5) depending
on the type of reverse mortgage;






, with Wt ∼
N(0, t);





, with λ = (µ+q−rf )/σ;
• BSput (S0, K, rf , q, τ, σ) is the Black-Scholes price of a put option with initial
value S0 of the underlying, strike K, risk free rate rf , dividend rate q, maturity
τ , and volatility σ.
3.4.2 Calibration of the GBM Model
The price of the guarantee in the GBM model depends on the dividend rate q, the
proportional transaction cost δ, the volatility of the house price σ, and the probability
distribution of the contract termination date T . It also depends on the loan balance Lt
for all t ≤ Tmax. For the lump-sum contract and the tenure contract, the loan balance
depends on the market-consistent mortgage rate r (from (3.7) and (3.11)), which in
turn depends on the term structure of interest rates and the probability distribution
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Figure 3.1: This figure displays P(T = t), the probability distribution of termination
date T , for single individuals of different ages, and for a couple with a male aged 67
and a female aged 64.
of the contract termination date T . In this section, we discuss the calibration of these
parameters.
δ and σ – The transaction cost in case of a forced sale is set equal to δ = 30%.2 The
volatility of the house price growth rate is calibrated based on the log return of the
Dutch House Price Index from the first quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 2014.
This yields σ = 7%.
The probability distribution of T – To determine the probability distribution of T ,
we use the survival rates published by the Dutch Actuarial Society (AG) in their
AG2014 cohort life table. Figure 3.1 displays P(T = t) for single individuals of
different ages, and for a couple with a male aged 67 and a female aged 64.
Risk free rate rf and mortgage rate r – In the GBM model, the term structure is
flat at the risk free rate rf . To determine this risk free rate rf (which we shall call
the “equivalent risk free rate”), we consider the yield curve determined by the VAR
model (see Section 3.5.1), and we let rf be equal to the yield corresponding to the
expected duration of the reverse mortgage contract in the lump sum and interest only
contract, while in the tenure contract, we let rf be equal to the average yield from the
first period to the expected duration of the reverse mortgage contract. The expected
duration of the contract is determined as the weighted average of the contract ending
2Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken: The Dutch Mortgage Market, 26 May 2014.
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times, with the weight of each time equal to P (T = t), the contract termination
probability at the corresponding time. The market consistent interest rates then





. With a constant
equivalent risk-free rate, the market consistent interest rate is equal to this equivalent
risk-free rate (since r = rf solves equation (3.7), (3.8) and (3.11)). The equivalent
risk free rate rf and the market-consistent mortgage rate r depend on the age(s) of
the borrower, as these determine the expected duration. The results are displayed
in Table 3.2. The corresponding loan balance as a function of time is displayed in
Figure 3.2 for the three types of reverse mortgages.
couple 65 70 75 80 85
Lump-sum 0.819% 0.815% 0.805% 0.794% 0.772% 0.744%
Interest-only 0.819% 0.815% 0.805% 0.794% 0.772% 0.744%
Tenure 0.742% 0.732% 0.711% 0.686% 0.649% 0.604%
Table 3.2: This table presents the risk free rates (rf ), which are also the market-
consistent mortgage rates (r), in the GBM model for buyers with different ages in the
the three types of reverse mortgage schemes.
Figure 3.2: The loan balance as a function of t, with L0 normalized to 1. The dashed
line, dotted line, and solid lines represent loan balances for different borrowers in
the lump-sum scheme, the interest-only scheme, and the tenure scheme, respectively.
The vertical dash-dotted lines represent the expected remaining lives of the borrowers,
which are also the expected durations of the contract.
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ϕ 1 3 5 6 10 15 20 30
0%-67% 1.25% 1.25% 1.25% 1.8% 1.88% 2.30% 2.7% 3.45%
68%-88% 1.45% 1.45% 1.45% 2.0% 2.08% 2.5% 2.9% 3.65%
89%-98% 1.75% 1.75% 1.75% 2.3% 2.38% 2.80% 3.2% 3.95%
99%+ 2.05% 2.05% 2.05% 2.60% 2.68% 3.10% 3.5% 4.25%
Table 3.3: This table displays the mortgage rates (r) of Florius for different loan-
to-value ratios and terms of maturity. These data are obtained from the website of
Florius on 8 April 2016.
Dividend rate q – To calibrate the value of the dividend rate q, we use data on interest
rates for regular mortgages offered by Florius. Table 3.3 displays the interest rate
of Florius for different loan-to-value ratios (ϕ) and terms of maturity. The interest
rate is not linearly but stair-step increasing with the loan-to-value ratio. We focus
on mortgages with ϕ = 67% and ϕ = 98% in the calibration of the dividend rate q.
We determine the model-implied interest rates for these two values of ϕ (also taking
into account that in the real world the mortgage rate r will include a mark-up). We
then determine the lower bound for q such that the model-implied interest rates are
no larger than the Florius interest rates and for all maturities, and the upper bound
for q such that the model-implied interest rates are no less than the Florius interest
rates for all maturities, i.e., we let
qmin = max
{





q : R(q, ϕ, Tm) ≥ RFlorius(ϕ, Tm) for all ϕ, Tm
}
,
whereR(q, ϕ, Tm) denotes the model-implied market-consistent interest rates for mort-
gages with loan-to-value ratio ϕ and term to maturity Tm. In the calibration we
consider ϕ ∈ {67%, 98%} and Tm ∈ {10, 15, 20}. The details of the procedure (in-
cluding our choice of mark-ups) are discussed in the Appendix.3 Figure 3.3 presents
R(q, ϕ, Tm) as a function of the time-to-maturity in the GBM model with q equal
to its upper or lower bound. We find qmin = 4.6% and qmax = 6.6%. We set the
calibrated value of q equal to (qmin + qmax)/2.
3.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the price of the NNEG, πNN , to the
various parameter values. The sensitivities of π̃NN(t) follow straightforwardly from
3https://www.hypotheeklastencalculator.nl/berekenen/executiewaarde/
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Figure 3.3: This figure displays R(q, ϕ, Tm) as a function of the term to ma-
turity of regular mortgage Tm, for q = qmin and for q = qmax in the GBM
model. The dashed lines represent the interest rates of Florius and the dotted
lines represent the model-implied interest rate. The lines from the top to the
bottom are R(qmax, 98%, Tm), R
Florius(98%, Tm), R(qmin, 98%, Tm), R(qmax, 67%, Tm),
RFlorius(67%, Tm), and R(qmin, 67%, Tm), respectively.
the “Greeks,” see, for example, Hull (2015). The sensitivity of πNN then follows from
(3.12). We first present the partial derivatives of π̃NN(t) with respect to the various
parameters. Then we illustrate graphically the sensitivities of πNN with respect to
these parameters.
To present the partial derivatives of π̃NN(t), we first notice that BSput (S0, K, rf , q, τ, σ),
with S0 = (1− δ)H0, K = Lt, and τ = t, is given by
BSput ((1− δ)H0, Lt, rf , q, t, σ) = e−rtLtΦ(−d2)− (1− δ)H0e−qtΦ(−d1),
with
d1 =





d2 = d1 − σ
√
t and where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution.
The partial derivatives of π̃NN(t) with respect to the loan-to-value ratio ϕ, the
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where ∂Lt/∂ϕ depends on the reverse mortgage scheme and where φ is the density
function of the standard normal distribution. These partial derivatives are all positive,
implying that π̃NN(t) and thus also πNN are increasing functions of these parameters.
These positive partial derivatives can easily be understood using the characteris-
tics of the underlying put option. For example, an increase in the loan-to-value ratio
ϕ results in an increase in the strike price of the put option, which leads to a higher
put option price. An increase in the dividend rate q results in an increase in the risk
premium (i.e., λ = (µ+ q− rf )/σ). This yields a more widespread distribution of the
SDF Mt, resulting in a higher put option price. An increase in the transaction costs
δ means a decrease in the underlying value (1 − δ)H0. But the delta (∆) of a put
option (i.e., the sensitivity of the put option price with respect to the underlying) is
negative, so that an increase in δ has a positive effect on the put option price. Finally,
an increase in the house price volatility σ is positive, following from vega (i.e., the
sensitivity of the put option price with respect to the volatility) being positive.




























with ν = ∂π̃NN(t)/∂σ, the partial derivative of π̃NN(t) with respect to σ (known as
the “Greek” vega). The second order partial derivatives with respect to ϕ and δ are
positive, implying that π̃NN(t) and thus also πNN are convex functions of ϕ and δ.
On the other hand, the second order partial derivatives with respect to q and σ can
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be both positive and negative. This implies that π̃NN(t) can be both accelerating and
decelerating as function of q and σ, depending on the parameter values.
In Figure 3.4, we illustrate graphically πNN as a function of the loan-to-value ratio
(ϕ, first row), the dividend rate (q, second row), the proportional transaction cost (δ,
third row), and the volatility of the house price (σ, last row), with ϕ ∈ [0, 1], and with
the latter three parameters around their calibrated values. The left panels correspond
to the the lump sum contract, the middle panels to the interest-only contract, and
the right panels to the tenure contract. In each case, results are displayed for single
borrowers of different ages. If ϕ is fixed, we set it equal to ϕ = 0.50. If any of the
other three parameters is kept fixed, its value is set equal to its calibrated value.
The initial house price is set equal to H0 = 1. Figure 3.5 complements Figure 3.4 by
showing the second order partial derivatives with respect to ϕ and q as a function of ϕ
and q, respectively, and by showing ∂2π̃NN(t)/∂ϕ∂q = ∂
2π̃NN(t)/∂q∂ϕ as a function









All curves in Figure 3.4 are increasing as follows from the positive partial deriva-
tives of π̃NN(t). Their shapes can be understood by taking into account the second
order partial derivatives. For the same parameter values, the curves for older buyers
typically correspond to lower values of πNN . Older buyers have a higher probability
of shorter remaining lifetimes. This would suggest a higher value, since theta (i.e., the
sensitivity of the standard put option price with respect to the time-to-maturity, with
symbol Θ) is typically negative, except for deep in-the-money put options. However,
there are two opposing effects. First, we have an effect via the strike price. Increasing
the time-to-maturity, increases this strike price (except in the interest only contract),
which has a positive effect on the put option value. Secondly, we have an effect via
the risk free interest rate: older buyers have a lower risk free interest rate (see Table
3.2). Since rho (i.e., the sensitivity of the standard put option price with respect to
the risk free interest rate) is negative, a lower risk free rate implies a higher value
of the put option. The graphs show the resulting net age effects. In most cases the
two positive effects (via the strike price and the risk free interest rate) dominate the
negative time effect (via Θ), except for the tenure contract with very low dividend
yields. The age effect is stronger in the lump sum case than in the interest only case.
This can be understood as follows. The lump sum and the interest only contract have
the same risk free rates, so an important difference in terms of the age effect between
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity analyses of πNN for the lump-sum scheme (left), the interest
only scheme (middle) and the tenure scheme (right). Diagrams from the first row
to the fourth row show the sensitivity of πNN with respect to the loan-to-value ratio
(ltv), the dividend rate (q), the proportional cost (δ), and the house price volatility
(σ), respectively.
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these two is the positive strike effect, which is present in the lump sum but absent
in the interest only contract. The tenure contract has a lower risk free interest rates
than the other two contracts (see Table 3.2), so that here the magnitude of the net
age effect compared to the other two is not immediately clear, but can be observed
from the figure (given the considered parameter values).
Among these calibrated parameters (dividend rate (q), proportional transaction
costs (δ), and volatility of the house price (σ)), πNN seems to be most sensitive to
the dividend rate. For example, πNN for a 65-year-old borrower increases from 1.68%
to around 39.8% as the dividend rate increases from 0% to 10% in the lump-sum
scheme. In the interest-only scheme, πNN only increases from 0.01%% to 17.35% and
in the tenure scheme, it increases from 4.21% to 42.28%.
3.5 Pricing with the VAR model
In this section we consider an alternative approach to model the joint distribution of
(Ht,Mt). This approach makes use of a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model that
includes the GBM model as a special case. We first present the VAR model, the
corresponding SDF, and the implied term structure. Next, we discuss the parameter
estimation and calibration. We conclude this section by illustrating the pricing of the
NNEG (i.e., πNN).
3.5.1 The VAR Model
Five variables in total will be included in the VAR model: the Dutch GDP log growth
rate, the log return on the Dutch House price index (which reflects the growth rate
of house prices), inflation (quantified as the log price change in the CPI index), the
3 months Euribor rate, and the spread of the 10 years zero coupon rate over the
3-months Euribor rate. Table 3.4 presents the variable names and a short descrip-
tion of each of the variables. These choices are motivated by the literature. Brooks
and Tsolacos (1999) indicated that interest and inflation are significant factors in
explaining house price returns. Abelson et al (2005) estimated a model using several
economic variables. They found that in the long run house prices are affected sig-
nificantly by disposable income, interest rates, equity prices, consumer price indexes,
and the supply of housing. Ang and Piazzesi (2003) describe the joint dynamics of
bond yields and macroeconomic variables in a VAR model. They include GDP as a
factor in predicting housing prices and the yield curve. Following this study, we also
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Figure 3.5: Sensitivity analysis of the derivative of πNN for the lump-sum scheme
(left), the interest only scheme (middle) and the tenure scheme (right). The trans-
action cost δ = 0.3, and the volatility of the house price increasing rate σ = 0.07.
Diagrams from the first row to the fourth row show the sensitivity of ∂πNN/∂q with re-
spect to the loan-to-value ratio (ϕ), the dividend rate (q), the sensitivity of ∂πNN/∂ϕ
with respect to the loan-to-value ratio (ϕ), the dividend rate (q), respectively.
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include GDP and inflation in our VAR model. In line with recent studies (Sherris
and Sun (2010), Alai et al (2013), Shao et al (2012) and Cho et al (2013)) we will use
two factors from the yield curve, namely, the three months Euribor rate and the ten
year spread.
variable definition
hpi house price growth rate
gdp GDP growth rate
cpi inflation
y(1) 3-month zero-coupon rate
y(40) − y(1) 10-year yield spread
Table 3.4: This table presents the state variables used in the VAR model.
The dynamics of the five state variables, collected in the n-dimensional vector xt,
with n = 5 in our case, is assumed to follow the following VAR:
xt+1 = α + Γxt + Σεt+1, εt+1
i.i.d∼ N(0n×1, In×n), (3.14)
where α is an n-vector of parameters, Γ is an n×n-dimensional matrix of parameters,
Σ an n× n-dimensional lower triangular matrix, and εt+1 is an n-dimensional vector
of error terms representing the shocks to the system.
For Γ = 0, we would find for Ht








with α1 the first component of α, σ1 the (1, 1)-component of Σ, and ε1,s the first
component of εs. Thus, this house price process is similar to the house price process
we used in the GBM (using α1 = µ− 12σ
2
1), implying that the VAR-model, with Γ 6= 0,
generalizes the GBM house price process.
3.5.2 The Stochastic Discount Factor
The SDF Mt is given by Mt =
∏t
s=1ms, where ms > 0 is the SDF between periods
s− 1 and s, i.e., for a payoff Xs at time s the price Ss−1 at time s− 1 is given by
Ss−1 = Es−1(msXs),
with Es−1 the conditional expectation operator, conditional upon the information
available at time s − 1. For a payoff Xt at time t, the price at time t = 0 can
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with E = E0.











t the one-period (continuously compounded) interest rate and λ an n-dimensional





















s=1 εs follows a n-dimensional normal distribution with mean vector 0 and
covariance matrix tIn, with In the n-dimensional identity matrix. Thus, this SDF Mt
generalizes the SDF that we use in the GBM model.
3.5.3 The (Implied) Term Structure
The (nominal) term structure can be derived from the yields of the zero-coupon bonds.







A T-year zero coupon bond, like any payoff in the economy, can be priced by the










For T = 1 we have
y
(1)
t = − log(P
(1)











t ) = −A(T)−B(T)′xt, (3.19)
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A(T) and B(T) can be solved recursively using this equation. This results in the
following equations:
A(T) = A(T− 1) +B(T− 1)′α− 1
2
B(T− 1)′ΣΣ′B(T− 1)−B(T− 1)′Σλ
B(T) = Γ′B(T− 1) + δ1,
(3.20)
with δ1 = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0)
′, selecting the fourth component of xt, which is y
(1)
t . The
starting values for A and B are A(0) = 0, B(0) = 0n (following from logP
(0)
t =
log(1) = 0). The zero-coupon yields are thus given by
y
(T)
t = a(T) + b(T)′xt, (3.21)
with a(T) = −A(T)/T and b(T) = −B(T)/T.
3.5.4 Data
For the five state variables, we use data retrieved from Datastream and the Dutch
Central Bank (DNB), from the first quarter of 2009 up to and including the first
quarter of 2016. Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of the five state variables since the
second quarter of 1995, when the HPI growth rate became available. Since the GDP
growth rate is only available quarterly, we use quarterly data. There was a change
in the evolution pattern during the financial crisis, especially for the 3-month rate
and the HPI growth rate. Both of them are essential in the pricing of the NNEG. To
better deal with the impact of the low interest rate and house price growth rate, we
use the subsample after the financial crisis in our estimation (i.e., starting from the
first quarter of 2009).
In the calibration to the prices of idiosyncratic risk (the parameter vector λ) we
make use of interest rates, downloaded from the website of the European Central
Bank.4 We use the three-month, nine-month, and one-year to thirty-year interest
rates from the third quarter of 2014 to the first quarter of 2016.
3.5.5 Estimation and Calibration
In line with the existing literature (Ang and Piazzesi, 2004; Cochrane and Piazzesi,
2005 and 2008), we conduct a two-step estimation procedure to determine the param-
eters of the VAR model and the SDF. In the first step, we estimate the VAR model
using maximum likelihood. In the second step, we treat the estimated parameters
in the VAR model as given, and calibrate λ, the vector of the price of idiosyncratic
4See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/yc/html/index.en.html.
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(a) HPI growth rate (b) GDP growth rate
(c) Inflation (d) 3-month rate
(e) 10-year spread
Figure 3.6: These figures display the historical movements of the state variables in the
VAR model. The caption under each figure indicates the name of the corresponding
state variable.
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risk, by minimizing the squared difference between the model-implied term structure
of interest rates (as function of λ) to the historical term structure of interest rates.
The first step estimation results are shown in Table 3.5. The calibrated values for the
price of the idiosyncratic risk parameters are shown in the second and third columns
(columns “original 1” and “original 2”) of Table 3.6. In case of “original 1” we do not
impose restrictions on λ. In case of “original 2” we assume only the inflation, short
rates, and 10-year rate spreads have a non-zero price of idiosyncratic risk. This means




-0.00196 0.39646 0.2496 -0.26041 -3.68573 1.37647
0.00401 0.14667 0.24664 0.27633 1.52411 1.06391
gdp
-0.00636 0.22988 0.07766 -0.0519 -0.0393 2.25398
0.003 0.1097 0.18447 0.20668 1.13992 0.79572
cpi
0.00324 -0.06246 -0.14935 -0.04322 0.55684 -0.16527
0.00276 0.10074 0.1694 0.1898 1.04681 0.73073
y(1)
0.00067 0.0066 0.03084 0.00348 0.86901 -0.12491
0.00043 0.01585 0.02665 0.02986 0.16469 0.11497
y(40) − y(1) 0.0013 -0.02394 -0.05615 -0.04688 -0.00171 0.69047
0.00045 0.01654 0.02782 0.03117 0.1719 0.1200
µ = (I − Γ)−1α Σ
hpi -0.00491 0.00895 0 0 0 0
gdp 0.00103 0.0001 0.0067 0 0 0
cpi 0.00346 -0.00028 -0.00079 0.00609 0 0
y(1) 0.00154 -2.63E-05 -0.0008 5.82E-05 0.00054 0
y(40) − y(1) 0.00385 -0.00029 -0.00039 0.00016 0.00027 0.00083
Table 3.5: Estimation results of the VAR(1) model xt+1 = α + Γxt + Σεt+1. The
first column contains the state variables. In the first part of this table, the estimated
coefficients and the corresponding standard errors are presented. In the second part
of this table, the Σ matrix and the model implied quarterly equilibrium rates for the
state variables are presented.
For the log return on the house price index we find that it depends positively on
its own lag (with coefficient around 0.40) and negatively on the one-year interest rate
(with coefficient around −3.7). These effects are statistically significant (at the 5%
significance level). The implied long run average of the log return on the house price
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original 1 original 2 middle lower upper
hpi -0.055 0 0 0 0
gdp 0.114 0 0 0 0
cpi -0.003 -0.0060 -0.0058 -0.0055 -0.0061
y(1) -0.126 -0.2525 -0.2505 -0.2470 -0.2540
y(40) − y(1) -0.008 -0.0162 -0.0163 -0.0166 -0.0161
Table 3.6: This table presents the calibrated λ, the price of risk. The first column
contains the name of the risk factors. The calibrated values for the price of the
idiosyncratic risk parameters are shown in columns 2 to 6. In the second column
(column “original 1”), we do not impose restrictions on λ. In columns 3 to 6, we
assume only the inflation, short rates, and 10-year rate spreads have a non-zero price
of idiosyncratic risk. The calibrated values in column 2 correspond to the case where
the house price increase rate is the one estimated by the VAR model (denoted as
µhhpi). The calibrated values in columns 4, 5, and 6 correspond to the cases where
the house price increase rate equal to the calibrated mortgage based drift (denoted
as µmhpi later), the lower bound of the drift (denoted as µ
m
hpi,min later), and the upper
bound of the drift (denoted as µmhpi,max later), respectively.
index (shown in the bottom panel of Table 3.5) turns out to be −0.491%, i.e., around
−1.96% on an annual basis. The estimated volatility of the house price index, equal
to around 1.8% on an annual basis (i.e., ca.
√
4×0.895%), is lower than the calibrated
value of the volatility used in the GBM model, since the estimated volatility is based
on a shorter sample, starting from the first quarter of 2009.
In the GBM model this long run average does not play a role in the pricing of the
NNEG (as it does not appear in the Black Scholes put option formula). However,
contrary to the GBM model, this parameter and the related (conditional) mean of
the log return on the house price index do play a role in the pricing of the NNEG in
our version of the VAR model. Indeed, suppose that the house-cum-dividend value
H̃t+1 at time t+ 1 is given by
H̃t+1 = Ht+1 exp(qt), (3.22)
with qt the dividend yield. Then Ht = Et(Mt+1H̃t+1) yields,
qt = y
(1)
t − α1 −
1
2
σ21 − γ′1xt + λ1σ1, (3.23)
with (as before) α1 the first component of α, σ1 the (1, 1)-component of Σ, λ1 the
first component of λ, and with γ1 the first row of Γ. As discussed in the context of
the GBM model, the parameter qt is an important parameter in the pricing of the
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NNEG. The results might be quite sensitive to this parameter. Therefore, like in the
GBM model, we shall calibrate qt, based on observed prices of regular mortgages.
The dividend yield qt can be calibrated in different ways, for example, by (re)
-calibrating one or more of the parameters of the right hand side of (3.23). In this
paper we choose to calibrate qt by (re)calibrating µ
h
hpi, the first component of µ, with
µ given by µ = (In−Γ)−1α, and h means the value is estimated using historical house
price data. The calibrated value of µhhpi results in (re)calibrated values of the whole
vector α, using α = (In − Γ)µ. To re-calibrated µhpi, we use the same procedure as
described for the GBM model. We expect that the re-calibrated value based on regular
mortgage data better reflects the risk premium in the house price increase rate than
the estimated value based on house price data. To make a distinction between the
calibrated value of the house price increase rate based on regular mortgage data and
the estimated value of the house price increase rate based on house price data, we refer
to the calibrated value (based on the regular mortgage data) as the “mortgage data
based drift” and denote it as µmhpi, where m means that this drift is based on (regular)
mortgage data. Details are available in the Appendix of this chapter. We present the
results for the version of our model with only the inflation, short rates, and 10-year
rate spreads having a non-zero price of idiosyncratic risk (i.e., version “original 2” in
Table 3.6). Figure 3.7 presents the analogue of Figure 3.3, with R(µmhpi, ϕ, Tm) instead
of R(q, ϕ, Tm). We show R(µ
m
hpi, ϕ, Tm) as a function of the term to maturity of regular
mortgages (Tm) with µ
m
hpi equal to its upper or lower bound. The figure also displays
RFlorius(ϕ, Tm) (see Figure 3.3). The resulting calibrated upper and lower bound for
µmhpi (annualized) are given by:
µmhpi, min = −4.99% and µmhpi, max = −1.14%.







t = 0, using annualized parameter values). Thus, there is some (minor)
overlap with the range found in the GBM model. We set the mortgage data based
drift of the annualized µmhpi equal to the average of the upper and lower bound drifts:
µmhpi = (µ
m
hpi, min + µ
m
hpi, max)/2 = −3.065%.
This mortgage data based drift is substantially lower than the estimated value (equal
to −1.96%). However, the estimated value lies between the lower and upper bound.
With the mortgage data based drift of the house price growth rate µmhpi and the
corresponding constant terms α, we re-calibrated the prices of idiosyncratic risk λ
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Figure 3.7: This figure displays R(q, ϕ, Tm) as a function of Tm, for µhpi =
µhpi,min and for µhpi = µhpi,max in the VAR model. The dashed lines repre-
sent the interest rates of Florius and the dotted lines represent the model-implied
interest rate. The lines from the top to the bottom are R(µhpi,min, 98%, Tm),
RFlorius(98%, Tm), R(µhpi,max, 98%, Tm), R(µhpi,min, 67%, Tm), R
Florius(67%, Tm), and
R(µhpi,max, 67%, Tm), respectively.
to derive the SDF corresponding to the mortgage data based drift, the upper and
the lower bound of µphpi. In this way, by not re-calibrating just a single (ad hoc)
parameter, we aim to avoid disturbing the links between the different parts of the
model. Table 3.6, columns “middle,” “lower,” and “upper” show the resulting values
of λ for µmhpi equal to its mortgage data based drift, and to its lower and upper limit,
respectively.
Finally, we make the same assumptions with respect to T as in the GBM model.
Also the value of δ is chosen as in the GBM model.
3.5.6 Pricing the NNEG
We can now price the NNEG with the VAR model. We use the end-of-sample term
structure of interest rates according to the VAR model, given by equation (3.21) with
xt equal to the state variables in the last period of the sample. The resulting term
structure is displayed in Figure 3.8. The corresponding market-consistent interest
rates follow from solving (3.7), (3.8), and (3.11), with P
(t)
0 = exp(−ty(t))t. The
results are displayed in Table 3.7.
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couple 65 70 75 80 85
Lump-sum 0.819% 0.815% 0.806% 0.793% 0.773% 0.741%
Interest-only 0.816% 0.811% 0.803% 0.790% 0.769% 0.737%
Tenure 0.847% 0.846% 0.844% 0.841% 0.835% 0.823%
Table 3.7: This table contains the market-consistent mortgage rates in the VAR model
for different buyers in the three reverse mortgage schemes.
Figure 3.8: This figure displays the term structure of interest rate in the VAR model.
This is also the term structure of interest rates used in the derivation of the market-
consistent reverse mortgage rates.
We determine the price of the guarantee conditional at time t, i.e.
π̃NN(t) = E [max {Lt − (1− δ) ·Ht, 0} ·Mt] ,
via simulation. In our simulation we generate 5000 scenarios for (Ht,Mt). For each
scenario, we determine the corresponding value of max {Lt(ϕ)− (1− δ) ·Ht, 0} ·Mt,
and we set π̃NN(t) equal to the average of these simulated values. Combined with the
probability distribution of T , this yields the value of πNN following from (3.12).
In Figure 3.9, we display πNN for the three reverse mortgage products as a function
of the two input parameters ϕ (the effect of the loan-to-value ratio) and δ (the forced
sale transaction cost), with the other parameters set to their estimated or calibrated
values, and with H0 = 1.
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Figure 3.9: Sensitivity analysis of πNN for the lump-sum scheme (left), the interest
only scheme (middle) and the tenure scheme (right) in the VAR model. πNN is plotted
against the loan-to-value ratio (ϕ) in the first row and the proportional transaction
cost (δ) in the second row.
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The interest-only contract yields the lowest πNN value, and the tenure contract
yields the highest πNN value. With µ
p
hpi = −3.065%, for a 65-year-old borrower, πNN
is 56.97% for the interest-only scheme when the initial loan-to-value ratio is 100%.
The corresponding πNN is around 73.55% for the lump-sum scheme and 79.16% for
the tenure scheme.
3.6 Model risk
In the previous sections we discussed two approaches to price the NNEG. The results
show that among the calibrated/estimated parameters, the value of the NNEG seems
to be quite sensitive to the dividend rate q in the GBM model, and to the house price
growth rate µhpi in the VAR model. For both these parameters, we have calibrated
the range of plausible values using data on regular mortgages. This led to (in annual
terms)
q ∈ [4.6%, 6.6%], for the GBM model,
µmhpi ∈ [−4.99%,−1.14%], for the VAR model.
We note that the mortgage data based drift in the VAR model, µphpi, not only reflects
the house growth rate, but also the risk premium.
In this section, we compare the ranges of the value of πNN for the GBM model
and for the VAR model, resulting from these calibrated ranges of parameters q and
µphpi, respectively.
Figure 3.10 and Table 3.8 display the upper bound and the lower bound for πNN
for both models, as a function of the loan-to-value ratio. All other parameters are set
equal to their calibrated/estimated values, as discussed in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.5,
respectively. We present results for the case where the borrower is a couple, consisting
of a male and a female, with the male 67 years and the female 64. As before, the
initial house value is normalized to 1. Figure 3.10 also includes the results using the
calibrated value of q in the GBM model (i.e., q = 5.6%) and using the estimated
value of µhhpi in the VAR model (i.e., µ
h
hpi = −1.96%).
The results show that the difference in the values of πNN between the lower and
upper bounds can be quite substantial. For example, for the lump sum contract, we
find using the VAR model that the interval of πNN is around [0%, 5.4%] for the lowest
loan-to-value ratio considered (ϕ = 15.5%), changing to [24%, 45%] for the largest




15.5% 1.320% 4.560% 0.000% 5.370%
20% 3.270% 8.090% 0.070% 9.360%
30% 10.210% 17.160% 2.710% 19.200%
40% 19.090% 26.860% 9.720% 29.500%
50% 28.700% 36.760% 19.130% 39.930%
55% 33.620% 41.740% 24.180% 45.170%
Interest-only Scheme
ϕ GBM VAR
15.5% 0.430% 2.390% 0.000% 2.760%
20% 1.330% 4.750% 0.000% 5.560%
30% 5.470% 11.510% 0.330% 13.080%
40% 11.760% 19.120% 3.320% 21.230%
50% 19.120% 27.020% 9.350% 29.560%
55% 22.990% 31.010% 13.080% 33.760%
Tenure Scheme
ϕ GBM VAR
15.5% 2.260% 5.680% 0.170% 7.100%
20% 4.650% 9.290% 0.960% 11.320%
30% 11.950% 18.250% 5.890% 21.440%
40% 20.650% 27.760% 13.880% 31.980%
50% 29.960% 37.470% 23.340% 42.670%
55% 34.740% 42.370% 28.340% 48.060%
Table 3.8: The boundaries of πNN in the two models. The first column contains the
loan-to-value ratios; the second and third columns contain the lower and upper bound
of πNN in the GBM model; the fourth and fifth columns contain the lower and upper
bound of πNN in the VAR model.
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(a) GBM: lump-sum (b) VAR: lump-sum
(c) GBM: interest-only (d) VAR: interest-only
(e) GBM: tenure (f) VAR: tenure
Figure 3.10: These figures show πNN as a function of the loan-to-value ratio in the
three reverse mortgage schemes. Figures on the left panels are from the GBM model,
and figures on the right panels are from the VAR model. Lines of different types
represent different house dividend rates in the GBM model and different house price
growth rates in the VAR model. Dotted lines in the right figures indicate the situation
with house price growth rate set to µphpi,min, and in the left figures they correspond
to the situation with the dividend rate set to qmax; dash-dotted lines in the right
figures indicate situation with the house price growth rate set to µphpi,max and in the
left figures they correspond to the situation with q = qmin. The solid lines represent
the πNN corresponding to the calibrated dividend rate (q = 5.6%) in the GBM model
and the estimated house price growth rate (µhpi = −1.96%) in the VAR model.
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model are somewhat smaller, but still large, and always included in the intervals of
the VAR model. These wide intervals, based on a regular mortgage based calibration,
show that there is considerable model risk when pricing the NNEG of reverse mortgage
products. This might be another reason why the reverse mortgage market is so
small. If there is an active housing market, where reverse mortgage providers can use
derivatives to reduce the exposure to model risk, the reverse mortgage market might
expand.
Table 3.9 shows the maximum allowed loan-to-value ratio by the Dutch mortgage
provider Florius for lump sum reverse mortgages, as a function of the age(s) of the
buyer(s).5 For the couple that we consider, the maximum loan-to-value ratio is 15.5%.
The reverse mortgage interest rate charged by Florius is fixed at 3.9% regardless of
the age and loan-to-value ratio.6 So, we cannot directly make a comparison with
our model based calculations of πNN . Based on a simple “back-of-the-envelope”
calculation, assuming that the NNEG corresponds more or less to the difference
between the reverse mortgage interest rate and a regular thirty-year mortgage interest
rate (3.45%, see Table 3.3), we find a value for the NNEG around 3.9% which is inside
the intervals of both the GBM and VAR models.
Age 65 70 75 80 85 couple (64+67)
maxϕ 18.5% 23.9% 29.6% 35.3% 40.1% 15.5%
Table 3.9: The maximum loan-to-value ratio allowed by Florius
In Figure 3.11 we plot the bounds of πNN corresponding to the cases presented
in Table 3.9 based on the GBM and VAR model. Thus, for the 65-year-olds, we use
ϕ = 18.5%, for the 70-year-olds we use ϕ = 23.9%, and so on. We also include as
reference the simple “back-of-the-envelope” based calculation of the NNEG using the
reverse mortgage and regular mortgage rates of Florius. Similar to the results for the
couples, we find a wide range for πNN , ranging from close to 0% to almost 7% for a
70-year-old to a range from close to 0% to around 3.5% for an 85-year-old. Again the
5These data are obtained from the Florius website on 8 April 2016, see https://www.florius.
nl/Pages/handig/bereken-verzilver-hypotheek.aspx. After we fill in the date of birth and
the house value of the buyer, the maximum loan-to-value ratio will be obtained with the existing
mortgage on the property equal to zero.
6The mortgage rate is also obtained from the Florius website on 8 April 2016, see previous
footnote.
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interval in case of the GBM model is narrower than in case of the VAR model, but
for higher ages the GBM range is no longer fully contained in the VAR range.
In our analysis, we have assumed that the termination rates are mortality rates
given by the AG2014 life table. However, there are two opposite forces that may
drive the termination rates away from the mortality rates in the AG2014 life table.
On the one hand, there might be adverse selection in buying a reverse mortgage
product. Those who have a longer subjective life expectancy may be more willing to
buy a reverse mortgage product. Thus, the mortality rates might be overestimated.
On the other hand, the termination probability may be underestimated because we
ignore other reasons for termination, for instance moving permanently to a nursing
home. The fact that in our analysis we did not account for adverse selection and
have assumed away the possibility of termination due to causes other than decease
implies that the degree of model risk in the price of reverse mortgages is likely un-
derestimated. We therefore performed a sensitivity analysis in which we investigate
the effects of alternative assumptions regarding the termination rate on the price of
reverse mortgages. We look at both cases where termination rates increase and cases
where termination rates decrease as compared to mortality rates from AG2014. Chen,
et al. (2011) and the HUD assume that the mobility rate is about 30% of the mortal-
ity rate. Therefore, as an upper bound we consider the case where the termination
rate is 130% of the mortality rate given by the AG2014 table. We also consider cases
where the termination rate is 110% or 120% of the mortality rate. To investigate the
potential impact of adverse selection, we consider the case where the termination rate
is 10%, 20% or 30% lower than the mortality rate according to the AG2014 table. We
find that increasing the termination rate reduces the value of the NNEG and the sen-
sitivity of πNN to the main parameters while decreasing the termination rates has the
opposite effect. But qualitatively, the results are largely consistent with the findings
when using the AG2014 life table. The main difference is that the rates charged by
Florius fall below the lower bound of the rates for the GBM model when termination
rates decrease by at least 20%. However, this is a quite extreme case. If the mobility
rate is 30% of the mortality rate, then a decrease of 20% in the termination rate as
compared to AG2014 implies that the adverse selection reduces the mortality rate by
38.5%.
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Figure 3.11: This figure displays the model implied NNEG. The solid lines represent
πNN implied by the GBM model. The dashed lines represent πNN implied by the
VAR model. The corresponding loan-to-value ratios are taken from Table 3.9. As
reference, the dash-dotted line shows the calculation of πNN assuming that the NNEG
corresponds to the difference between the reverse mortgage interest rate (3.9%) and
a regular thirty-year mortgage interest rate (3.45%, see Table 3.3).
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we price the No-Negative-Equity-Guarantee (NNEG) of reverse mort-
gage products using two different models. In the first model, the house price follows a
Geometric Brownian Motion. Treating the house as a dividend paying asset, we can
price the value of the NNEG as a put option with the strike price equal to the loan
balance. In the second model, we model the house price and the stochastic discount
factor using a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model. In this way, the house price
movement is allowed to be correlated with other macro-economic factors.
Based on our sensitivity analysis, we find that the dividend rate has a substantial
impact on the price of the NNEG. For example, the partial derivative of the value of
NNEG to the dividend rate is around 4 at the benchmark in the GBM model. An
increasing dividend rate will dramatically increase the value of the NNEG and thus
decrease the amount of cash that can be released from the house.
We calibrate a range of the dividend yield in the GBM model and of the house
price growth rate in the VAR model using regular mortgage data. For the dividend
rate we find a range of 4.6% to 6.6%. For the mortgage data based drift µmhpi we find a
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range of −4.99% to −1.14%. Given these calibrated parameter ranges, we determine
the model implied price ranges of the price of the NNEG. These price ranges turn out
to be quite substantial, implying that there is considerable model risk when pricing
the NNEG using the models that we consider.
This substantial model risk means that pricing the NNEG in reverse mortgage
products is quite a challenging task. However, in our approach we made a number
of possibly restrictive assumptions, which might have impact on our findings. For
example, in practice regular and reverse mortgage interest rates might be determined
in a different way than we model. This might affect our calibration results, in par-
ticular, it might affect the amount of model risk that we find. In the GBM model
we only allow for one source of risk. In the VAR model we allow for multiple sources
of risk, but, at least in the version that we present, we assume that the house price
of idiosyncratic risk is equal to zero. Other ways of calibrating the prices of idiosyn-
cratic risk and the dividend yield might yield different outcomes. When calibrating
the ranges of the dividend yield (in the GBM model) and the house price growth rate
(in the VAR model), presented in the Appendix, we also impose strong assumptions.
For example, we assume independence between the financial risk, house price risk,
and default risk. Relaxing these and other assumptions might affect the model risk.
Finally, we present results for both the GBM and a version of the VAR model, but
without making a clear choice between them. These are topics of future research.
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Appendix
We use ordinary mortgage products to calibrate the dividend rate q in the Geometric
Brownian Motion Model and the expected house price growth rate µhpi in the VAR
Model. First, we describe the mortgage products used in the calibration. Next, we
discuss the calibration of the two aforementioned parameters in the two models. Table
3.10 summarizes the notation used in the main text and in this appendix.
Mortgage Products—The cash flow pattern associated with a regular mortgage
is very straightforward. A cash outflow equal to the initial loan amount is lent to
the borrower at the beginning of the contract and in the following years cash inflows
will be generated from the interest payments and the repayments of the loans. From
the lenders’ perspective, risks involved in a normal mortgage are due to the default
of the borrowers in combination with a house value lower than the loan balance.
To compensate the default risk, the bank charges an interest-rate that is above the
market-consistent rate without default. We can use the default probability and the
recovery rate in case of a default to assess the present value of the expected cash
inflow at the contract initiation, which can be compared to the cash outflow– the
initial loan amount. In addition to the default premium, the bank needs to reserve
some capital that is at least 4% of the loan balance as required by the Basel 1. The
required return on the reserved capital, the hurdle rate, is set to be 9.33%.7 Besides,
we assume there is a 1% operation cost proportional to the loan balance. By setting
the net present value of all cash flows to the sum of the present value of the operation
cost and required profit on the reserved capital, we can derive the model-implied
mortgage rate, which depends on the loan-to-value ratio ϕ. We then compare the
interest rates for loan-to-value ratios ϕ = 98% and ϕ = 67% to the market rates,
which are displayed in Table 3.3.
The Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) Model—The mortgage contract that
we consider is an annuity mortgage, which means that the lender pays a fixed amount
per year during the entire lifetime of the mortgage. In line with the continuous-time
nature of the GBM model, we assume that the lender pays a continuous cash flow
at an annual rate denoted by A. In the GBM model, with R denoting the mortgage
rate, the remaining liability Lt of the mortgage then satisfies
dLt
dt
= RLt − A,




(x, y) The ages of the two spouses of the household (x: husband; y: wife)
Tx, Ty The times of death of the two spouses of the household
sp
(g)
z,t The probability that a z-year-old in year t with gender g survives at least s more years
q
(g)
z,t The probability that a z-year-old in year t with gender g dies within a year
p
(t)
0 The date-zero price of a zero-coupon bond with a unit payoff in date t
Lt The value of the loan balance at date t
Ht The value of the property at date t
ϕ The loan-to-value ratio
δ The proportional transaction cost related to selling the house
T The time at which the reverse mortgage contract terminates, i.e., T = max{Tx, Ty}
Tm The term to maturity of a regular mortgage
Tmax The maximum value of T
mt The stochastic discount factor linking year t− 1 to year t
Mt The stochastic discount factor linking year 0 to year t
C The fixed payments made each period in the tenure contracts
NNT The value of the No-Negative-Equity-Guarantee (NNEG) at contract termination
πNN The premium for the No-Negative-Equity-Guarantee (NNEG)
π̃NN(t) The premium for the No-Negative-Equity-Guarantee (NNEG) ending at date t
q Fixed house net dividend rate
qmin The lower bound of the net dividend rate
qmax The upper bound of the net dividend rate
Φ The cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
φ The probability distribution function of the standard normal distribution
S The initial value of the underlying asset
K Strike price of the put option
r Reverse mortgage rate
rf The risk-free rate in the GBM model
R Mortgage rate
RFlorius Mortgage rate charged by Florius
σ Annualized house price volatility
κ Markup for πNN
A Fixed rate of payments of the regular mortgage
Tm Term to maturity, Tm ∈ {10, 15, 20}
Tf Horizon for redemption of the loan, which is 30 year
β The default rate for the mortgage
τ Time of default
hpi The house price growth rate
gdp The GDP growth rate
cpi The inflation rate
y(1) The 3-month zero-coupon rate
y(40) The 10-year rate
λ The price of risk
µhhpi The mean of the house price increasing rate estimated using historical house price data
µmhpi The mortgage based drift
µmhpi,min The lower bound of the mortgage based drift
µmhpi,max The lower bound of the mortgage based drift
Table 3.10: This table contains the notations used in this paper.
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(a) GBM (b) VAR
Figure 3.12: These graphs plot the difference between the sum of the cash outflow
and the required premium (the LHS of equations (3.26) and (3.27 )) and the present
value of all the future cash flows (the RHS of equations (3.26) and (3.27 )) against
the interest rate R for mortgage with Tm = 15 years. We set the dividend rate q








Let Tf be the horizon for redemption of the loan (Tf = 30 years). The constant





The value of such a cash flow during the period from 0 to t is:∫ t
0




The time-to-default is modeled as an exponential distribution, with default rate β
set equal to 2% in the calibration. In the calculations, we assume the time-to-default
to be independent of (Ht,Mt).
8
The constant payment should satisfy that the present value of all the future cash
8See footnote 1.
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flows equals to the initial loan plus the required premium:
L0 + (ρ+ αh)
∫ Tm
0





















































where h = 9.33% is the hurdle rate, α = 4% the reserve rate, and ρ = 1% the
operation cost.
The interest rate R is determined by solving (3.26) using (3.24) and (3.25). Figure
3.12 plots the difference between L0 + Premium (the LHS of (3.26)) and the present
value of all the future cash flows (the RHS of (3.26)) against the interest rate R. The
R that leads to an intersection with the horizontal line solves (3.26).
VAR Model—In the VAR model, we adopt a similar approach to calibrate the
parameters by fitting the model implied mortgage rate to the observed mortgage rate
of Florius. We assume payments occur at the end of every period. The maximum
maturity is 30 years. Mortgage with maturity shorter than 30 years needs to refinance
at the end of the contract period.
With default risk, the annual payment A is set such that the expected present
value of all the future cash flows equal to the initial loan plus the required premium:

















E [A ·Ms] + E [LTm ·MTm ]
)
P(τ > Tm) (3.27)
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The time-to-default is modeled as a geometric distribution, with default probability
β set equal to 2% in the calibration. In the calculations, we assume the time-to-
default to be independent of (Ht,Mt).
9 The time-to-default τ is assumed to follow a
geometric distribution,









and the corresponding loan balance (before period t payment of A) is given by:




for t > 1 and L1 = L0 · (1 +R)
The interest rate R follows from solving (3.27), using (3.28) and (3.29). Similar to





The Effect of the New Rural Social
Pension Insurance Program on the
Retirement and Labor Supply
Decision in China
4.1 Introduction
As a developing country that has the world’s largest population and a strict family-
planning policy, China faces a serious aging problem. By the end of 2014, more than
212.4 million people, i.e., 15.5% of the country’s entire population, were aged 60
or over.1 China differs from most developed countries in that its pension system is
rudimentary. Many elderly people, especially those in rural areas, continue to work
at a very advanced age.
In 2009, the New Rural Social Pension Insurance program (NRSPI), a voluntary
pension program aimed at the rural elderly, was introduced. The program was ex-
panded to nationwide scale in 2012. The amount of basic pension benefits is only
660 CNY per year,2 which is much lower than the minimum cost of living in rural
China. Modest as it is, the NRSPI was the first rural pension program to be strongly
promoted by the government and it has reached every village in China. Not surpris-
ingly, the Chinese people want this program to improve the life of the rural elderly.
Therefore, it is of interest to find out whether such a modest widely-covered pension
program can make a difference for the retirement and old-age labor supply situation
in the rural area.
1Ministry of Civil Affairs: 2014 Statistical bulletin of Social Service and Development.
21 US dollar was approximately 6.36 CNY on October 29, 2015.
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In this paper, we analyze the effects of the pension provision on the retirement
decision using an instrumental variable approach. Receiving pension benefits does
not require the pensioners, those enrolled in the pension program and aged 60 and
above, to stop working, thus the NRSPI generates a pure income effect for them.
The pension contributors, those enrolled in the pension program and younger than
60, nevertheless need to make contributions. The NRSPI helps them to save money
for the future. Thus, the effect of NRSPI might be different for contributors and
for pensioners. Therefore, we explore the effect of the NRSPI on different kinds of
labor supply for both males and females, both pensioners and contributors, to further
investigate channels through which the NRSPI affects the labor supply decision.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it helps us understand
the retirement behavior under a unique social security program. As is argued by Gru-
ber and Wise (2008) in the Social Security and Retirement Around the World project,
the labor force participation is strongly correlated to the social security programs.
Although previous literature shows that pension systems shift people’s retirement
behavior by providing economic incentives, that literature mainly focused on pension
systems providing the main income for the elderly involved. Even the pension system
in rural Brazil, another developing country considered in the retirement literature,
offers a pension benefit equal to the minimum wage (see de Carvalho Filho (2008)).
The benefits from the NRSPI, however, are far below the minimum living cost. This
pension program is quite unique and gives us a chance to study whether and, if so, to
what extent people respond to such a small amount of money. Besides, the NRSPI
is also special since its pension benefits are not contingent on the work status. For
those above age 60 when the program was introduced, contribution is not needed at
all and they can continue to work while receiving pension benefits; thus, joining the
pension program generates a pure income effect.
We also contribute to the literature regarding the impact of non-financial fac-
tors by investigating the role played by the regional characteristics in the retirement
decision. After controlling for financial situation, demographic background, family
structure, etc., there is still a substantial difference in retirement patterns between
city dwellers and people living in rural areas.
Our study is an empirical one, with data from a two-wave survey: the China
Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), which covers about 10,000
households and 17,500 individuals aged 45 or older in 150 counties in the years 2011
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and 2013. Our empirical results show that after controlling for economic and demo-
graphic factors, receiving pension from the NRSPI substantially increases the proba-
bility of retirement and decreases the weekly working time for females. The economic
value of the changes in the labor supply is far more than the average pension benefits
received per year, suggesting that the impact of this pension system goes far beyond
the amount of money it brings to the female participants. For male participants, the
effect of the NRSPI is not significant. Besides, we further decompose the different
kinds of labor supply and find that most of the decrease in labor supply is from
agricultural work.
We also examine the segmentation between the urban and rural areas. There are
some cultural differences between the urban and rural sides that play a role in people’s
retirement decision. Population mobility in the rural area is low and people know each
other’s background, resulting in high peer pressure against deviations from traditional
patterns of behavior. Retirement is a relatively new concept, thus less likely to be
accepted in the rural area. Although we don’t model these differences structurally, our
reduced form empirical findings are in favor of this argument. Living in the urban
area, ceteris paribus, increases the likelihood of retiring at any time during life by
25.7% and 18.3% for females and males, respectively. The decreased weekly working
time is 9.7 hours for females and 9.0 hours for males. Most of the observations in
our urban sample have an agriculture household registration,3 indicating that most
of them are migrants from the rural area. It seems that after migrating to the urban
area, where the concept of retirement is commonly accepted and peer pressure is
weaker, their retirement pattern changed and they behave differently from their rural
counterparts.
In addition to the above findings, we also find that people tend to work more when
they have more never-married sons. One explanation is that, while traditionally adult
sons are the main old age support for their old parents, parents do not want to retire
before their sons have their own family, since they still need to earn money to increase
their sons’ bargaining power in the marriage market. This is what is suggested by
the theory of Wei and Zhang (2011), namely that people increase saving to improve
their relative standing in the marriage market. In the traditional Chinese culture, in
addition to the groom’s family being responsible for most of the wedding expenditures,
they also need to give the bride family the betrothal gift before the wedding. The
3We exclude people covered by the urban pension programs. It is very likely that those people
have a non-agriculture household registration.
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amount of the betrothal gift would signal the wealthiness of the groom’s family. The
son from a wealthier family is more attractive in the marriage market. The betrothal
gift system is economically rational, since traditionally the sons provide the old age
support in rural China rather than the daughters.
There is a very recent paper studying the effect of the NRSPI on the labor supply
using the CHARLS dataset by Ning et al. (2016). These authors focused on the
subsample from the districts that were covered by the NRSPI when the survey was
conducted, i.e., 26% of the sample in the first wave and the entire second wave were
used to fit a regression-discontinuity model. They found an insignificant effect of
the NRSPI on the retirement decision and a significant positive effect of the NRSPI
on the labor supply without controlling for the occupation of the individuals. They
argued that the increase in the labor supply was caused by a crowding out effect of
the NRSPI on the intergenerational economic transfer. One would expect a crowding
out transfer larger than the amount of benefits received if the labor supply increases.
Yet, none of the three papers (Cheng et al. (2013), Chen and Zeng (2013), Zhang and
Chen (2014)) they cited to support the crowding out effect found an effect larger than
one. The largest effect is found by Chen and Zeng (2013), which is 62.4%. Zhang and
Chen (2014) found that the pension receipts decreased the probability of receiving
transfers from the children by 32-56% but had no significant effect on the amount of
transfers. Cheng et al. (2013), however, found a positive but insignificant effect of the
pension receipts on the intergenerational transfers. In contrast to Ning et al. (2016),
we believe the subsample that had no access to the NRSPI in the first wave should
also be included in the estimation. It is of particular interest to study the change in
the retirement and labor supply behavior of those who had no access to the NRSPI
in the first wave but received pension benefits in the second wave. After controlling
for the age, the NRSPI still significantly increases the probability of retirement and
decreases the labor supply for that group. The results are robust when the squared
age is included in the control variables. If we exclude the districts that were not
covered by the NRSPI in the first wave, as Ning et al. (2016) did, we also find an
insignificant effect of pension receipt on the retirement decision. The effect on the
labor supply is also positive but insignificant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents previous lit-
erature on retirement. In Section 4.3 we discuss the institutional background. The
data source and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we
introduce the methodology used in the paper, and Section 4.6 shows the empirical
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findings. We carry out a sensitivity analysis in Section 4.7 and conclude the paper in
Section 4.8.
4.2 Literature
Retirement and old age labor supply attracted great attention in the previous decades.
Factors affecting people’s retirement decision fall into two categories: financial incen-
tives and non-financial factors. In the neoclassical framework, the retirement decision
is part of the life-cycle choice of consumption and leisure. Social security programs,
for instance, pension programs, and age related health insurance programs provide
financial incentives for people to retire (see, for example, Coile and Gruber (2004);
Vere (2011); Stock and Wise (1990); Hurd (1997); Lee (1998)). Individual wealth
also plays a role in the retirement decision: wealthier people tend to retire earlier
(see Bloemen (2006); Fields and Mitchell (1984)), and decumulation in wealth, like
medical expenditure, is important for understanding retirement behavior (see French
and Jones (2011)). Non-financial factors include financial literacy (see Van Rooij et
al. (2012); Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)), social norms (see Vermeer et al. (2014)),
and family obligations (see Szinovacz et al. (2001); Maurer-Fazio et al. (2011)).
However, studies of the retirement decision in developing countries with less so-
phisticated pension systems are very scarce. Social security in the rural side is sparse,
(see Hussain (1994)) and the economic position of the elderly and family as a social
security institution seem to be weakened as argued by Benjamin et al. (2000). Pen-
sion systems, varying across countries, constitute an important factor of labor market
behavior. Based on a pension reform in 1991, de Carvalho Filho (2008) studied the
retirement decision of the rural elderly in Brazil and found that receiving old-age
pension benefits significantly reduces the probability of working and the number of
hours of work.
There are a little number of papers investigating the retirement pattern in China.
For example, Benjamin et al. (2003) documented the labor supply situation of the
elderly people in China and investigated the effect of age and health on the labor
supply of the elderly. Using physical limitations as an instrument for the health
situation, and based on three waves of panel data of the China Health and Nutrition
Survey (CHNS), they found that health issues can explain half of the reduction in
labor supply for men from 60 to 70, but have no significant effect on the labor supply
of women. In addition, Giles et al. (2015) documented the retirement patterns and
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the factors affecting the retirement decisions, based on the first national survey of
China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS).
Zhang et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2015) analyzed the effect of the NRSPI on
work status using a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (FRD) model, and Ning et al.
(2016) used a combination of Regression Discontinuity and Different-in-Difference.
Our paper differs from these three papers in the following ways. Firstly, the first two
papers use a cross-sectional data set and the third paper pools the two-wave data
together in the estimation, while we use a panel data. With panel data, individual
effect is better controlled. Secondly, the sample selection is different. Because the
cited papers use a FRD model, only communities which already have access to the
pension program can be used. Therefore, only 26% of the whole sample in the first
wave are used. In addition to this, an FRD model limits the focus of the mentioned
studies to people around the cutoff age; consequently, a local treatment effect is
estimated. Our model allows us to investigate a wider sample and a wider age group.
This is relevant because the pension contributors’ retirement decision also responds to
the NRSPI status. Thirdly, an FRD model cannot estimate the effect of the amount
of pension benefits on the retirement behavior, while our model is able to do that.
Finally, we distinguish between females and males and decompose the total labor
supply to further investigate the channel via which the NRSPI plays a role.
In addition to the reduced-form models, there are a few other types of methods
that are used in the estimation. Stock and Wise (1990) treated retirement as an op-
tion. People reassess the value of continuing to work and immediate retirement every
period to make their retirement decision. As long as the value of continuing working
is larger, people will not withdraw their labor supply. Samwick (1998) extended the
previous study by introducing dis-utility of labor into the model and by extending
the dataset from a specific firm to the whole nation. People will stop working when
the financial gain from postponing retirement falls just below the utility loss from
decreasing leisure.
Another method, heavily used by many researchers, is the life-cycle dynamic pro-
gramming approach. People maximize their life-cycle utility subject to a budget con-
straint. Early models like the one used by Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) only con-
sidered consumption and the labor supply decision (full-time work, part-time work,
and retirement). Later models introduced, for example, wage uncertainty (see Gour-
inchas and Parker (2002)), health uncertainty and health insurance (see French and
Jones (2011)), and saving (see van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)).
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While structural retirement models allow us to understand the underlying mecha-
nism of the retirement behavior, the drawbacks of this kind of models are also obvious.
The estimation is more complex and the results rely heavily on the assumptions. At
this stage, we focus on reduced-form models to measure the relation between the NR-
SPI and the retirement decision in quantitative terms. In further studies, structural
estimation could be adopted in order to allow for counterfactual analysis.
4.3 The Institutional Background
The New Rural Social Pension Insurance program (NRSPI) was introduced in 2009,
when 320 out of 2 858 counties joined the program as a pilot. In 2010, 518 new
counties entered (see Cheng et al. (2015)) followed by 1076 counties in 2011.4 By the
end of 2012, this pension program extended to nationwide scale.
The New Rural Social Pension Insurance program is voluntary for people regis-
tered in the rural area and aged 16 or older. However, students and those participating
in any other pension plans are excluded. Other pension plans include the government
pension program, which is for people working in the government and government
institutions, the firm basic pension, which is for firm-employed, and urban residents
pension, which is for unemployed people with urban registration. The registration
system (Hukou) was established in the 1950s to control the population mobility. All
individuals are classified into one of two categories: agriculture Hukou (rural regis-
tration) and non-agriculture Hukou (urban registration). A status change from rural
to urban registration is very difficult. Therefore, many migrant workers still carry
a rural registration even though they are working in the urban area; thus, they still
have access to the NRSPI as long as they are not covered by other pension plans.
The pension contributions are shared by individual participants, the local village
communities, and the local and central governments. Five basic levels of contribution
can be chosen by individual participants, varying from 100 CNY to 500 CNY per
year. However, in 10 provinces, another five levels up to 1000 are also available.5
Nevertheless, the most popular level of contribution is 100 CNY per year (see Lei
et al. (2013)). The collective subsidy from the local village is encouraged but not
mandatory. Subsidies from the governments are partially matched to the individual
contribution level, with a minimum subsidy equal to 30 CNY per year per participant.
4Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the PRC: http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/
SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/dfdt/gzdt/201201/t20120119_94512.html.
5Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the PRC.
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The pension benefits consist of the benefits from the individual account and the
basic benefits from the government. The individual account is like a DC system, and
the basic benefits from the government are similar to the state pension. The monthly
amount from the individual account, a life annuity, consists of the accumulated assets
in the individual account divided by 139, where 139 is assumed to be the average
remaining life expectancy measured in months. The amount of basic benefits from
the government is 660 CNY per year. For the east provinces, the central government
bears half of the basic benefits, while for the relatively poor middle and west provinces,
the central government finances the whole basic benefits.6
The minimum age to be qualified to receive the pension benefits is 60. Receiving
pension benefits is not contingent on retirement. However, unlike the state pension
in most countries, the basic pension benefits are not for everyone above 60 but only
for participants. People aged 60 or older before the introduction of the pension pro-
gram can receive the basic pension benefits without any contribution, but under the
condition that their children, if eligible for the program, participate in the program.
For those younger than 45 years when the program was introduced, a minimum of 15
years of contribution is needed for entitlement to pension benefits after reaching age
60. There is no minimum number of years of contribution required for those between
age 45 and 60.
Compared to the rural poverty line, which was set to be 2 300 CNY per year in
20117, the level of pension benefits from the NRSPI is quite low. The basic pension
benefits amount to 660 CNY and the level of overall pension benefits in the sample
is around 965 CNY, less than half of the rural poverty line. In 2012, the average per
person annual net income and consumption in the rural area were 7 916.6 and 5 908
CNY,8 respectively. Even for families with income in the lowest income group (the
bottom 20% quantile), the average per person annual net income and consumption
were 2 316.2 and 3 742.4 CNY per year.9 The pension benefits from the new rural
pension program are not sufficient for elderly people to maintain a normal life, but
are an important source of income for the lowest income group.
6Eight Provinces increased the basic pension. The basic pension of Beijing is 3 960 CNY, Shanghai
is 3600 CNY, Tianjin is 1800 CNY, Chongqing is 960 CNY. Other provinces provide amounts varying
from 720 to 840 CNY per year. http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/ncshbxs/NCSHBXSgongzuodongtai/20
1201/t20120109_83895.htm.
7Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
8Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
9Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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4.4 Construction and Description of the Main Vari-
ables
4.4.1 Data Source
The source of all the data used in this paper is the biennial survey of the China
Health and Retirement Longitude Study (CHARLS), with exception of the province
level federal revenue, which has been retrieved from the National Bureau of Statistics
of China. CHARLS is a nation-wide survey covering approximately 10 000 households,
consisting of 17 500 individuals aged 45 or older in 150 counties in the years 2011 and
2013. Following the experience of the Health and Retirement survey (HRS) in the U.S.
and the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), it contains
information on demographics, family transfers, health status and health care, income
and consumption, work, retirement and pension, assets and liabilities, and so on. A
detailed description of this study and the advantages of the data set can be found in
Lei et al. (2012), Lei et al. (2014), Shen (2014), and Smith et al. (2014).
In this paper, we focus on the retirement decision and old-age labor supply of the
elderly. Among the different modules in the questionnaire, we are particularly inter-
ested in the work, retirement, and pension parts, taking the demographic information,
financial situation, and health conditions as control variables. The construction of
the main variables is described in the following section.
4.4.2 Construction of the Variables
Dependent variables
Retirement status: The retirement status Rit is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if individual i is “retired”, i.e., not working and not searching for jobs at time
t, otherwise it is 0. In the urban side, although compulsory retirement ages are set
for workers (65 for males, 60 for white collar females and 55 for blue collar females),
there is a mismatch between the retirement procedures and the actual labor supply.
According to the survey data, around 35% of the people who have completed the
retirement procedure continue to work. Thus, the compulsory retirement ages are
not perfect proxies for people’s retirement status. In the rural area, many people
are engaged in agricultural work and seasonality is the nature of that kind of work.
Thus, we define retirement in the following way: if individual i did not engage in any
agricultural work for more than 10 days in the previous year, did not work for at least
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1 hour in the previous week, is not currently laid-off, and did not search for a new
job in the past month, then we consider individual i as retired.
Non-agriculture work status: The non-agricultural work status takes the value 1 if
individual i engaged in activities to earn a wage, ran a business or worked for unpaid
family business for at least 1 hour in the previous week.
Agriculture work status: The agricultural work status takes the value 1 if individual
i engaged in any agriculture work for more than 10 days in the previous year.
Agriculture work status for their own household: The agricultural work status takes
the value 1 if individual i worked on their own field for more than 10 days in the
previous year.
Weekly working hours: The number of weekly working hours Hit is a continuous
variable representing the labor supply condition of individual i at time t. As indi-
cated before, agricultural work is seasonal, thus the weekly working hours on agri-
cultural work are rescaled by the number of working months. In the questionnaire,
three questions are asked to the farm-employed and those who work on their own
household field. a: How many months did you work on cropping (forestry), live-
stock, and fishing in the past year? b: How many days did you work per week on
average during a normal work month in the past year? c: How many hours did
you usually work per day during a normal work day in the past year? The num-
ber of weekly working hours on agricultural work is the product of the answers in
these three questions divided by 12. For employed or self-employed work, although
the number of months worked is asked as well, survey participants are asked the
average working days in a week in the past year and the average working hours
per day in the past year. Thus, the number of weekly working hours is just the
product of the answers in the last two questions. The total number of weekly
working hours is the sum of the weekly working hours for the farm-employed work,
work on their own household field, and the non-agricultural work. We also use the
three components as dependent variables to investigate more deeply the effect of NR-
SPI on different kinds of work.
Main explanatory variables
Pension: The pension status Pensionit is a dummy variable indicating whether indi-
vidual i receives pension from the NRSPI at wave t. This variable is used in model
4.1 in section 4.5.
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Enrollment: the NRSPI enrollment status Enrollit is a dummy variable as well. If
individual i participates in the NRSPI at wave t, it takes the value 1, otherwise it
is 0. So, Enrollit = 1 for both pension contributors and pensioners. This variable is
used in model 4.2.
Pension benefits: the pension benefits Benefitsit is the amount of money individual
i receives from the New Rural Social Pension Insurance at time t. It is also used in
model 4.1.
Main control variables
The control variables include self-reported health status, demographic background,
family structure, occupation, financial situation, whether the respondents have grand-
children or old parents to take care of, and district and wave dummies. Self-reported
health status varies from 0 (very poor) to 5 (excellent). 49.48% of the sample report
their health status as “fair”. Education levels are classified into 12 categories, varying
from 1 (illiterate) to 12 (doctoral degree). The intermediate levels include not having
finished primary school, home school, elementary school, middle school, high school,
vocational school, two-/three-year college/associate degree, bachelor, and master de-
gree. Most of the people in the survey have education not higher than elementary
school.
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Samples
The samples are selected by sequentially deleting the observations of individuals that
do not satisfy the following criteria. (1) Individuals appear in both surveys, (2) are
older than 45, (3) have ever worked in their whole life, (4) are not covered by commer-
cial pension and other urban pension programs in any wave, (5) have full information
on the key variables. Before sample selection, we have 36 330 individual-year obser-
vations; 5 948, 177, 104, and 8 652 observations drop out because of criteria (1), (2),
(3), and (4), respectively. After the selection, we dropped those only appearing in
one wave. In the end we have 11 300 observations in the rural group and 1 056 obser-
vations in the urban group. Since the New Rural Social Pension Insurance program
is for rural-registered people, we first focus on people in the rural area without any
other pension other than the NRSPI. However, migrant workers, i.e., those who are
rural registered but work and live in the urban area, are also eligible to participate in
the NRSPI. To investigate further whether the NRSPI has effects when people move
to the urban side, in the next stage we also include people in the urban area in the
analysis.
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Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show the retirement ratio, i.e., the proportion of retired
people, as a function of age for different subsamples. Both the rural and urban
observations are included in the plots. Figure 4.1 plots the retirement ratio against
age by pension status and wave, Figure 4.2 shows the retirement ratio by region and
wave, and Figure 4.3 shows the retirement ratio for different genders and waves. We
see that the retirement ratio is increasing with age in all three figures. The variable
we are interested in, the pension enrollment, does not seem to make a big difference,
at least not without controlling for other variables. From Figure 4.1, we cannot see
a substantial difference in terms of the retirement ratio for those participate in the
NRSPI, the pension participants, and those who do not participate in the NRSPI, the
non-participants. Differences between people in the urban and rural areas (Figure 4.2)
and between different genders (Figure 4.3) are quite substantial. As shown in Figure
4.2, at the age of 60, around 40% of the people in the urban area are retired, but only
10% are retired in the rural area. Even after age 70, most of the rural residents still
work. In terms of gender differences, the retirement ratio of women is higher than
that of men. As stated before, the retirement age for males is 60, for white collar
females is 55, and 50 for blue collar females. However, there is no substantial jump
at those ages because the fraction of people working in the government and firms,
where the retirement regulation is applied, is very low and many of them continue to
work after the compulsory retirement ages.
Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 present the average weekly working hours as a function of
age for different subsamples. Both the rural and urban observations are included in
the figure plots. Figure 4.4 presents the average working hours against age for people
with different pension status, Figure 4.5 is grouped by region, and 4.6 is grouped
by gender. Again, without controlling for other variables, there is no substantial
difference in working hours between pension participants and non-participants. The
difference in working hours between the urban and rural areas is not substantial,
especially before age 50. However, urban people between age 60 and 65 on average
work less than their rural counterparties. For people at very advanced age, the
difference is diminishing. But as the number of observations for elderly people in the
urban side is small, those differences may be driven by disturbances. Figure 4.6 shows
that males typically work longer than females.
Figure 4.7 shows the proportion of people who receive pension benefits from the
NRSPI in the rural area. Those enrolled in the other pension programs are excluded.
People begin to receive pension at the age 60 if they are enrolled in the NRSPI.
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Thus, we see a big jump at the age of 60 and 61. The reason that there is a jump at
61 is because some people use the nominal age10 which is usually 1 year older than
the actual age. From Figure 4.8, we see that the pension program expanded quickly
between the two waves. In 2011, about 20-30% of the rural villagers were covered in
the program. In 2013, the coverage ratio increased to about 80%.
The means and numbers of observations of the main variables are summarized in
Table 4.1. In column (1), we present the sample average for females, column (2) is
for males, and column (3) covers the whole sample. Consistent with Figures 4.3 and
4.6, females are more likely to get retired, and work less. The average difference in
weekly working hours between males and females is around 10 hours. Moreover, the
allocation of time to different kinds of work is different, too. Males spend twice as
much time on non-agriculture work as females do, but the differences with respect to
agricultural work are small. These findings motivate us to investigate the effect of
NRSPI for males and females separately.
The average level of total pension income from the New Rural Social Pension
Insurance program is around 857 CNY per year. It is quite small when compared to
the household income, which amounts to around 13 170 CNY per year.
4.5 Model
From the descriptive statistics in section 4.4, we cannot see the impact of the NRSPI
on the retirement and labor supply situation. In this section, we use econometric
models to analyze the impact of the pension income by estimating the following
regression equation:
yit = α+ Pensionitγ+ Pensionit×Benefitsitθ+X ′itβ+D′iδ+ Wavetψ+αi + εit (4.1)
which can be estimated using G2SLS with the first-stage:




ia3 + Waveta4 + η1,i + ν1,it,
Pensionit × Benefitsit = b0 + Zitb1 +X ′−itb2 +D′ib3 + Wavetb4 + η2,i + ν2,it,




ic3 + Wavetc4 + η3,i + ν3,it,
where
10Newborns start at age of 1 instead of age 0. See Wikipedia East Asian age reckoning : https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Asian_age_reckoning.
108
yit is the dependent variable that can be the retirement status Rit, the hours of
the weekly labor supply Hit, or the work status and weekly working hours of
different kinds of work as discussed in section 4.4.2. Detailed description of the
variables is given in section 4.4.2;
Pensionit is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i receives pension ben-
efits at time t;
Benefitsit is the amount of the received benefits;
Healthit is the subjective health status;
Xit refers to other individual background characteristics, including occupation type,
education level, marital status, age, self-reported health status, financial situa-
tion, taking care of elderly parents or young grandchildren, and family structure;
X−it the control variables excluding the self-reported health status;
Zit the instrumental variables described later;
Di represents district dummies referring to Eastern China, Middle China, Western
China, and Northeastern China. Middle China is set as the benchmark;
Wavet is the wave dummy with the first wave equal to 0 and the second wave equal
to 1;
α, γ, θ, β, δ, ψ, a0 to a4, b0 to b4, and c0 to c4 are vectors of parameters to be
estimated;
αi and ηn,i, n ∈ (1, 2, 3) are the individual effects with αi ∼ (µαi , σ2α,i), ηn,i ∼
(0, σ2η,n,i);
εit and νn,it, n ∈ (1, 2, 3) are the error terms with εit ∼ (µε, σ2ε,i), νn,it ∼ (0, σ2ν,n,i).
As discussed in section 4.3, the NRSPI is voluntary and the pension benefits
can be determined to some extent by the pension participants. Villagers younger
than 60 years when the program was introduced can choose the level of contribution,
which will affect the pension benefits they are about to receive after age 60. People
who want to retire may have more incentive to join the NRSPI and choose a higher
level of contribution. It is therefore very likely that the NRSPI enrollment status
and the pension benefits are correlated with the error term εit. So, the assumption
of exogeneity of the independent variables may lead to biased estimation results.
Previous literature deals with this problem by utilizing discontinuity regression, see
Chen (2015), or an instrumental variable approach, see Cheng et al. (2015), de
Carvalho Filho (2008), and Vere (2011). The existence of the endogeneity problem
also makes the linear probability model attractive in the estimation of retirement
status.
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We adopt an instrumental variable approach to deal with the endogeneity prob-
lem. We assume the instrument variables are exogenous but are correlated with the
endogenous variables. Following Cheng et al. (2015), we choose the first instrumental
variable as the length of the duration of the pension program in each community. The
pension program was launched at different times for different communities, therefore,
the pension status will be correlated to the duration of the pension program. The
longer the duration, the more likely people are enrolled in the NRSPI. The imple-
mentation of the pension program was determined by the government, and thus the
assumption of zero correlation with the retirement and labor supply situation of the
individual villagers seems plausible. For each community, we define the duration of
the New Rural Social Pension Insurance program as the difference between the survey
time and the time the first villager in the community joined the pension program.
For communities without any pensioner, we set the duration equal to zero.
The second instrumental variable is the province level federal revenue. Both the
basic pension and government subsidies can vary across provinces and their level may
be related to the federal revenue, since the local government can adjust the basic
pension and subsidies based on its economic situation. This not only directly affects
the pension benefits, but also influences the pension enrollment decision, since people
are more incentivized to participate when the compensation is higher. Since the
province level federal revenue is not determined by individuals, it is expected to be
independent of the error terms.
A second endogeneity problem arises with the use of the self-reported health sta-
tus. There is a large literature documenting the effect of health on labor supply
and retirement, in which the measurement of the health condition is highlighted.
In addition to the self-reported health condition, more objective measures of health
condition were adopted, for instance, the constructed “health stock” (see Hagan et
al. (2008), Disney et al. (2006), and Bound et al. (1999)), which uses the presence
of specific conditions and activity limitations to instrument the self-assessed health
condition (see Stern (1989)). As indicated by Jones et al. (see Jones et al. (2010)),
constructing the health stock using objective measures is analogous to using more
objective health indicators as instrumental variables for self-reported health condi-
tion. Besides, Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) found that neither the self-reported health
condition nor the objective health indicators are endogenous when they compare the
results to the one using hospital stay situation and parental health and mortality
as instruments. Moreover, self-reported health condition is important in explaining
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retirement because other objective health indicators measure health condition rather
than work capacity (see Bound (1991)). Thus, in this paper, we follow the previous
literature and use objective health indicators as instruments for self-reported health
condition. The health indicators include the presence of certain diseases and physical
limitations.
After the analysis of the effects of receiving pension from the New Rural Social
Pension Insurance program, we want to investigate the effects of pension enrollment on
pension contributors’ retirement and labor supply situation. The pension contributors
are people making pension contributions, whose ages are below 60, and who are
therefore not eligible to receive pension benefits. The model used in this estimation
is
yit = A+ EnrollitΓ +X
′
itB +Di∆ + WavetΨ + Ai + Υit. (4.2)
Similarly, this model is estimated using G2SLS with the first stage




iA3 + WavetA4 +H1,i + Ω1,it,




iC3 + WavetC4 +H3,i + Ω3,it,
where
Enrollit is the pension enrollment status, whether individual i is enrolled in the
NRSPI at time t;
Γ, A, B, ∆, Ψ, A0 to A4, and C0 to C4 are vectors of parameters to be estimated;
Ai and Hn,i, n ∈ (1, 3) are the individual effects with Ai ∼ (µAi , σ2A,i), and Hn,i ∼
(0, σ2H,n,i);
Υit and Ωn,it, n ∈ (1, 3) are the error terms with Υit ∼ (µΥ , σ2Υ,i), and Ωn,i ∼ (0, σ2Ω,n,i);
yit, Xit, X−it, ZiT , Di and Wavet refer to the same variables as in model 4.1.
4.6 Empirical Results
4.6.1 The Effect on the Pensioners
As discussed in section 4.4, the labor supply situations and the retirement statuses of
females and males are quite different. A formal test of equality of the regression coef-
ficients also shows that the regression coefficients for the two groups are significantly
different at the 5% significance level. Therefore, in this section, we analyze the effect
of the New Rural Social Pension Insurance program separately for different genders.
We first look at the effect of receiving pension benefits on the retirement status
of males and females in the rural side. Model 4.1 is used in the estimation and the
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results are presented in Table 4.2. In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is
the retirement status. Column (1) contains the results when both males and females
are included in the sample. Columns (2) and (3) contain the results when males
and females are estimated separately. The coefficients of Pensionit and Pensionit ×
Benefitsit are significantly different from 0 in column (3), showing that receiving
pension benefits can substantially change the retirement status of females. However,
for males, the effect is not significant as shown in column (2). For most of the sample,
the partial effect of pension receipt, ∂E(y)/∂(Pension), on female is around 10% as
shown in Figure 4.9.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.2 present the effect of receiving pension benefits
on labor supply for the whole sample, the males, and the females, respectively. The
dependent variables are the weekly working hours. We fit model 4.1 to the rural
observations in this estimation as well. In the whole sample with both males and
females, the partial effect of receiving pension benefits on labor supply is around 17
hours. We plot the partial effect in Figure 4.9. The horizontal axis represents the
fraction of the data, and the vertical axis represents the partial effect. In 80% of the
sample, the deduction in labor supply falls in the range of 15-20 hours. For males, the
coefficients on the variable Pensionit and the interaction term are not significantly
different from 0, indicating that the effect of the NRSPI on labor supply of males is
not significant. But for females, receiving pension benefits decreases the labor supply
substantially. Compared to males, females have a lower productivity on agricultural
work; the pension benefits are worth more work for them.
We further decompose the total labor supply into non-agricultural labor supply
and agricultural labor supply in Table 4.3. The dependent variables are the weekly
working hours of non-agricultural work for the first three columns, the weekly working
hours of agricultural work for columns (4) to (6), and the weekly working hours on
one’s own household fields for columns (7) to (9). The coefficients on the main ex-
planatory variables are insignificant in columns (2) and (3), indicating neither females
nor males substantially change their non-agricultural labor supply after receiving pen-
sion benefits. But they all decrease their agricultural labor supply accordingly, and
females respond more to the pension program, as shown in columns (5) and (6). Most
of the decrease in agricultural labor supply comes from decreased working hours on
the participants’ own fields. This finding is reasonable given that rural people allocate
most of their working time to household agricultural work. Remarkably, however, the
amount of decreased labor supply for females is very large when comparing it to the
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amount of benefits received. As shown in Table 4.1, the average annual benefits re-
ceived by females amount to only 860 CNY. This is about the wage of 78 hours of
work if we use the minimum wage of 11.73 CNY.11 Two reasons might explain this
phenomenon. In the rural side, the actual economic value of one hour’s work might
be far below the minimum wage. Farmers can spend lots of time on the field but the
production cannot be raised proportionally. Besides, for older workers, working on
the field might be a very heavy burden and the disutility of labor is very high.
The big effect of the NRSPI found in this paper is in line with previous findings.
According to the analysis of Chen et al. (2015), the probability of retirement in-
creased by 13.2% to 36.8% based on different model specifications. The size of the
effect as estimated by Zhang et al. (2014) is around 25%. One possible explanation of
the big impact of the NRSPI is that the introduction of this pension program brings
rural people a feeling that the government is taking care of them so that they can
have the opportunity to retire. The findings in Table 4.4 (the effect of the amount
of received pension on the work/retirement status) and Table 4.5 (the effect of the
amount of received pension on the labor supply) confirm this explanation. The depen-
dent variables in Table 4.4 are the retirement status in the top panel of the first three
columns, the agricultural work status in the bottom panel of the first three columns,
the non-agricultural work status in the top panel of the last three columns, and the
agricultural work status on their own household field in the bottom panel of the last
three columns. Only the coefficients on pension benefits, health status, gender, and
number of never married sons are presented in the table.12 The dependent variables in
Table 4.5 are the total weekly working hours, the weekly working hours on agricultural
work, non-agricultural work, and own household field agricultural work from the top
left panel to the bottom right panel. None of the coefficients on pension benefits are
significant in these two tables. When we focus on the subsample of pension receivers,
the amount of pension benefits has no significant effect on the retirement decision or
the labor supply situation. It seems people are motivated mostly by whether they
get something, rather than by how much they get. Traditionally, people in the rural
area did not have the concept of retirement. This pension program can also spread
the concept of retirement among pension contributors and pensioners. Although the
above explanations are in line with our findings, they cannot be verified using the
11In 2014, the average minimum hourly wage in China was 11.73 CNY. See website: http://
www.china-briefing.com/news/2014/06/11/complete-guide-minimum-wage-levels-across-
china-2014.html.
12The full table is available upon request.
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reduced-form regression analysis. Further structural estimation is needed to reveal
the reason why the NRSPI has such a sizable effect. Anyway, the NRSPI is the first
pension program that covers the whole rural area. Its sizable effect is found not only
on the labor supply decision, but also on people’s living arrangement (Chen (2015),
and Cheng et al. (2015)) and health (Cheng et al. (2016)).
In contrast to our findings, as discussed in the introduction, Ning et al. (2016)
found an insignificant effect of the NRSPI on the labor supply. The sample size in
their study is much smaller since they only include districts where the NRSPI was
introduced at the survey time, which means 74% of the samples in the first wave are
excluded. Moreover, they use a different definition of retirement. People working less
than 52 hours are considered as retired in their study. Thus the annual working hours
need to be measured to determine the retirement status. At the left tail of the annual
working hours, the value of the retirement status might be very sensitive to the choice
of the cutoff. Besides, such a definition might wrongly classify people currently laid
off to be “retired”. In addition, their model has less control variables, for instance
the occupation, which we believe strongly affects people’s retirement decision.
Another interesting finding is the role the number of never married sons is playing
in people’s retirement and labor supply decision. Although adult children, especially
adult sons, are very important old age supporters, people need to work more before
their single sons are getting married. The coefficients on the number of never married
sons are significantly larger than 0 for males in column (5) of Table 4.2, columns (5)
and (8) of Table 4.3, where the dependent variables are the weekly working hours,
the weekly agricultural working hours, and the weekly agricultural working hours on
one’s own household field, respectively. This is in line with the competitive saving
theory proposed by Wei and Zhang (2011). People with single sons need to work
harder to improve their son’s relative attractiveness for marriage.
Consistent with the previous literature (see Benjamin et al. (2003)), health con-
ditions play an important role in people’s retirement decision. People with poorer
health are more likely to get retired, and to work less. The coefficient of health is
always significantly less than 0 when the dependent variable is the retirement status
and significantly larger than 0 when the dependent variable is the weekly working
hours as shown in the columns in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Occupation affects the retire-
ment planning as well. People engaged in agricultural work are less likely to retire,
and work for more hours per week, which can be shown by the coefficients of farming
in Table 4.2.
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4.6.2 The Effect on the Pension Contributors
According to the regulation framework, only pension participants above the age of 60
can receive pension benefits from the NRSPI. Our sample includes a group of people
below age 60. For them, enrolling in the New Rural Social Pension program means
that they need to make contributions. They haven’t received any pension benefits
from the pension program. We want to see how the pension program will affect
the pension contributors’ labor supply decision, whether they will work more to earn
money to make contributions. Since there are no received pension benefits, the model
used in this subsection is model 4.2.
Table 4.6 shows the effect of pension enrollment on the retirement status for
the pension contributors. In the first three columns, the dependent variable is the
retirement status, in the last three columns it is the non-agricultural work status.
The coefficients of pension enrollment on the retirement status are only significant
for the female group in column (3). It suggests female contributors will increase the
probability of retirement by around 16.6% after enrolling in the pension program. As
for agricultural work, Table 4.7 shows females will decrease the working probability
by 13.9% (column (3) of Table 4.7) but the effect of pension enrollment on males is
not significantly different from 0. Again, the decrease in agricultural work is mainly
driven by decrease of own-field labor supply as shown in column (6).
The labor supply situations of female contributors and male contributors are
shown in Table 4.8. The dependent variables for the first three and last three columns
are the weekly working hours, and the weekly non-agricultural working hours, respec-
tively. Similar to the retirement status, instead of working more, female contributors
will significantly decrease their weekly labor supply by 12.4 hours. The agricultural
labor supplies of both females and males are affected as shown in the first three
columns of Table 4.9. The difference is that the influence on female contributors is
more significant and more sizable. Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.9 show the effect of
pension enrollment on the weekly working hours on one’s own household field. Similar
as before, only females will decrease their labor supply after pension enrollment.
Although the NRSPI generates a cash outflow for pension contributors, female
contributors still decrease their labor supply and increase the likelihood of retire-
ment. It is possible that within a household, the younger contributors and male
contributors work to pay the pension contribution while the female contributors work
less. The finding that instead of working more, female contributors work less also sup-
ports our previous explanation that the feeling to be taken care of after joining the
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NRSPI matters in the labor supply decision. However, to verify those explanations,
a structural model is needed, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we look at how robust the results are to changes in the sample and
in the model specification. We first extend our sample to include migrants in the
urban side. Next, we compare the linear probability model and the Probit model
estimation results. Then we adopt a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (FRD) model
to analyze further how robust the results are to different model settings and compare
our findings with the findings in the previous literature.
4.7.1 Extended Sample Size
We further include people in the urban area but not covered by other pension pro-
grams, to see whether the NRSPI affects those in the urban side. As mentioned
before, there are many migrants from the rural side who work in the urban side.
Thus, even in the urban side, there are people enrolled in the NRSPI. To analyze the
effect of the NRSPI on their retirement and labor supply decision, model 4.1 is being
used in this subsection.
Tables 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 present the results for the extended sample.
The columns with header “All” contain results for the sample with both males and
females, the columns with header “Male” contain results for the male subsample, and
the columns with header “Female” contain results for the female subsample. The
dependent variables are the headers below the column label. Similarly as before,
enrolling in the NRSPI increases the likelihood to retire (column (3) of Tables 4.10)
and decreases the number of working hours per week (column (3) of Table 4.12)
for females. Retiring from work (column (6) of Table 4.11) and decreased labor
supply (column (6) of Table 4.13) are mainly from own-field agricultural work as
well. However, the magnitudes of the coefficient estimators are smaller. The pension
program has less effect on people living in the urban area.
Previous studies, for instance, Sicular et al. (2007) investigate the income differ-
ence and inequality between the rural and the urban areas in China. As shown in
this paper (see their tables 10 and 12), there are substantial differences in terms of
retirement status, and working hours between the urban and the rural area. After con-
trolling for demographic background, social welfare, financial situation, gender, and
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family situation, people in the urban area are still more likely to go into retirement
and to work for less hours than their rural counterparts. This suggests retirement is
not only an economic decision, but cultural factors are also essential.
In rural China, population mobility is lower, people know each other’s back-
grounds, resulting in high peer pressure against deviant behavior. Retirement may
be one of the things that are on the “forbidden list”, because traditionally, it was the
privilege of very high-level officers. And even for them, after resigning from imperial
court, they usually returned to their native town to help the local education. The
urban side, however, is more industrialized and “open-minded” to the concept of re-
tirement. This might explain why there are differences between the rural and urban
in terms of the retirement decision. There are also other reasons that can explain the
differences, for instance, old people in the rural side can always work on their own
field while in the urban side it may be difficult for them to get a job.
4.7.2 Probit Model
As described in section 4.4, the dependent variable, retirement status Rit, is a binary
variable. A main concern of using a linear probability model with a binary dependent
variable is that the estimates are not constrained to the unit interval. As a sensitivity
analysis, we fit the sample to a Probit model to see whether there will be a big change.
Then, model (4.2) becomes
yit = 1(A+ EnrollitΓ +X
′
itB +Di∆ + WavetΨ + ξit%+ Ai + Υ2,it > 0)
Enrollit = 1(α0 + α1durit + α2fedrevit +X
′
itB +Di∆ + WavetΨ + ξit + Aiρ+ Υ1,it
> 0)
with ξit ∼ N(0, 1), Ai ∼ N(0, σA), Υ2,it ∼ N(0, 1) and Υ1,it ∼ N(0, 1).
(4.3)
Here yit = 1(·) means yit = 1 if the latent variable in the parentheses is positive, and
ξit, Ai, Υ2,it and Υ1,it are uncorrelated with each other.
The variables durit and fedrevit are the two instruments for pension enrollment
status Enrollit. They only affect the dependent variable via the pension enrollment
status. Both the retirement status and the enrollment status are affected by the indi-
vidual effect Ai and the unobserved time-varying component ξit. The parameters Υ1,it,
Υ2,it, Ai and ξit follow a normal distribution. For convenience, we assume the pension
enrollment status is the only variable that is endogenous. The ML estimation results
of this model are shown in table (4.14). The coefficients of the pension enrollment
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status have the same sign in both models. Both models suggest the NRSPI program
has a positive effect on the retirement status.
In contrast to the case of the linear probability model, the coefficient estimate of
the pension status cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect of the NRSPI program
on retirement. We calculate the average marginal effect by taking the average of the
marginal effects for each individual in the pooled sample. For each individual, the
marginal effect is φ(Â+Enrollit+X
′
itB̂+Di∆̂+WavetΨ̂)−φ(Â+X ′itB̂+Di∆̂+WavetΨ̂),
where φ denotes the probability density function of the standard normal distribution.
The average marginal effects amount to 7.39% for the whole sample, 9.85% for the
females, and 4.29% for the males. It is consistent with what we find in the linear
probability model that the NRSPI program has a more sizable and convincing effect
on females than on males. The difference is that the marginal effects are smaller for
both groups in the Probit model. Similar to the linear probability model, the effect
is only significant for the female group.
4.7.3 Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Model
Since the pension participants can only receive pension benefits from the NRSPI
program when they reach the age of 60, we can use this minimum age requirement in
a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (FRD) design to estimate the local treatment effect
of the pension program. Zhang et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2015) also adopted this
method in their papers. As discussed by Carpenter and Dobkin (2009), Zhang et al.
(2014), Chen et al. (2015), and Angrist and Pischke (2008, Chapter 6), the model
can be estimated using 2SLS with a pooled sample. The second stage is
yi = α + ρPensioni + β0agei + θXi + εi, (4.4)
with yi the outcome variables, Xi the control variables, which include the control
variables that we define in section 4.5 and the second and third order of age. The
parameter ρ is the local treatment effect we are interested in. The first stage is
Pensioni = η0 + η1agei + η2Ti + η3Xi + ξi, (4.5)
with Ti = 1(agei ≤ 60). In another word, we use Ti as instruments to Pensioni. The
bandwidth, the neighborhood size around the cut-off age 60, determines the sample
size in the estimation.
We use the pooled sample to estimate this model. The estimated local treatment
effects and the corresponding standard errors using FRD are shown in Table 4.15.
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Only the coefficients on Pension are presented in the table for the sake of conve-
nience. The whole table is available upon request. Consistent with the findings from
model (4.1), the effect of the NRSPI program on retirement status and labor supply
situation is not significant for males, no matter which bandwidth is chosen. The ef-
fect on females, however, depends on the bandwidth. With a bandwidth equal to 10
years, the probability of retirement will increase by 14.9% for female pensioners. The
effect on retirement status is not significantly different from zero when choosing other
bandwidths. With a very narrow bandwidth (3 years) or very wide bandwidth (20
years), the sign of the coefficient of receiving pension is even negative. The effect on
the females’ labor supply is also dependent on the chosen bandwidth. Only when the
bandwidth is equal to 5 years, the effect is significantly different from zero. Female
pensioners will decrease their weekly labor supply by 18.1 hours.
The magnitude of the only significant coefficient on retirement status matches the
results found by Chen et al. (2015), which is varying from 13.2% to 16.2% for different
control variable specifications. The effect on retirement status found by Zhang et al.
(2014) varies from 16.3% to 26% for different bandwidth. The 90% confidence interval
of the effect on retirement status with bandwidth equal to 10 years is (3.4%, 43.2%),
which contains our point estimation of 14.9%.
The estimation results from the FRD model are very sensitive to the bandwidth;
this is one of the reasons that we prefer our model over this model. Another reason is
that the NRSPI program not only has an effect on the retirement status of participants
above age 60, who have already received pension, but also on contributors below age
60. Thus, the local treatment effect is not very representative for the whole sample.
Although there is a big jump in terms of probability to receive pension at the cutoff
age, the change in labor supply and retirement status is small at the cutoff age. It
further indicates that it is the fact of being in the pension program, being taken care
of by the government, that matters for retirement decision making.
4.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the effect of the New Rural Social Pension Insurance
program on the retirement behavior and the labor supply situation of the Chinese
elderly. Our findings confirm that the labor force participation is correlated to the
social security programs, as is shown by Gruber and Wise (2008) in their Social
Security and Retirement around the World project. With a monthly pension benefit
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of less than 100 CNY, less than one-half of the minimum cost of living, the pension
program significantly changes the retirement pattern of females. Their retirement
likelihood is increased and weekly working hours are decreased. But for males, the
labor supply situation does not change significantly.
The amount of the basic pension received has no effect on the retirement pattern.
The variation in the basic pension is low and the overall pension income is not suffi-
cient to shift the retirement behavior. It seems it is the feeling that the government
will support them in their old age, rather than the amount of money received that
affects people’s retirement decision. However, to verify this explanation, a structural
model is needed in future research.
Although the NRSPI changes the retirement pattern of the rural villagers, there
are still substantial differences between the rural area and the urban area. Retirement
is a relatively new concept for the rural villagers; it is not easy for them to abandon
the tradition of working until too old to work.
We also find that people tend to work more when they have single sons. Although
people in the rural side still mainly rely on their adult sons for old age support, they
need to work harder to help their sons get married. This is consistent with the finding
by Wei et al., (see Wei and Zhang (2011)) that families with unmarried sons tend to
save more to increase their son’s attractiveness in the marriage market.
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In this part, we want to validate the choice of the instrumental variables. Table 4.16
presents the first stage estimation results of the pooled OLS model in column (2),
(4), and (6), as well as the random effect model in columns (1), (3), and (5).
The pooled OLS and the random effect model produce similar results. The co-
efficients of duration and province level federal revenue on pension enrollment and
pension income are significant at the 1% significance level in both models. Longer
duration is associated with higher probability of joining the pension program and
higher pension income. The impact of federal revenue is negative on pension enroll-
ment while positive on pension income, indicating that the pension program was first
introduced in relatively poor provinces, but those provinces fail to provide higher ba-
sic pension or higher subsidies. The effect of financial assets shows a similar pattern.
People with more financial assets are less likely to join the pension program, but when
they participate, they tend to choose a higher level of contribution. The negative cor-
relation between financial assets and the probability of pension enrollment suggests
that there is some substitution effect. People have different methods of provision for
old age, and the NRSPI is a substitute for individual saving.
Most of the health indicators are significant at the 1% significance level when ex-
plaining the self-reported health condition. In addition, by using instrumental vari-
ables, we decrease the dimension of health to one: the self-reported health condition,
which is powerful in explaining work capacity.
4.10 Figures and Tables
In this section we present a list of figures and tables.
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Figure 4.1: Retirement ratio of different age groups by pension status and wave. The
dotted line represents pension participants in the first wave. The solid line represents
pension participants in the second wave. The dashed line represents non-participants
in the first wave. The dash-dotted line represents non-participants in the second
wave. Pension participants are those participating in the NRSPI; they can be either
contributors or pensioners. Both males and females, both rural and urban samples
are included in this plot. The x-axis refers to the age of the individuals, and the
y-axis refers to the proportion of people in retirement.
Figure 4.2: Retirement ratio of different age groups by region and wave. The dotted
line represents individuals in the rural area in the first wave. The solid line represents
individuals in the rural area in the second wave. The dashed line represents individu-
als in the urban area in the first wave. The dash-dotted line represents individuals in
the urban area in the second wave. Both males and females are included in this plot.
The x-axis refers to the age of the individuals, and the y-axis refers to the proportion
of people in retirement.
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Figure 4.3: Retirement ratio of different age groups by gender and wave. The dotted
line represents males in the first wave. The solid line represents males in the second
wave. The dashed line represents females in the first wave. The dash-dotted line
represents females in the second wave. Individuals from both the urban and the rural
areas are included in this plot. The x-axis refers to the age of the individuals, and
the y-axis refers to the proportion of people in retirement.
Figure 4.4: The average working hours per week by pension status and wave. The
dotted line represents non-participants in the first wave. The solid line represents
non-participants in the second wave. The dashed line represents participants in the
first wave. The dash-dotted line represents participants in the second wave. Pension
participants are those participating in the NRSPI; they can be either contributors or
pensioners. Both males and females, both rural and urban samples are included in
this plot. The x-axis refers to the age of the individuals, and the y-axis refers to the
average working hours per week.
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Figure 4.5: The average working hours per week by region and wave. The dotted
line represents urban individuals in the first wave. The solid line represents rural
individuals in the first wave. The dashed line represents urban individuals in the
first wave. The dash-dotted line represents rural individuals in the second wave.
Both males and females are included in this plot. The x-axis refers to the age of the
individuals, and the y-axis refers to the average working hours per week.
Figure 4.6: The average working hours per week by gender and wave. The dotted
line represents females in the first wave. The solid line represents females in the
second wave. The dashed line represents males in the first wave. The dash-dotted
line represents males in the second wave. Individuals from both the urban and the
rural areas are included in this plot. The x-axis refers to the age of the individuals,
and the y-axis refers to the average working hours per week.
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Figure 4.7: The proportion of people who receive pension benefits. The hollow dia-
mond represents the proportion in the first wave, and the solid diamond represents
the proportion in the second wave. Both males and females, both urban and rural
samples are included in this plot. The x-axis refers to the age of the individuals, and
the y-axis refers to the proportion of people who receive pension benefits.
Figure 4.8: The proportion of people who enrolled in the New Rural Social Pension
Insurance program by gender and wave. The hollow circle represents females in the
first wave, and the solid circle represents males in the first wave. The hollow diamond
represents females in the second wave, and the solid diamond represents males in the
second wave. Both urban and rural samples are included in this plot. The x-axis
refers to the age of the individuals, and the y-axis refers to the proportion of people
who participate in the NRSPI.
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(a) All (b) Female (c) Male
Figure 4.9: Partial effect of receiving pension on the retirement probability. These
figures plot the ordered values of γ̂ + θ̂ × Benefitsit against the uniform distribution,
where γ̂ and θ̂ denote the estimated values of parameters in model (4.1) when the
dependent variable is the retirement status. The x-axis is the fraction of the data and
the y-axis displays the partial effect. Panels (a), (b), and (c) show the partial effect
for the whole sample, the female subsample, and the male subsample, respectively.
(a) All (b) Female (c) Male
Figure 4.10: Partial effect of receiving pension on the labor supply. These figures
plot the ordered values of γ̂+ θ̂×Benefitsit against the uniform distribution, where γ̂
and θ̂ denote the estimated values of parameters in model (4.1) when the dependent
variable is the number of weekly working hours. The x-axis refers to the fraction of
the data and the y-axis displays the partial effect. Panels (a), (b), and (c) show the





Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Dependent variables
retired(%) 21.9 5884 13.3 5416 17.8 11300
non-agri. work(%) 14.9 5884 30 5416 22.2 11300
agri. work(%) 72.3 5884 77.5 5416 74.8 11300
weekly working hours(H) 23.2 5667 33.8 5183 28.3 10850
w.h. on non-agri work(H) 6.5 5823 14.9 5319 10.5 11142
w.h. on agri. work(H) 16.8 5722 18.7 5271 17.7 10993
w.h. on own field(H) 16.2 5748 18 5312 17.1 11060
Pension
pension enrollment(%) 52.9 5884 51.6 5416 52.3 11300
receive pension(%) 20.8 5884 21.4 5416 21.1 11300
benefits(CNY/year) 860 1222 853.2 1160 856.8 2382
Demography
male(%) 5884 5416 47.9 11300
married(%) 86.5 5884 90.8 5416 88.5 11300
agri.-hukou(%) 98.9 5884 98.8 5416 98.8 11300
education 2.4 5884 3.5 5416 2.9 11300
age 58.4 5884 59.4 5416 58.9 11300
Geography
East(%) 28.2 5884 27.8 5416 28 11300
West(%) 36.7 5884 36.4 5416 36.6 11300
Northeast(%) 4.7 5884 4.9 5416 4.8 11300
Middle(%) 30.4 5884 30.9 5416 30.6 11300
Table 4.1: The sample averages of the main variables. All variables are expressed
as percentages except age, education, working hours, benefits, health, which is the
self-reported health status, and financial situation. The column (1) represents the
female subsample, the column (2) represents the male subsample, and column (3)
includes both males and females.
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Female Male Overall
Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs
Occupation
farming(%) 92.5 5884 89.5 5416 91 11300
government(%) 1 5884 2 5416 1.5 11300
firm(%) 2 5884 4.7 5416 3.3 11300
other employed(%) 7.2 5884 14.7 5416 10.8 11300
self-employed(%) 6.3 5884 10.1 5416 8.1 11300
Family Obligation
care child(%) 20.9 5884 21.5 5416 21.2 11300
care parent (%) 6.6 5884 5.9 5416 6.3 11300
Health Situation
self-reported health 1.9 5884 2.1 5416 2 11300
Financial Situation
h.h. income (CNY/year) 11872.2 5884 14576.3 5416 13168.3 11300
financial asset (CNY) 4156.8 5884 7036.3 5416 5536.9 11300
financial liability (CNY) 2331.8 5884 3043.6 5416 2673 11300
Table 4.1 continued. The variables care child and care parent indicate whether survey
participants have a grandchild under 6 or old parents to take care of. The variable
self-reported health denotes the self-reported health condition, which varies from 0
(very poor) to 5 (excellent).
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retired hours pension benefits health married hukou
retired 1
hours -0.4553 1
pension 0.1532 -0.1477 1
benefits 0.0934 -0.0808 0.6456 1
health -0.139 0.1215 -0.0422 -0.0183 1
married -0.2105 0.1442 -0.1427 -0.0746 0.0465 1
hukou -0.0249 0.0056 0.011 0.0089 -0.014 -0.0235 1
single son -0.0762 0.0858 -0.0956 -0.0589 -0.0045 0.0503 0.0167
single dau. -0.0556 0.0695 -0.1142 -0.0691 0.0121 0.0793 0.011
farm -0.0156 -0.1612 0.0783 0.0358 -0.0909 -0.0299 0.0463
government 0.0381 0.0411 -0.0023 0.0008 0.0117 0.0219 -0.0227
firm 0.0591 0.1023 -0.027 -0.0097 0.0312 0.0057 -0.0275
ind. firm -0.0107 0.2915 -0.0893 -0.0425 0.0851 0.0314 0.0042
self emp. -0.103 0.2941 -0.0606 -0.0233 0.093 0.0356 -0.0338
hh income -0.074 0.1352 -0.1179 -0.0784 0.0813 0.0302 -0.0016
education -0.1467 0.1678 -0.1666 -0.0946 0.1242 0.1639 -0.0321
age 0.3408 -0.2637 0.4927 0.3062 -0.1158 -0.3172 0.0032
fin. asset -0.0374 0.0725 -0.0458 -0.0046 0.1026 0.0575 -0.0137
fin. Liab. -0.0056 0.0212 -0.0258 -0.0159 -0.0012 0.0237 0.005
male -0.1137 0.179 0.0099 0.0069 0.0882 0.0684 -0.0032
single son single dau. farm government firm ind. firm self emp.
single son 1
single dau. 0.147 1
farm -0.0416 -0.0707 1
government -0.012 0.0165 -0.1517 1
firm 0.0128 0.0265 -0.1835 0.0209 1
ind. firm 0.0445 0.0358 -0.2993 -0.0339 -0.03 1
self emp. 0.0322 0.0571 -0.3302 -0.0328 -0.047 -0.0693 1
hh income 0.0412 0.0582 -0.1236 0.0136 0.0513 0.1106 0.0792
education 0.1072 0.1245 -0.1491 0.0626 0.0944 0.1388 0.1235
age -0.1984 -0.2139 0.1416 -0.0131 -0.0479 -0.1528 -0.1222
fin. asset 0.028 0.0681 -0.1151 0.0201 0.0371 0.0337 0.13
fin. Liab. 0.0235 0.0107 -0.0416 0.0031 0.0048 0.0048 0.0331
male 0.0067 0.01 -0.0515 0.0364 0.0748 0.1201 0.0706
hh income education age fin. asset fin. Liab. male
hh income 1
education 0.1341 1
age -0.1773 -0.337 1
fin. asset 0.1192 0.1177 -0.0929 1
fin. Liab. 0.0349 0.0421 -0.0672 0.0297 1
male 0.0514 0.3367 0.0547 0.061 0.014 1
Table 4.1 continued. Correlation matrix of the main variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Retirement Status weekly working hours
All Male Female All Male Female
pension 0.369** 0.045 0.296** −34.562*** −11.048 −27.155**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (11.10) (14.60) (11.881)
pension × benefits −0.384** −0.026 −0.273** 24.819** −2.815 17.088
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (11.42) (15.34) (11.217)
self-reported health −0.201*** −0.232***−0.167*** 8.048*** 10.838*** 5.528***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.87) (1.30) (1.157)
married −0.110*** −0.129***−0.103*** 5.789*** 11.613*** 2.384**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (1.01) (1.75) (1.197)
agri-hukou −0.101** −0.092 −0.125* 5.792** 7.240** 5.992
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (2.74) (3.68) (3.803)
male −0.084*** 6.487***
(0.01) (0.69)
no. never married sons −0.024** −0.013 −0.030** 2.073*** 2.593** 1.443
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.73) (1.02) (1.001)
no. never married daughters 0.018 0.004 0.03 −0.953 −1.012 −0.908
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.92) (1.23) (1.353)
farming −0.051*** −0.029 −0.073*** 10.898*** 12.639*** 7.178***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (1.45) (1.85) (2.262)
government 0.126*** 0.090** 0.182*** 17.215*** 20.680*** 11.428*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (3.95) (4.59) (5.91)
firm 0.154*** 0.165*** 0.127*** 21.323*** 23.321*** 18.017***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (2.47) (3.06) (3.802)
individual firm 0.076*** 0.060*** 0.095*** 28.872*** 32.447*** 23.396***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (1.42) (1.68) (2.602)
self-employed −0.044*** −0.012 −0.097*** 34.012*** 33.640*** 34.348***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (1.63) (2.04) (2.498)
household income −0.121 0.12 −0.246 41.760*** 34.808* 35.451*
(0.15) (0.18) (0.22) (13.85) (20.42) (18.982)
education 0.009*** 0.005 0.010** −0.793*** −0.491 −0.990***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.22) (0.31) (0.275)
age 0.106*** 0.091*** 0.115*** −1.784 0.057 −3.354**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (1.19) (1.74) (1.47)
financial asset 0.592*** 0.415* 0.649* −32.520* −23.974 −28.808
(0.22) (0.24) (0.34) (18.19) (23.68) (29.523)
financial liability 0.017 −0.136 0.036 4.402 31.45 0.199
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (7.67) (24.49) (4.902)
east 0.071*** 0.043** 0.071*** −3.001*** −1.566 −2.403*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (1.07) (1.51) (1.401)
west −0.022* −0.016 −0.042** 2.722*** 2.456* 4.102***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.91) (1.27) (1.112)
northeast 0.057*** 0.056** 0.060* −4.691*** −5.016** −4.429**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (1.41) (2.18) (−1.758)
wave dummy 0.007 0.022 −0.006 2.016 1.489 2.273
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (1.49) (2.19) (1.862)
Observations 11300 5416 5884 10428 4966 5462
χ2 1222.831 533.640 699.149 2450.440 1489.345 860.718
Table 4.2: The effect of NRSPI program on the retirement status and weekly working
hours. We fit model (4.1) to the rural observations with age above 45 in these regres-
sions. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the dependent variable is the retirement status;
in columns (4), (5), and (6), it is working hours per week. Columns (1) and (4) use
all rural observations, columns (2) and (5) use only the male rural observations, and
columns (3) and (6) use only the female rural observations. The constant terms and
coefficients on the number of sons and daughters, and whether individuals need to






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Male Female All Male Female
retirement status non-agr. work status
benefits −0.107 0.025 −0.136 0.012 0.011 0.010
(0.070) (0.085) (0.092) (0.032) (0.051) (0.022)
self-reported health −0.277*** −0.296*** −0.233*** 0.036*** 0.055*** 0.018
(0.029) (0.036) (0.043) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014)
male −0.096*** 0.032***
(0.022) (0.011)
no. never married sons −0.064** −0.039 −0.059 0.002 −0.004 0.007
(0.026) (0.033) (0.045) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 2382 1160 1222 2382 1160 1222
agriculture work status agr. work for own household
benefits 0.110 −0.024 0.133 −0.034 0.014 −0.092
(0.070) (0.083) (0.093) (0.047) (0.028) (0.120)
self-reported health 0.275*** 0.286*** 0.237*** 0.114** 0.129** 0.122*
(0.029) (0.035) (0.042) (0.045) (0.061) (0.069)
male 0.092*** 0.040
(0.022) (0.037)
no. never married sons 0.063** 0.042 0.056 0.040 0.060 0.022
(0.026) (0.032) (0.045) (0.036) (0.060) (0.049)
Observations 2382 1160 1222 416 208 208
Table 4.4: The effect of pension benefits on the retirement status and work status of
different types of work. We fit model (4.1) to the rural pensioners in these regressions.
In the top panel, in columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the retirement status,
and in columns (4) to (6), it is the non-agricultural work status. In the bottom panel,
in columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the agricultural work status, and
in columns (4) to (6), it is the own-field agricultural work status. Columns (1) and
(4) use all rural pensioners, columns (2) and (5) use only the male rural pensioners,
and columns (3) and (6) use only the female rural pensioners. Other coefficients are
omitted from the report.
138
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Male Female All Male Female
weekly working hours hours non-agri. work
benefits 2.365 −4.283 3.672 0.031 −2.343 1.919
(3.450) (6.102) (3.788) (2.019) (3.588) (1.403)
self-reported health 7.233*** 8.830*** 5.072*** 1.497** 1.911 0.880
(1.379) (2.071) (1.837) (0.754) (1.310) (0.778)
male 6.475*** 1.771***
(1.129) (0.635)
no. never married sons 2.500* 2.437 1.153 0.133 −0.812 0.425
(1.329) (2.011) (1.997) (0.676) (1.317) (0.885)
Observations 2241 1087 1154 2241 1087 1154
hours agri. work hours agri. work for own household
benefits 2.282 −2.061 1.723 2.557 −1.128 1.756
(2.863) (4.422) (3.374) (2.853) (4.383) (3.361)
self-reported health 5.710*** 6.888*** 4.182** 5.481*** 6.912*** 3.654**
(1.196) (1.615) (1.811) (1.172) (1.600) (1.798)
male 4.713*** 4.690***
(0.906) (0.903)
no. never married sons 2.355** 3.218** 0.734 2.453** 3.519** 0.677
(1.147) (1.623) (1.681) (1.143) (1.609) (1.673)
Observations 2241 1087 1154 2241 1087 1154
Table 4.5: The effect of pension benefits on the weekly working hours of different
types of work. We fit model (4.1) to the rural pensioners in these regressions. In the
top panel, in columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the total working hours
per week; in columns (4) to (6), it is the non-agricultural working hours per week. In
the bottom panel, in columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the agricultural
working hours per week; in columns (4) to (6), it is the own-field agricultural working
hours per week. Columns (1) and (4) use all rural pensioners, columns (2) and (5)
use only the male rural pensioners, and columns (3) and (6) use only the female rural
pensioners. Other coefficients are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
retirement status non-agr. work status
All Male Female All Male Female
prev. year pension enrollment 0.113** 0.037 0.166** −0.051 −0.107** 0.016
(0.048) (0.057) (0.068) (0.033) (0.051) (0.042)
self-reported health −0.140*** −0.150*** −0.131*** 0.040*** 0.063*** 0.027**
(0.017) (0.027) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013)
married −0.044* −0.130*** 0.036 −0.011 0.037* −0.049**
(0.024) (0.036) (0.033) (0.015) (0.022) (0.019)
agri-hukou −0.132** −0.146* −0.137* 0.043 0.098*** 0.008
(0.056) (0.084) (0.072) (0.026) (0.036) (0.036)
male −0.054*** 0.047***
(0.010) (0.008)
no. never married sons −0.022*** −0.008 −0.035*** −0.002 −0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
no. never married daughters 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
farming −0.082*** −0.048** −0.119*** 0.027 0.038* 0.006
(0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.017) (0.021) (0.029)
government 0.055 −0.007 0.171*** 0.735*** 0.850*** 0.574***
(0.043) (0.037) (0.064) (0.059) (0.064) (0.112)
firm 0.057** 0.069** 0.049 0.714*** 0.728*** 0.686***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.039) (0.036) (0.043) (0.065)
individual firm 0.038*** 0.027* 0.060** 0.773*** 0.802*** 0.717***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029)
self-employed −0.049*** −0.014 −0.097*** 0.862*** 0.843*** 0.885***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
household income −0.011 −0.036 0.073 0.318** 0.505*** 0.058
(0.148) (0.169) (0.229) (0.127) (0.193) (0.180)
education −0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
age 0.022** 0.003 0.037** −0.009 −0.008 −0.011
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
financial asset 0.380** 0.449** 0.245 −0.247 −0.399** −0.021
(0.187) (0.227) (0.307) (0.154) (0.181) (0.195)
financial liability 0.025 −0.283* 0.085 −0.061 −0.054 −0.066
(0.159) (0.150) (0.142) (0.085) (0.246) (0.084)
east 0.050*** 0.039** 0.058*** −0.014 −0.031** 0.007
(0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
west −0.029** −0.008 −0.044** −0.011 −0.036** 0.013
(0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012)
northeast 0.037* 0.013 0.070* −0.018 −0.042* 0.003
(0.021) (0.022) (0.037) (0.015) (0.023) (0.020)
wave dummy −0.050* −0.007 −0.077* 0.021 0.057* −0.024
(0.027) (0.033) (0.039) (0.019) (0.030) (0.024)
Observations 6362 2962 3400 6362 2962 3400
χ2 254.929 87.101 156.987 12058.464 6050.487 5224.082
Table 4.6: The effect of NRSPI program on the retirement status and work status
of non-agriculture work. We fit model (4.2) to rural observations with age below 60
in these regressions. In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the retirement
status; in columns (4) to (6) it is the non-agricultural work status. Columns (1) and
(4) use all rural observations below age 60, columns (2) and (5) use only the male
rural observations below age 60, and columns (3) and (6) use only the female rural
observations below age 60. The constant terms and coefficients on the number of sons
and daughters, and whether individuals need to take care of grandchildren or parents
are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
agriculture work status agr. work for own hh.
All Male Female All Male Female
prev. year pension enrollment −0.066 0.027 −0.139** −0.111*** −0.087 −0.109**
(0.043) (0.048) (0.067) (0.040) (0.059) (0.052)
self-reported health 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.127*** 0.016 0.020 0.009
(0.016) (0.025) (0.022) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017)
married 0.037* 0.083*** −0.011 0.002 0.014 −0.011
(0.022) (0.032) (0.029) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025)
agri-hukou 0.123** 0.120 0.143** −0.039 −0.018 −0.063***
(0.053) (0.081) (0.066) (0.032) (0.068) (0.020)
male 0.044*** 0.005
(0.009) (0.010)
no. never married sons 0.024*** 0.010 0.036*** 0.015* 0.020* 0.012
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
no. never married daughters −0.000 −0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.005 −0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
farming 0.909*** 0.939*** 0.861*** 0.335 −0.095** 0.751***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.296) (0.041) (0.061)
government −0.030 −0.005 −0.110 0.076*** 0.068** 0.094***
(0.031) (0.028) (0.068) (0.027) (0.033) (0.017)
firm −0.056*** −0.049** −0.071* 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.025
(0.021) (0.024) (0.038) (0.020) (0.022) (0.042)
individual firm −0.030*** −0.011 −0.064*** −0.015 −0.013 −0.020
(0.011) (0.012) (0.023) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028)
self-employed 0.010 0.002 0.016 −0.001 0.006 −0.009
(0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028)
household income −0.170 −0.201 −0.135 −0.101 −0.140 −0.040
(0.133) (0.143) (0.230) (0.158) (0.185) (0.265)
education −0.001 −0.004 −0.000 0.001 0.003 −0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
age −0.027*** −0.012 −0.037** 0.008 0.014 −0.001
(0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
financial asset −0.346*** −0.291* −0.385 0.045 −0.068 0.372
(0.134) (0.158) (0.266) (0.193) (0.226) (0.368)
financial liability −0.017 0.245** −0.065 −0.059 0.206 −0.340
(0.155) (0.123) (0.129) (0.210) (0.219) (0.370)
east −0.041*** −0.017 −0.061*** −0.022* −0.013 −0.026
(0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018)
west 0.029** 0.016 0.037* −0.008 −0.009 −0.006
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
northeast −0.033* −0.003 −0.070** 0.020 0.049** −0.011
(0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.018) (0.020) (0.030)
wave dummy 0.023 −0.020 0.056 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.119***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.038) (0.026) (0.038) (0.034)
Observations 6362 2962 3400 4582 2176 2406
χ2 15066.913 12880.441 4678.392 89.342 199.374 40621.252
Table 4.7: The effect of NRSPI program on the work status of agriculture work. We
fit model (4.2) to the rural observations with age below 60 in these regressions. In
columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the agricultural work status; in columns
(4) to (6) it is the agricultural work status on their own household field. Columns
(1) and (4) use all rural observations below age 60, columns (2) and (5) use only the
male rural observations below age 60, and columns (3) and (6) use only the female
rural observations below age 60. The constant terms and coefficients on the number
of sons and daughters, and whether individuals need to take care of grandchildren or
parents are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
weekly working hours hours non-agri. work
All Male Female All Male Female
prev. year pension enrollment −10.494*** −6.470 −12.425** −0.511 2.871 −3.016
(4.069) (6.396) (5.092) (2.622) (4.303) (2.968)
self-reported health 5.510*** 7.654*** 3.904*** 2.502*** 3.641*** 1.563*
(1.195) (1.931) (1.494) (0.703) (1.254) (0.810)
married 4.389** 11.108*** −3.020 1.232 3.764** −1.744
(1.743) (2.451) (2.327) (1.020) (1.852) (1.291)
agri-hukou 6.446* 7.724 6.571 −3.745 0.469 −6.364
(3.724) (4.984) (5.239) (2.539) (3.721) (4.053)
male 5.270*** 2.734***
(0.898) (0.573)
no. never married sons 2.825*** 2.918** 2.885*** 0.406 0.858 0.225
(0.772) (1.194) (1.010) (0.497) (0.800) (0.574)
no. never married daughters −0.067 −0.989 0.995 −0.579 −0.937 −0.059
(0.923) (1.330) (1.286) (0.609) (0.984) (0.671)
farming 12.415*** 13.436*** 10.246*** −2.906* −2.482* −4.148*
(1.679) (2.166) (2.659) (1.485) (1.399) (2.281)
government 22.254*** 25.566*** 15.977* 30.814*** 33.228*** 27.456***
(4.658) (5.101) (8.777) (4.252) (2.814) (8.256)
firm 28.458*** 30.134*** 24.999*** 37.666*** 40.556*** 32.802***
(2.648) (3.363) (4.284) (2.448) (1.732) (4.155)
individual firm 32.605*** 34.871*** 28.123*** 41.938*** 45.513*** 36.215***
(1.539) (1.814) (2.820) (1.273) (1.081) (2.231)
self-employed 36.232*** 34.643*** 37.933*** 43.230*** 43.307*** 43.213***
(1.816) (2.293) (2.952) (1.494) (1.290) (2.301)
household income 40.602** 52.708* 22.354 48.748*** 71.342*** 20.339
(17.851) (27.884) (23.132) (11.525) (13.358) (12.602)
education −0.357 −0.044 −0.664** 0.309* 0.163 0.413**
(0.263) (0.413) (0.338) (0.174) (0.270) (0.206)
age 1.256 4.624*** −1.460 −0.875 −0.529 −1.206
(1.018) (1.541) (1.345) (0.630) (1.046) (0.745)
financial asset −14.272 −19.875 −2.476 −16.017 −21.517* −9.814
(20.341) (25.689) (26.487) (16.559) (11.192) (23.097)
financial liability 2.769 40.597 −4.333 −0.880 16.780 −3.881
(8.739) (24.708) (5.154) (5.591) (16.789) (5.402)
east −1.664 −0.999 −1.935 −1.569* −1.400 −1.306
(1.269) (1.834) (1.755) (0.833) (1.232) (1.044)
west 3.904*** 2.333 5.010*** −1.139* −1.598 −0.798
(1.127) (1.680) (1.509) (0.683) (1.143) (0.822)
northeast −3.202* −1.699 −5.090** −0.586 −0.402 −1.168
(1.804) (2.783) (2.284) (1.211) (1.967) (1.273)
wave dummy 4.264* 1.782 5.397* 0.633 −0.769 1.452
(2.306) (3.580) (2.944) (1.487) (2.530) (1.756)
Observations 5802 2686 3116 5802 2686 3116
χ2 1289.769 758.394 433.970 3478.797 3861.872 1028.622
Table 4.8: The effect of NRSPI program on labor supply. We fit model (4.2) to
rural observations with age below 60 in these regressions. In columns (1) to (3), the
dependent variable is the total weekly working hours; in columns (4) to (6), it is the
weekly non-agricultural working hours. Columns (1) and (4) use all rural observations
below age 60, columns (2) and (5) use only the male rural observations below age 60,
and columns (3) and (6) use only the female rural observations below age 60. The
constant terms and coefficients on the number of sons and daughters, and whether
individuals need to take care of grandchildren or parents are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hours agri. work hours agri. work for own hh.
All Male Female All Male Female
prev. year pension enrollment −10.023*** −8.554* −9.538** −8.496*** −6.302 −8.714**
(3.135) (4.554) (4.062) (2.999) (4.374) (3.824)
self-reported health 2.811*** 3.812*** 2.229* 2.595*** 3.974*** 1.733
(0.946) (1.380) (1.201) (0.912) (1.329) (1.180)
married 3.120** 7.479*** −1.227 2.726** 6.471*** −1.218
(1.376) (2.017) (2.007) (1.356) (1.942) (1.992)
agri-hukou 10.229*** 7.159* 13.024*** 9.359*** 5.981 12.489***
(2.305) (4.144) (2.400) (2.271) (3.993) (2.420)
male 2.397*** 2.109***
(0.686) (0.663)
no. never married sons 2.273*** 1.832** 2.648*** 2.218*** 1.919** 2.482***
(0.579) (0.790) (0.808) (0.551) (0.757) (0.775)
no. never married daughters 0.547 0.014 1.201 0.765 0.020 1.611
(0.719) (0.972) (1.066) (0.700) (0.930) (1.045)
farming 15.576*** 15.831*** 15.150*** 14.542*** 14.708*** 14.230***
(0.738) (1.397) (1.155) (0.696) (1.338) (1.082)
government −7.725*** −5.948** −11.061*** −6.539*** −5.123* −9.559***
(1.901) (2.865) (2.038) (1.843) (2.748) (1.980)
firm −8.621*** −9.595*** −7.392*** −7.810*** −8.692*** −6.779***
(0.999) (1.719) (1.543) (0.949) (1.646) (1.440)
individual firm −8.636*** −9.658*** −7.283*** −8.026*** −9.081*** −6.561***
(0.840) (1.076) (1.525) (0.770) (1.030) (1.368)
self-employed −5.902*** −7.359*** −4.103*** −4.949*** −6.384*** −3.223**
(0.942) (1.283) (1.461) (0.913) (1.228) (1.425)
household income −2.115 −16.993 12.086 −9.972 −22.088* 0.466
(12.344) (13.029) (17.413) (9.881) (12.468) (13.536)
education −0.693*** −0.237 −1.112*** −0.682*** −0.246 −1.083***
(0.198) (0.299) (0.264) (0.190) (0.289) (0.252)
age 2.162*** 5.267*** −0.215 2.386*** 5.302*** 0.155
(0.792) (1.154) (1.077) (0.767) (1.112) (1.053)
financial asset 2.065 1.132 6.512 −5.176 −7.707 2.600
(9.961) (11.334) (16.543) (7.267) (10.865) (15.747)
financial liability 3.669 21.666 −0.757 3.766 21.023 −0.468
(6.298) (16.783) (3.903) (6.024) (16.079) (3.512)
east −0.113 0.346 −0.570 −0.209 0.623 −1.007
(0.959) (1.358) (1.356) (0.927) (1.308) (1.298)
west 5.054*** 4.073*** 5.808*** 5.234*** 4.463*** 5.785***
(0.900) (1.257) (1.242) (0.874) (1.211) (1.208)
northeast −2.588* −1.291 −3.895** −2.367* −1.127 −3.655**
(1.361) (2.185) (1.874) (1.318) (2.106) (1.815)
wave dummy 3.753** 2.151 4.153* 2.849* 1.030 3.462
(1.768) (2.640) (2.292) (1.699) (2.535) (2.168)
Observations 5802 2686 3116 5802 2686 3116
χ2 2363.454 534.747 1193.809 2374.549 521.323 1221.952
Table 4.9: The effect of NRSPI program on labor supply of agricultural work. We
fit model (4.2) to the rural observations with age below 60 in these regressions. In
columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the agricultural working hours per week;
in columns (4) to (6), it is the own-field agricultural working hours per week. Columns
(1) and (4) use all rural observations below age 60, columns (2) and (5) use only the
male rural observations below age 60, and columns (3) and (6) use only the female
rural observations below age 60. The constant terms and coefficients on the number
of sons and daughters, and whether individuals need to take care of grandchildren or
parents are omitted from the report.
143
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
retirement status non-agr. work status
All Male Female All Male Female
pension 0.281** −0.059 0.237* −0.130 −0.148 0.024
(0.120) (0.154) (0.125) (0.079) (0.138) (0.077)
benefits −0.297** 0.112 −0.256*** 0.125* 0.059 0.040
(0.117) (0.186) (0.090) (0.068) (0.138) (0.051)
self-reported health −0.194*** −0.231*** −0.159*** 0.045*** 0.072*** 0.028***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)
urban 0.233*** 0.182*** 0.257*** −0.046*** −0.052** −0.032*
(0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016)
male −0.093*** 0.050***
(0.010) (0.006)
no. never married sons −0.025*** −0.012 −0.033** −0.002 −0.008 0.007
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
married −0.101*** −0.125*** −0.090*** −0.000 0.038** −0.013
(0.016) (0.025) (0.019) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010)
agri-hukou −0.023 −0.020 −0.051 0.052** 0.040 0.081***
(0.031) (0.043) (0.041) (0.022) (0.031) (0.029)
no. never married daughters 0.012 0.002 0.019 0.001 −0.000 0.009
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
farming −0.018 −0.002 −0.046** −0.019 −0.016 −0.038*
(0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
government 0.169*** 0.129*** 0.207*** 0.489*** 0.589*** 0.352***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.051) (0.049) (0.060) (0.075)
firm 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.155*** 0.517*** 0.554*** 0.457***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.050)
individual firm 0.079*** 0.065*** 0.099*** 0.691*** 0.738*** 0.601***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026)
self-employed −0.073*** −0.022 −0.145*** 0.844*** 0.819*** 0.871***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
household income −0.087 0.185 −0.238 0.429*** 0.472*** 0.221*
(0.129) (0.170) (0.203) (0.096) (0.150) (0.125)
education 0.010*** 0.005 0.011** −0.004** −0.006** −0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
age 0.116*** 0.090*** 0.133*** −0.037*** −0.028* −0.039***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.021) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012)
financial asset 0.115 0.021 0.790** 0.010 0.004 −0.079
(0.115) (0.085) (0.327) (0.079) (0.085) (0.195)
financial liability 0.151 −0.127 0.207 −0.122 −0.084 −0.155
(0.093) (0.162) (0.154) (0.093) (0.169) (0.114)
Observations 12356 5876 6480 12356 5876 6480
χ2 1542.615 603.720 999.662 20715.841 11839.810 9355.492
Table 4.10: The effect of NRSPI program on the retirement status and work status of
non-agricultural work. We fit model (4.1) to all the observations in both the rural and
urban side with age above 45. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the dependent variable
is the retirement status; in columns (4), (5), and (6), it is the non-agricultural work
status. Columns (1) and (4) use all observations, columns (2) and (5) use only the
male observations, and columns (3) and (6) use only the female observations. The
constant terms and coefficients on the districts and wave dummies, the number of
sons and daughters, and whether individuals need to take care of grandchildren or
parents are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
agriculture work status agr. work for own household
All Male Female All Male Female
pension −0.126 0.133 −0.101 −0.453*** −0.403** −0.413**
(0.101) (0.140) (0.132) (0.145) (0.167) (0.197)
benefits 0.201** −0.163 0.169* 0.208 0.196 0.133
(0.100) (0.176) (0.101) (0.135) (0.127) (0.191)
self-reported health 0.184*** 0.212*** 0.153*** 0.029** 0.041** 0.021
(0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015)
urban −0.211*** −0.169*** −0.234*** −0.027 0.019 −0.065*
(0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.037)
male 0.076*** 0.003
(0.009) (0.008)
no. never married sons 0.032*** 0.014 0.042*** −0.004 0.012 −0.021*
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
married 0.099*** 0.107*** 0.098*** −0.025* −0.010 −0.035*
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018)
agri-hukou −0.026 −0.015 −0.017 0.008 0.009 0.018
(0.029) (0.040) (0.042) (0.031) (0.038) (0.051)
no. never married daughters −0.005 0.002 −0.013 −0.014 −0.015 −0.011
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
farming 0.793*** 0.861*** 0.718*** 0.561*** 0.449 0.782***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.211) (0.317) (0.035)
government −0.073*** −0.059* −0.087* 0.044** 0.044* 0.056**
(0.028) (0.033) (0.048) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
firm −0.124*** −0.132*** −0.094*** 0.010 0.017 −0.002
(0.021) (0.026) (0.036) (0.023) (0.026) (0.045)
individual firm −0.067*** −0.042*** −0.105*** −0.022 −0.019 −0.033
(0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.029)
self-employed 0.006 −0.004 0.016 −0.019 −0.011 −0.033
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026)
household income −0.171 −0.483*** 0.064 0.072 0.039 0.128
(0.122) (0.163) (0.182) (0.144) (0.176) (0.233)
education −0.010*** −0.006* −0.011*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
age −0.118*** −0.089*** −0.132*** 0.059*** 0.059** 0.056*
(0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.030)
financial asset −0.136 −0.018 −0.722** −0.363 −0.478 0.015
(0.085) (0.065) (0.287) (0.269) (0.336) (0.378)
financial liability −0.108 0.101 −0.170** −0.221 −0.045 −0.513
(0.096) (0.155) (0.083) (0.199) (0.210) (0.380)
Observations 12356 5876 6480 7688 3858 3830
χ2 8867.383 6456.472 3777.320 115.216 64.448 43451.780
Table 4.11: The effect of NRSPI program on the work status of agricultural work.
We fit model (4.1) to all the observations in both the rural and urban side with age
above 45. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the dependent variable is the agricultural work
status; in columns (4), (5), and (6), it is the agricultural work status on their own
household field. Columns (1) and (4) use all observations, columns (2) and (5) use
only the male observations, and columns (3) and (6) use only the female observations.
The constant terms and coefficients on the districts and wave dummies, the number
of sons and daughters, and whether individuals need to take care of grandchildren or
parents are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
weekly working hours hours non-agri. work
All Male Female All Male Female
pension −27.120*** −7.188 −20.446** −5.128 4.665 −3.249
(8.880) (15.534) (9.873) (4.985) (9.235) (5.422)
benefits 19.408** −7.572 17.526** 6.143 −6.007 6.904*
(8.082) (16.857) (7.797) (4.388) (10.735) (3.832)
self-reported health 8.056*** 10.722*** 5.663*** 2.594*** 3.454*** 1.930***
(0.798) (1.272) (1.016) (0.492) (0.871) (0.569)
urban −10.227*** −9.078*** −9.923*** −1.988* −1.501 −1.725
(1.373) (2.071) (1.655) (1.019) (1.286) (1.225)
male 6.768*** 2.869***
(0.655) (0.412)
no. never married sons 1.892*** 2.066** 1.697* 0.168 0.203 0.380
(0.676) (1.024) (0.926) (0.421) (0.697) (0.531)
married 5.352*** 11.178*** 2.167* 0.730 3.505*** −0.433
(0.950) (1.795) (1.124) (0.565) (1.188) (0.637)
agri-hukou 3.985** 6.179** 3.243 2.233 4.471** 1.049
(1.902) (2.817) (2.387) (1.617) (1.833) (2.088)
no. never married daughters −0.525 −0.978 0.197 −0.267 −0.877 0.562
(0.872) (1.186) (1.282) (0.561) (0.850) (0.732)
farming 7.767*** 9.396*** 5.305*** −4.889*** −4.742*** −5.823***
(1.295) (1.767) (1.917) (1.113) (1.001) (1.620)
government 12.178*** 16.774*** 6.679 19.888*** 24.291*** 13.868***
(3.423) (4.053) (5.070) (3.057) (1.899) (4.654)
firm 17.717*** 21.141*** 13.073*** 27.607*** 32.004*** 20.531***
(2.193) (2.682) (3.351) (1.887) (1.250) (3.042)
individual firm 27.224*** 30.885*** 21.347*** 36.689*** 41.246*** 28.974***
(1.302) (1.642) (2.259) (1.099) (0.861) (1.809)
self-employed 34.941*** 33.288*** 36.786*** 41.579*** 41.170*** 41.686***
(1.436) (1.910) (2.140) (1.155) (0.959) (1.774)
household income 45.537*** 39.412** 36.719** 51.758*** 61.578*** 30.228***
(11.813) (19.132) (14.769) (7.916) (10.162) (8.553)
education −0.840*** −0.468 −1.046*** 0.046 0.082 0.126
(0.202) (0.308) (0.262) (0.130) (0.198) (0.160)
age −2.772** −0.337 −5.024*** −2.004*** −1.900* −2.163***
(1.079) (1.697) (1.290) (0.682) (1.154) (0.795)
financial asset −2.441 1.104 −34.747 3.942 4.558 −13.740
(7.322) (6.815) (29.714) (4.586) (4.576) (20.403)
financial liability −0.044 34.192* −7.505 0.529 22.898 −5.479
(6.750) (20.718) (5.866) (5.716) (14.051) (5.522)
Observations 11444 5400 6044 11444 5400 6044
χ2 2903.749 1551.045 1130.035 4911.589 6543.491 1498.620
Table 4.12: The effect of NRSPI program on labor supply. We fit model (4.1) to all
the observations in both the rural and urban side with age above 45. In columns (1),
(2), and (3), the dependent variable is the total working hours per week; in columns
(4), (5), and (6), it is the weekly non-agricultural working hours. Columns (1) and (4)
use all observations, columns (2) and (5) use only the male observations, and columns
(3) and (6) use only the female observations. The constant terms and coefficients on
the districts and wave dummies, the number of sons and daughters, and whether
individuals need to take care of grandchildren or parents are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hours agri. work hours agri. work for own household
All Male Female All Male Female
pension −20.479*** −12.598 −17.053** −20.634*** −14.064 −17.829**
(6.172) (10.274) (7.356) (6.137) (9.743) (7.144)
benefits 12.661** −2.492 11.141** 14.086** 2.930 11.458**
(5.736) (11.180) (5.493) (5.927) (10.946) (5.477)
self-reported health 5.464*** 7.291*** 3.733*** 5.121*** 7.023*** 3.336***
(0.625) (0.882) (0.830) (0.618) (0.874) (0.819)
urban −8.165*** −7.269*** −8.225*** −8.326*** −7.354*** −8.491***
(0.788) (1.303) (0.972) (0.774) (1.292) (0.894)
male 3.851*** 3.699***
(0.492) (0.484)
no. never married sons 1.726*** 1.877*** 1.402* 1.701*** 1.987*** 1.272*
(0.507) (0.725) (0.716) (0.496) (0.710) (0.693)
married 4.642*** 7.843*** 2.681*** 4.408*** 7.210*** 2.634***
(0.722) (1.228) (0.892) (0.715) (1.206) (0.890)
agri-hukou 1.898* 2.174 2.097 1.439 1.516 1.797
(1.064) (1.842) (1.404) (1.060) (1.833) (1.397)
no. never married daughters −0.244 −0.300 −0.232 −0.005 −0.089 0.101
(0.652) (0.904) (0.971) (0.647) (0.875) (0.963)
farming 12.590*** 13.712*** 11.615*** 11.834*** 12.868*** 10.962***
(0.542) (1.068) (0.842) (0.531) (1.033) (0.814)
government −7.442*** −7.591*** −7.009*** −7.045*** −7.160*** −6.496***
(1.255) (2.015) (1.846) (1.277) (1.954) (1.828)
firm −9.292*** −10.601*** −7.183*** −8.956*** −10.114*** −6.953***
(0.898) (1.351) (1.461) (0.879) (1.298) (1.424)
individual firm −9.016*** −10.541*** −7.051*** −8.735*** −10.165*** −6.791***
(0.651) (0.936) (1.135) (0.611) (0.896) (1.042)
self-employed −6.282*** −8.255*** −4.423*** −5.678*** −7.471*** −3.918***
(0.743) (1.033) (1.040) (0.718) (0.994) (1.022)
household income −4.384 −24.503** 10.897 −7.976 −24.671** 4.800
(8.752) (10.993) (11.594) (7.617) (10.560) (9.660)
education −0.898*** −0.545*** −1.195*** −0.855*** −0.506** −1.132***
(0.149) (0.200) (0.200) (0.147) (0.198) (0.195)
age −0.942 1.832 −2.955*** −0.868 1.544 −2.590***
(0.806) (1.204) (1.019) (0.788) (1.176) (0.992)
financial asset −6.362 −3.232 −24.188 −8.157 −5.072 −32.504*
(4.389) (4.736) (18.329) (4.968) (4.649) (17.853)
financial liability −0.119 8.695 −2.176 0.118 9.195 −1.957
(3.893) (15.210) (3.141) (3.795) (14.607) (2.969)
Observations 11444 5400 6044 11444 5400 6044
χ2 2744.097 1086.610 1308.488 2555.734 1026.827 1278.832
Table 4.13: The effect of NRSPI program on labor supply of agricultural work. We fit
model (4.1) to all the observations in both the rural and urban side with age above 45.
In columns (1), (2), and (3), the dependent variable is the agricultural working hours
per week; in columns (4), (5), and (6), it is the weekly agricultural working hours
on their own household field. Columns (1) and (4) use all observations, columns
(2) and (5) use only the male observations, and columns (3) and (6) use only the
female observations. The constant terms and coefficients on the districts and wave
dummies, the number of sons and daughters, and whether individuals need to take
care of grandchildren or parents are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Female Male
LP Probit LP Probit LP Probit
pension enrollment(%) 0.112*** 0.777** 0.145** 0.795* 0.038 0.575
(0.041) (0.321) (0.057) (0.415) (0.055) (0.455)
self-reported health −0.216*** −0.320*** −0.173*** −0.258*** −0.233*** −0.368***
(0.015) (0.049) (0.020) (0.060) (0.022) (0.069)
married −0.131*** −0.816*** −0.112*** −0.625*** −0.130*** −0.855***
(0.016) (0.133) (0.021) (0.160) (0.024) (0.183)
agriculture-hukou(%) −0.124*** −0.870*** −0.146** −0.974** −0.096 −0.683
(0.045) (0.323) (0.057) (0.450) (0.066) (0.425)
no. never married sons −0.028*** −0.161** −0.037*** −0.205** −0.013 −0.042
(0.008) (0.073) (0.011) (0.097) (0.011) (0.104)
no. never married daughters 0.013 0.180* 0.022 0.210* 0.004 0.113
(0.011) (0.099) (0.017) (0.127) (0.013) (0.152)
no. sons 0.013** 0.102*** 0.019*** 0.141*** 0.003 −0.003
(0.005) (0.036) (0.007) (0.052) (0.007) (0.049)
no. daughter 0.002 0.030 0.000 0.033 0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.031) (0.006) (0.041) (0.006) (0.044)
farming(%) −0.062*** −0.762*** −0.091*** −0.791*** −0.030 −0.592***
(0.018) (0.156) (0.031) (0.222) (0.021) (0.192)
government(%) 0.116*** 0.686*** 0.193** 1.078*** 0.089** 0.562*
(0.039) (0.248) (0.078) (0.406) (0.041) (0.306)
firm(%) 0.135*** 0.865*** 0.113** 0.654** 0.164*** 1.175***
(0.025) (0.181) (0.044) (0.285) (0.030) (0.234)
other employed(%) 0.060*** 0.253** 0.088*** 0.517*** 0.060*** 0.294*
(0.013) (0.115) (0.025) (0.186) (0.014) (0.152)
self-employed(%) −0.055*** −1.332*** −0.103*** −1.383*** −0.011 −0.981***
(0.013) (0.210) (0.022) (0.292) (0.015) (0.250)
household income(CNY/year) −0.039 −2.648** −0.178 −2.670 0.120 −1.772
(0.138) (1.287) (0.224) (1.768) (0.166) (1.793)
education −0.001 −0.083*** 0.009** 0.030 0.005 −0.017
(0.003) (0.024) (0.004) (0.032) (0.004) (0.033)
age(year) 0.098*** 0.819*** 0.123*** 0.874*** 0.095*** 0.973***
(0.007) (0.099) (0.010) (0.140) (0.009) (0.144)
financial asset(CNY) 0.415** 1.165 0.416 −0.395 0.412* 2.247*
(0.191) (1.252) (0.293) (2.871) (0.242) (1.343)
financial liability(CNY) 0.047 0.574 0.124 1.169 −0.156 −4.881
(0.136) (1.016) (0.110) (1.353) (0.170) (4.288)
care child(%) −0.019** −0.013 −0.004 0.094 −0.033*** −0.122
(0.009) (0.072) (0.013) (0.096) (0.012) (0.109)
careparent(%) 0.000 −0.179 −0.004 −0.265 −0.006 −0.139
(0.013) (0.143) (0.019) (0.180) (0.017) (0.232)
Observations 11300 11300 5884 5884 5416 5416
χ2 1238.746 786.355 529.198
Table 4.14: The estimation results of the Probit model. In all columns, the dependent
variable is the retirement status; Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the linear proba-
bility model estimation results and columns (2), (4), and (6) report the Probit model
estimation results. Rural individuals younger than 60 are used in the estimation in
columns (1) and (2). Columns (3) and (4) only use the female subsample and columns
(5) and (6) only use the male subsample. The constant terms and coefficients on the
districts and wave dummies are omitted from the report.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
retirement status weekly working hours
bandwidth Female Male Female Male
3 years −0.327 0.137 15.734 3.056
(0.358) (0.488) (20.590) (20.257)
5 years 0.027 −0.106 −18.067** 8.006
(0.151) (0.171) (8.914) (11.477)
8 years 0.089 0.024 −0.113 −1.434
(0.090) (0.111) (5.742) (8.521)
10 years 0.149* −0.046 −1.976 2.346
(0.076) (0.087) (4.788) (7.039)
15 years 0.036 0.033 2.261 0.770
(0.060) (0.062) (3.815) (5.238)
20 years −0.015 −0.004 4.201 1.934
(0.055) (0.055) (3.385) (4.398)
Table 4.15: The effect of receiving pension benefits on the retirement status and
weekly working hours for females and males using regression discontinuity design.
The bandwidth of the sample varies from 3 years to 20 years with the cut-off age
equal to 60 years old. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the retirement
status; in columns (3) and (4), it is the weekly working hours. The other coefficients
are omitted from this report.
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pension enrollment pension income self-reported health
RE panel Pooled OLS RE panel Pooled OLS RE panel Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
duration 0.085*** 0.087*** 2.630*** 3.058*** 0.010 0.012*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.351) (0.347) (0.007) (0.007)
federal revenue −0.028*** −0.026*** 2.425*** 2.380*** −0.010 −0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.502) (0.455) (0.010) (0.009)
physical −0.003** −0.003** −0.239* −0.291** −0.079*** −0.085***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.122) (0.119) (0.002) (0.002)
pain −0.008 −0.007 0.695 0.921 −0.247*** −0.277***
(0.011) (0.011) (1.055) (1.067) (0.021) (0.021)
dyslipidemia −0.067** −0.069** 7.301** 8.608** −0.081 −0.071
(0.034) (0.034) (3.323) (3.438) (0.066) (0.068)
diabetes 0.096** 0.097** 1.854 1.833 −0.330*** −0.366***
(0.042) (0.042) (4.081) (4.206) (0.081) (0.083)
cancer −0.093 −0.098 5.746 6.181 −0.718*** −0.816***
(0.096) (0.096) (9.373) (9.574) (0.186) (0.190)
heart 0.083** 0.080** 2.613 2.295 −0.259*** −0.285***
(0.032) (0.032) (3.166) (3.243) (0.063) (0.064)
stroke 0.102 0.100 8.666 9.137 −0.274** −0.298**
(0.065) (0.065) (6.358) (6.465) (0.126) (0.128)
agriculture-hukou(%) 0.148*** 0.148*** 4.521 4.583 −0.038 −0.034
(0.038) (0.037) (4.107) (3.656) (0.082) (0.073)
male(%) −0.010 −0.010 −1.313 −1.407 0.001 −0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.980) (0.876) (0.020) (0.017)
no. never married sons −0.012 −0.013 −3.638*** −2.920*** −0.039** −0.045***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.901) (0.889) (0.018) (0.018)
no. never married daughters −0.005 −0.003 −3.926*** −3.528*** −0.035 −0.048**
(0.012) (0.012) (1.220) (1.211) (0.024) (0.024)
farming(%) 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.360 0.132 −0.026 −0.035
(0.017) (0.016) (1.666) (1.628) (0.033) (0.032)
government(%) 0.006 0.006 1.013 1.472 0.002 −0.020
(0.034) (0.033) (3.480) (3.343) (0.069) (0.066)
firm(%) 0.008 0.006 0.206 0.081 0.054 0.038
(0.023) (0.023) (2.305) (2.281) (0.046) (0.045)
other employed(%) −0.001 −0.001 1.431 1.214 0.080*** 0.080***
(0.014) (0.014) (1.430) (1.411) (0.028) (0.028)
self-employed(%) −0.019 −0.018 1.915 2.183 0.152*** 0.161***
(0.016) (0.016) (1.610) (1.597) (0.032) (0.032)
household income(CNY/year) 0.153 0.169 −24.688 −23.799 0.768** 0.892***
(0.158) (0.158) (15.561) (15.778) (0.308) (0.313)
education −0.000 −0.000 0.137 0.115 0.010 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.298) (0.266) (0.006) (0.005)
age(year) −0.001 −0.001 13.182*** 13.431*** 0.023* 0.029**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.650) (0.594) (0.013) (0.012)
financial asset(CNY) −0.438** −0.455*** 24.886 25.362 1.689*** 1.829***
(0.172) (0.171) (17.173) (17.072) (0.340) (0.339)
financial liability(CNY) 0.127 0.128 −7.384 0.065 −0.098 −0.168
(0.156) (0.156) (15.196) (15.562) (0.301) (0.309)
Observations 11300 11300 11300 11300 11300 11300
Wald chi2 5301.181 1770.042 2069.700
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4.16: The results of the weak instrument test. In columns (1) and (2), (3) and
(4), (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the pension enrollment status, the pension
benefits, and the self-reported health, respectively. The rural samples are used in the
estimation. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the RE estimation results and columns
(2), (4), and (6) show the pooled OLS estimation results. The constant terms and
coefficients on the districts and wave dummies, the number of sons and daughters,
and whether individuals need to take care of grandchildren or parents are omitted
from the report.
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